Panajotis Kondylis

Machiavelli

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With a preface by
Günter Maschke

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NIKOAO MAKIABEAAI - EPf A - TOMO TIPQTO
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A problem that can never be solved

Preface by GÜNTER MASCHKE

I

To be ambiguous and inexhaustible is the characteristic of the classics, and those who insist on differences even from them may give Machiavelli the highest rank: *Tanto nomini nullum par elogium.* The Florentine, who was born with his eyes open on May 3, 1469, was certainly one thing: a decisionist. But when they were closed to him on June 22, 1527, immediately began a never-ending conversation, which to this day is often conducted with anger, but always with zeal. Even the numerous, sometimes imposing attempts to objectify the interpretation of Machia velli and to view his work in a value-neutral way, "within the framework of specialized scientific paradigms", have not led to "a unified interpretation", so that "the research question of Machia velli's work has not yet been answered.
'Machiavelli' continues to remain open." [2]

It is certain that this will not change, except for minor biographical verifications, dating, snippets of influence and related accessories. Perhaps, however, the research question remains open only because it is not noticed that it does not arise seriously at all. After all, for almost half a millennium, the same questions have been raised and the same answers given, the same hypotheses launched, which receive the same rejections, which are quickly ennobled as refutations that have long since been given, - and all these questions, answers, hypotheses, rejections and refutations, related to the respective current conflicts and wrapped in the garments of the respective latest fashions and methods, present themselves again shortly thereafter: Many people like to tell us once again what was already proclaimed a long time ago. Those who patiently reconnoiter Machiavelli's literature up to about 1850 will find in it *all the* elements of today's debates, which owe their radiance to forgetting, that is, to the great power that also rules the sciences.

Was Machiavelli a counselor, even a panegyrist of despotism, or did he fight for freedom, a sublimely vague word that always means something different and that always evokes the same emotional reflexes? Was he writing a satire on the moralizing mirrors of princes or was he formulating a warning against ty rannei? Did he create a work of art or did he establish the science of politics? Was he merely the teacher of a political technique, so that each party can take care of itself from "his little bag of tricks "[3] or did this technique serve him, who was one of the first in Europe to separate politics from morality, only as a means to higher ends, which, of course, almost every actor claims to serve? Was Machiavelli a Machiavellian4 or were these not rather his enemies, the declared anti-Machiavellians, be they Jesuits, Huguenots, monarchomachs, liberals, democrats or the divergent, suspicious lovers of humanity, who accused and convicted each other of Machiavellianism with verve?[5] Was he a moral monster, a godless despiser of religion, even a harbinger of the Antichrist, whose book had been written by an enemy of the human race and by the finger of [Satan6] or only the critic of a corrupt church and of a misinterpretation of the Gospel that promoted political and social decadence, who in the end remained influenced by Christianity?[7] [Did] he consider people to be incurably evil - by which he actually only meant that they were dangerous - or did he hope that they would improve under certain circumstances and learn from history, that they could hold their own against a hostile fortuna by means of virtu? Did he represent a pessimistic or an optimistic anthropology?[8] Or did he at least assume that people would not improve, but would be able to improve? Was he a republican or a monarchist of reason, or did he consider this only a matter of circumstances? Is there not an irreconcilable contradiction between his main works, the 'Principe' and the 'Discorsi', or do we simply encounter two questions to be distinguished: how to found the new state, how to maintain the established state?[9] But are these writings his main works, are they not rather the 'Arte della guerra' and the 'Istorie Fiorentine'? Was he a fragmentarist or did he at least outline a system? When he compared constellations of his present with those of antiquity, was he one of the first to engage in comparative studies or or did he merely gather a few fruits of reading in order to extract dogmatic axioms from them, far removed from any serious engagement with history?[10]

Does his thinking belong to the methodological science that emerged during his time or does it remain a mere mixture of empirical-pre-scientific rules of wisdom, sarcastic observations, captivating aperçus? In order to do justice to the much-maligned, must one understand his work entirely from the historical situation in which it arose (in which case, of course, one limits its meaning) 11 or does it possess a general, enduring validity, because here a regularity has been found, the regolarita degli egoismi concorrenti, the regularity of competing egoisms, which is indeed a fundamental factor of all politics, but which, like everything general, only appears in a particular and in a concrete situation, and then achieves a visibility that can no longer be denied? but then attains and retains an undeniable visibility? 12 Was Machiavelli a realist, completely devoted to the verita effettuale he celebrated, or is his 'Principe' the aesthetic construction of an artist? of an artist 13, indeed, only the wishful image of a nostalgic who dreaming of the return of heroic times? 14 Was his interest politics or an arte dello Stato or arte dello Stato that should be carefully distinguished from it? dello Stato or arte dello Governo?[15]

Such questions, which are often interconnected in literature, here poured out before the reader at random instead of carefully ordered, can be multiplied almost ad libitum. The respective answers, with whatever scientific pomp they may stride along, are often only due to the spirit of the times, the ideological camp of the answerer or the irremediable fluctuations to which observers of fluid facts usually fall prey. And indeed, not only are there countless different interpretations, but that the Florentine has been seen differently by many observers throughout different assessments of the Florentine in the course of their lives. Whoever looks long enough into the darkness you will always find something in it, but it is possible that what you see, with its with its opposite is really inside; moreover, suggestive sketches are more stimulating than full sketches are more stimulating than finished paintings. With Claude Lefort, one may say that with Machiavelli the work "works itself".[16] and becomes a quarry for the most diverse, often mutually antagonistic forces, usable in the most diverse epochs. To this that the core of his teachings is a 'riddle' or an 'arcanum', a 'secret' or a 'mystery'. Arcanum', a 'secret' or a 'mystery'. These are words that touch each other, but they by no means have the same meaning.

That is why Benedetto Croce's sigh, expelled in 1949, three years before his death, after a lifelong preoccupation with Machiavelli, should find our understanding:

„Probabilmente la questione de! Machiavelli restera una di quelle ehe non si chiuderanno mai e non passeranno agli archivii" - "Probably the Machiavelli problem will remain one of the problems that can never be solved and that do not end in the archives."[17] Ernst Cassirer, in a more reserved mood, concluded in 1944 in his last work, published only posthumously, that "even now, after the book of the 'Principe' has been approached from the most diverse angles, after it has been discussed by philosophers, historians, politicians, and sociologists, ... this mystery (has) not been completely revealed. From one century to another, almost from one generation to another, we find not only a change but a complete reversal in the judgments about the "Principe". The same is true of the author.... ".[18] Finally, Raymond Aron, the 'thinking machine' (his nickname during his student days in Cologne), who worked as restlessly as he did without interference, stated in 1969: "Whoever puts the name Machiavelli on the head of a blank sheet of paper cannot help feeling a certain anxiety; After hundreds of others, writers and rulers, historians and philosophers, politicians and strategists, moralists and theologians, he too tries to interrogate the Sphinx, the diplomat in the service of Florence, the Italian patriot, the author whose prose is clear and transparent in every sentence and ambiguous on the whole, who conceals his intentions and whose ceaseless illuminations have challenged the acumen of interpreters for four centuries; he too makes a choice in which he cannot fail to notice that so many others have made it before him, yet any interpretation he undertakes, of whatever kind, will not be his own."[19] Even Robert von Mohl, who was more positive about the chances that intellectual work would lead to certain results, declared already in 1858 that it was "hardly conceivable that anything new can be found" and that nevertheless "it attracts almost innumerable people with a kind of magical force to find out how Machiavelli thought in his innermost being, what he wanted, and how he accomplished this. One would like to call it a political squaring of the circle, the discovery of a perpetual motion machine. In the entire history of the development of the human mind, it would be hard to find a second man whose life fate is so undoubted, who has spoken so unambiguously for himself, who has written so much, and about whom the opinions differ so widely.

II

Four great old men - von Mohl, Cassirer, Croce, Aron - who, towards the end of their lives, are to some extent resigned to their uncertainty, without therefore being hindered in their duty to sharply formulate the view that seems to them to be correct. In Kondylis, too, we find the sharp expression, but not the uncertainty. To a lesser extent, this is due to the fact that Kondylis, when he wrote the text before us, was only 28 years old. But here no Bei near-yet-youthful, strengthened by lack of knowledge, rushes on long since conquered, yes, already measured stars and presumes to discover them, - the knowledge of the young Greek scholar was already then stupendous and was enough for several worthy Emeriti. The German, who can read this text here for the first time in his own language, must not forget that in 1971 it served as the somewhat lavishly guessed introduction to the first Greek Machiavelli edition. Kondylis wanted his compatriots to become acquainted with an author who was still almost unknown to them and not to bother them in advance with the doubts and misgivings with which he was also familiar. In this wretched birthplace of philosophy, there is not even a systematic, explanatory-critical edition of one or the other great thinker; this is well known and rich in testimony, "[21] he remarked at the time.

Like most who love their homeland, Kondylis suffered from its
In this case, it is the intellectual anemia, the ignorance and the inertia of the brains in a country that, despite its terrible political experiences in the 19th and 20th centuries, has hardly made an effort to understand them. The suffering pa triot likes to become a propagandist of Machiavelli, which is not only true for Hegel and Alfieri. But Kondylis spurned what so many before him did: Applying Machiavelli, turning his work into a recipe book, and using diagnoses to generate flywheel ideas. If one disregards a few undertones and interjections, about the direction of which German readers can only speculate, the "descriptive decisionism" that characterizes the mature Kondylis is already to be found in this early work. Here, Kondylis views Ma chiavelli, whom he, like Karl Marx or Carl Schmitt, must classify as a "militant dezi sionist," "with the clinically cold light of dissection, which alone wants to expose the structure of effects of social, intellectual, historical, and political constellations,

As our author never tired of emphasizing, this value-free 'descriptive decisionism' does not make any claims to power, "it also has nothing to propose to people for shaping their lives, "[23] and thus also no political formula and no ideological concept. Kondylis is still somewhat distant from such an ascetic attitude, which will prevail in his later work, especially in his most successful work 'Power and Decision', but his path to it is already clear. It is the colloquial stoic 'neither laugh nor cry - understand', reminiscent of the attitude of Vilfredo Pareto, the great successor of Machiavelli, who surpassed the Florentine in astuteness, erudition and intellectual cold-bloodedness, who only observed the gears of mankind and neither wanted to be involved in it nor to influence it. It may well be that Kondylis wanted to have an influence, but he left it up to the reader to draw conclusions from his cool and factual descriptions and could only warn him against being overwhelmed by feelings through the detachment and discipline of his discussions.

Like Machiavelli, Kondylis also set out in search of the verita effettuale, but he did not want to find it in order to gain influence on reality, but to observe it disinterestedly. This attitude, "bordering on hubris, of an observer who is almost planetarily distanced from the hustle and bustle of the earth," which is fully developed in his later work, may be called a "verita effettuale",[24] as a rare and strange escape from - decision; for the writer, it is extremely exhausting and for the reader, it compels extraordinary desinvolture. In contrast, 'militant decisionism', including that of Machiavelli, is able to inspire and spur to action, but above all it is capable of meaning and romanticisation, even for those who dwell at its coldest point. The 'descriptive decisionist', on the other hand, brings no gifts of the kind expected, if not demanded, by the steadfast. One usually only exposes oneself to disturbing truths in order to be rewarded with strengthening illusions.

Kondylis' hands, however, were empty, he did not arouse that inquisitive disgust that militant decisionists can delight in, but a very but a very peculiar aggressiveness composed of interest and disinterest. aggressiveness. Even his great books on philosophy and history of ideas already aroused the suspicions of the more clear-sighted If these investigations, whose forcefulness even exceeded their scope, could not be reduced to the fact that 'spirit',

'discourse', 'ethos' and the like were only weapons for self-preservation and for increasing power, that the 'world views' and 'values' can only be explained if one works out their life-supporting functions, indeed, that all the great creations of human thought serve only a never-ending power struggle, both refined and intensified by means of ever new derivations and ever more far-reaching legalisations, that, to speak vulgarly and in the words of Scharnhorst, in the final analysis "everything is only catfighting", bloody or bloodless, carried out by force or by cunning, brutal or gentle - and that this is the 'sense' of the 'world' and 'values'. and that this was the 'meaning' of it all? When Kondylis's programmatic work "Power and Decision" finally appeared in 1985, it became obvious even to the more ponderous: he "brings us nothing," he "does not say what we can hold on to," his writings are "bleak. In everyday language, this is what the current and also majority opinions read, while people spoke in a more upbeat way of "enlightened nihilism" and of the "wasteland of ideological unmaskings. If Kondylis had allowed himself the occasional sarcasm, had occasionally louged against political correctness, had lashed out at radical hypermoralists to the secret delight of moderate hypermoralists, he would have been forgiven in Germany (partly because he was not German), albeit with a reproving forefinger. But here was a complex work of several thousand pages in which the disenchantment of all conceivable 'world views' and 'values' was taken too far. An author takes on the Occident and leaves no stone unturned," sneered one critic[25] who had not yet noticed that the Occident had perished on August 3, 1914. The uniform density of Kondylis' prose, which neither has resting points nor grants tempo changes, which is not dramatized by any crescendi and would thus be consumable, the hardly changing proximity of all sentences to the center of a grinding mill, - from such a prose numerous readers, who claimed room for objections and demanded consideration for their vanity, turned away. The vice is not a familiar home, and if important authors ever succeed, it is not because of the quality of their thoughts, but because of the active ingredients and attractants attached to them. However, the aforementioned attitude of the "almost planetary distanced observer" is matched by such unadornedness. Both, however, the unadornedness and the attitude, had their source in a quality hardly comparable to other thinkers.

The first step is the development of a new, unprecedented, and consistent value freedom, i.e., also in an extraordinary intellectual honesty.

III

This honesty includes that Kondylis pays almost no attention to the curses as well as the hymns to Machiavelli and not only expressis verbis criticizes that "the legend of Machiavelli has replaced the knowledge of Machiavelli". That Kondylis does not want to dwell on the foam of thought honors him, but at least the ser rises from the material and would be worth some attention. Why then did Machiavelli's work create and still creates legends? The legends, 'what is to be read', are after all (often all too deeply) sunk cultural goods, are the end products of the efforts of great interpreters, and whoever examines the interpretations of 10, 15 or more authors who have seriously dealt with Machiavelli in the last centuries, will come across the intellectually stimulating preforms of the legends that once or still circulate today. In this context, one may also question Kondylis' thesis that the anti-Machiavellists did not really know their enemy and that their opinions, due to the different content, "have nothing to do with Machiavelli's person and work", p. 78.

But to a work belongs also what it evokes and it does not tolerate any doubt that, to mention only a few names, for Innocent Gentillet, Giovanni Botero, Pedro Rivadeneyra, Jean Bodin, Justus Lipsius, Baltasar Gracian or for a Tacitist like Diego Saavedra Fajardo the writings of the Florentine were anything but a rumor. A conviction common to these men, some of them stars of the first magnitude, was that a *stato* whose chiefs proceeded only by means of violence, amoral trickery, and cynical cunning was doomed to ruin. But so would have said Machiavelli, the panegyrist of *virtu,* who occasionally vigorously stressed the value of morality but ultimately regarded it only as a function. The simulations and dissimulations that critics considered morally acceptable can even be seen as systematizing refinements of Machiavelli's thought, which only through them was raised to the level of raison d'état. To a large extent, the polemics of the anti-Machiavellists, if one leaves aside the clumsier and therefore more successful productions, which also included Frederick II's treatise and the countless, intentionally or unintentionally hypocritical moral trumpets, were the development and advancement of Machiavelli's thoughts -

apparently overpainting, but actually radiography or even overpainting as radiography. The Florentine was able to be established because he had been made unrecognisable, sometimes through denigration, sometimes through rampant interpretation.

To be sure, it cannot be denied that this enterprise was accompanied by considerable aversions, whether because of the "tactical use of religion as a means of state preservation" suggested by Machiavelli (Stolleis), or because predictability and trust were threatened by the separation of morality and politics, or because the absolutism implicitly demanded by Machiavelli destroyed the freedoms of the estates.[26] But such aversio ns served not only authors such as Bodin (1530-1596), Lipsius (1547-1606), Saavedra Fajardo (1584-1648), or Baltasar Gracian (1601-1658) as a façade, hung with or without the adornment of Tacitus, behind which/ behind which Machiavelli prevailed. The anti-Machiavellis mus was to a great extent the triumph of Machiavelli, - an aspect that is always neglected compared to a more obvious one, which admittedly also belongs to the effects of the work and thus to the work itself and which Carl Schmitt outlined: "That a political thinker is drawn into the enmity of the fighting fronts is given by the very concept of the political. This danger is not eliminated or mitigated by correct thinking, but rather increased and intensified. [27]

IV

The basis for correct political thinking can, according to a widely held consensus, only be political *science*; Machiavelli is said to have founded it for the Modem. Kondylis, however, thinks that Machiavelli's disentanglement of politics and morality only created the possibility to treat political phenomena "with elemen tary scientific presuppositions" (p. 14). As a scientist, Machiavelli is said to have stopped halfway because he equated his theory of action with historical and political ontology and did not arrive at the creation of a coherent theoretical system and often contradicted ideas

formulated (p. 58). But what is "political ontology"? It is probably to be found in the nebulous realms of political philosophy, on terrain whose veins of rock hold little treasure and much ideology, and which is to be explored with great curiosity but also with considerable suspicion. But just when one suspects that a doctrine of action is sufficient to bring political science into being, Machiavelli can only be considered its founder to a limited extent. It is true that many political thinkers before and after him wanted to subordinate politics to morality, for example, they described the so arbitraire bonum commune as the goal of all politics, claimed that politics had a finality, assumed that society was based on objective truths common to all people, and even on eternal and natural laws, In the end, they even postulated that science is "the knowledge of the order of being and its origin in the being beyond" (Voegelin) and thus did not arouse amazement but reaped admiration. But many of these authors, who belong more to the history of ideologies than to that of political science, contributed to the latter whenever they ignored their beliefs and, proceeding strictly phenomenolo gically, investigated concrete political problems. The rank of a political scientist, who may of course be a lawyer, economist, philosopher, diplomat, soldier, historian, etc., is measured by the extent to which he is capable of such analyses and by the place they occupy in his writings - seen in *this light,* Thucydides and Tacitus, for example, are more important than Plato and even Aristotle.

Machiavelli's greatness, however, does not lie in his intellectual capacity, however great it may be, not in his erudition, which is far from that of Aristotle, Hobbes or Pareto, not in an effort to systematize, we only come across a kind of framework, formed by a sketch of the cyclicity of events and by the insufficiently illuminated quadrilateral fortuna-occasione-nesessita-virtu. Machiavelli's greatness lies in the fact that he blurted out with childlike impartiality what very many suspected and many knew: The emperor has no clothes on! This modest, unpathetic, with "human naturalness" (Carl Schmitt)[28] coming along, sometimes also shrugging off ingenuity, combined with completely factual, based on common sense and historical tact, references to the importance of violence, cunning, simulation and the necessity of appearance, made the Florentine

a monster, for the more cold-blooded still to a problem case. Thanks to his not to be overlooked naiveté, which probably only through the involuntary retiro of San Andrea di Percussina near San Casciano freed itself from the fetters offered by the profession, Ma chiavelli became the shatterer of venerable and life-giving deri vations. Politics behaves differently from the sphinx in the fable: whoever solves its riddles, even if to a good extent out of innocence, it devours; in Machiavelli's case, it was content with a defamation that was of such solid permanence because it remained close to the truth. Through Machiavelli's writings, despite some considerable misconceptions,29 the way was cleared for a purely phenomenological contemplation of politics and the political, and thus for political realism, which before him, as after him, dared to express itself mostly only in a hidden way. The brave "Recognize the situation!" admittedly has little chance of becoming as popular as the norma tivist and scientistic veil dances or the variants of contemporary political science adorned with the tinsel gold of humanitarian declarations, whose not unimportant function is to prevent the recognition of the situation. On this trajectory, Machiavelli has been followed since 1527, take it all in all, by few; one of them was Panajotis Kondylis. He, the later master, whose meaning is yet to be understood, delivered his impressive journeyman piece with his "Niccolo Machiavelli" of 1971.

Notes

[1] Giuseppe Prezzolini, Vita di Niccolo Machiavelli fiorentino, Milano 1927, opens his (rather 'novelistic') book with the sentences: "Niccolo Machiavelli was born with his eyes open. In his time, children born with open eyes were still a rarity. Today, this has become fashionable and does not cause so much sensation. However, at that time all the gossips around the Holy Trinity Church were talking about it".

[2] Volker Dreier, Die Architektur politischen Handelns - Machiavelli's *II Principe* im Kontext der modernen Wissenschaftstheorie, Freiburg/ München 2005, pp. 38, 40.

[3] Thus Conor Cruise O'Brien, The Suspecting Glance, London 1972, p. 31.

[4] See Herfried Münkler, Was Machiavelli a Machiavellian?, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 1983, pp. 329-340. Münkler emphasizes that Machiavelli rejected a principled immoralism: „... he would have consistently

that cruelty and deceit are in principle more politically efficient than leniency and fairness". Certainly, - but indifference to the means and methods to be used, judged only by their prospects of success, outrages many more than a fundamental plea for cruelty and deceit.

5 On the centuries-long dispute over Machiavelli and on Machiavel lism/anti-Machiavellism, among others: Charles Benoist, Le Machiavelisme, 3 vols, Paris 1907/1934/1936; Antonio Panella, Gli Antimachiavellici, Firenze 1943; Jose Antonio Maravall, Teorfa de! Estado en Espaiia en el siglo **XVII** (first 1944), Madrid 1997, esp. pp. 361-408; Giuseppe Prezzolini, Machiavelli Anticristo, Roma 1954, esp. pp. 325-370, 428- 449; Giuliano Procacci, Studi sulla fortuna de! Machiavelli, Roma 1965 (now expanded and reworked under the title Machiavelli nella cultura euro pea dell'eta moderna, Roma-Bari 1995); Machiavellismo e Anti machiavellismo en el Cinquecento (Congress in Perugia 1969), Firenze 1970; Rodolfo de Mattei, Da! premachaivellismo all' antimachiavellismo, Firenze 1970; August Buck, Machiavelli, Darmstadt 1985, esp. pp.129-. 155; Robert Bireley, Anti-Machiavellianism or Catholic Statecraft in Early Modem Europe, Chapel Hill 1990.

6 Machiavelli's earliest and probably still harshest critic, the English Cardinal Reginald Pole (1500-1558), an opponent of Henry VIII's Reli gion policy. In his Apologia ad Carolum V Caesarum, written around 1539, Pole declared that the 'Principe' was written by an enemy of the human race ("scriptum ab hoste humani generis") or with the finger of Satan ("Satanae digito scriptum"); cf. the reprint of Pole's chapter on Machiavelli in: Hein rich Lutz, Ragione di Stato und christliche Staatsethik im 16.Jahrhundert, Münster 1976 (first 1961), pp. 48-62, 55.

7 Leonhard von Muralt, Machiavellis Staatsgedanke, Basel 1945: „... we believe ... that for Machiavelli there were ultimate ethical values founded in religious ideas, which are not only justified by the fact that they can certainly also be useful to the state, but which have their basis in themselves or in heaven" (82). (82). v. Muralt bases this on a passage in the Discorsi, 1, 12: "If religion had been preserved by the heads of Christendom („republica cristiana") as its founder ordered it („ordinato"), the Christian states and republics would be more united and much happier than they are now." This is only a suggestive phrase of very little, simulatori
value'. Luigi Russo, Machiavelli, Bari 1949, even declares: ".... il Machiavelli e uomo religioso, e di una religiosita tipicamente [!] cri
stiana" (p. 222). But for Machiavelli, religion is *instru mentum regni on the* one hand, and on the other, since it promotes good morals, it has a positive effect on the firmness of the state order. Beyond all his criticism of the papacy and the corrupt clergy of the time, Machiavelli here evaluates Christianity very negatively.

[8] Although Machiavelli considered human nature dominated by 'ambizione' to be thoroughly depraved, he emphasized the value of history "as a teaching tool for present action" (Troeltsch). This is not possible without a portion of 'optimism'.

[9] The majority of today's Machiavelli interpreters consider this contradiction, which still occupied Leo Strauss strongly (in: Thoughts on Machiavelli, University of Chicago Press 1958, pp. 15-53, „The Twofold Character of Machiavelli's Teaching") as outdated, settled, etc. - let us wait for some future publications!

[10] A sharp critique of Machiavelli's often ignorant and sloppy treatment of antiquity is provided by Friedrich Mehmel: Machiavelli und die Antike, Antike und Abendland, III, 1948, pp. 152-186.

[11] This is strongly advocated by: **J.H.** Whitfield, Machiavelli, Oxford 1947, but already Hegel and Ranke and, in his later statements, Herder.

[12] Gianfranco Miglio, in his preface to Carl Schmitt, Le catego rie de! politico', Bologna 1972, pp. 7-14, points out such regularities which, as great partial truths, could be fused into a theory of politics: the regularity of the external search for domination in Thucydides, that of the presence of a political leader in every political system in Bodin, that of the fictitious character of every community in Hobbes, that of the political class in Mosca and Pa reto, that of the opposition friend/enemy in Schmitt, etc.

[13] Thus, often criticized, Rene König, Machiavelli - Zur Krisenanalyse einer Zeitenwende, 1941, ndr. Munich 1979.

[14] This is the quintessence in Karl-Heinz Gerschmann, Über Machiavellis Modernität, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 2/1973, pp. 149-176 : „... his prince is an instrument for the restoration of the old ... power serves the restitution of antiquity, whose timelessly valid standard cannot be surpassed."

[15] This has been repeatedly emphasized by Dolf Sternberger, starting from an Aristotelian understanding of politics, making a bit of a fuss about the fact that the word "politics" does not appear in the 'Principe'. But Machiavelli just founded a *new* concept of politics.
"politics," and Sternberger later admits this, rather en passant; cf. Machiavelli's 'Principe' and the Concept of the Political, Wiesbaden 1975; Three Roots of Politics, Frankfurt/M. 1978, I, pp. 159-265, II, pp. 91-162; Notes on the Word 'Politics,' Its Wanderings and Transformations (1981), in Die Politik und der Friede, Frankfurt/M. 1986, pp. 89-106.

[16] Cf. Claude Lefort, Le travail de l'ceuvre - Machiavel, Paris 1972. Part of the book (pp.153-309) is devoted to "interpretations exemplaires," including those of Francesco de Sanctis, Augustin Renaudet, Ger hard Ritter, Ernst Cassirer, Antonio Gramsci, Leonhard v. Muralt. Le fort's first sentence reads: „Ce livre est ne d'un attrait pour un enigme, dont nous ne saurions dire tous !es motifs."

[17] Benedetto Croce, Una questione ehe forse non si chiudera mai, Qua derni della ‚Critica', luglio 1949, pp. 1-9, 9.

[18] Cassirer's "The myth of the State", completed in 1944, did not appear until 1946, after his death (13.4.1945); the quotation from the German edition, Vom Mythus des Staates, Zurich 1949, 153. Cassirer's dictum applies, somewhat weakened, also to the "Discorsi".

[19] Raymond Aron, Machiavel et Marx (1969), in: Ders, Machiavel et !es tyrannies modernes, Paris 1993, pp. 255-274, 255.

[20] Robert v. Mohl, Die Machiavelli-Literatur, in: Ders, Geschichte und Literatur der Staatswissenschaften, III, Erlangen 1858, pp. 519-591, here 521, 529.

[21] Thus in the prologue to the Greek Machiavelli edition of 1971.

[22] Adolph Przybyszewski, Author Portrait Panajotis Kondylis, in: Sezes sion, January 2006, pp. 2-7, 4.

[23] Kondylis, Macht und Entscheidung - Die Herausbildung der Weltbil der und die Wertfrage, Stuttgart 1984, p. 127.

[24] Przybyszewski, p. 7.

[25] Joachim Vahland, Noch eine Dialektik der Aufklärung - Über Panajo tis Kondylis und sein "Macht und Entscheidung," Frankfurter Rund schau, 23.7.1985.

[26] Thus Michael Stolleis, Machiavelli in Deutschland. Zur Forschungslage der Machiavelli-Rezeption im 16. und 17.Jahrhundert, in: Italienisch, Mai 1982, pp. 24-35, 25 f.

[27] Carl Schmitt, Clausewitz als politischer Denker. Bemerkungen und Hinweise (1967), in: Ders., Frieden oder Pazifismus?, Berlin 2005, p. 910.

[28] Carl Schmitt, Macchiavelli - Zum 22.Juni 1927, Kölnische Volkszeitung, 21.6.1927; Ndr. in: Ders., Staat - Großraum - Nomos, Berlin 1995, pp.102-105, 104.

[29] C.J. Friedrich, Die Staatsräson im Verfassungsstaat, Freiburg 1961, writes, among other things: "... the practical result of this scientific consideration was extremely meager. He (Machiavelli) believed in a citizen army at a time when the formation of professional armies was imminent, he misjudged the political chances of Cesare Borgia, he propagated the city-states of antiquity in a time of growing national territorial states.... These are only some of the many examples of the highly unscientific character of his alleged scholarship. *But his project was undoubtedly an approach.* [Italicized by me, GM]. Machiavelli wanted to understand the world as it really is, he was sure that success in politics depended on that understanding, and he did his best to make progress in that direction." (p. 33 f.).

Panajotis Kondylis Niccolo Machiavelli

Introduction

Looking at individual sections of Machiavelli's life story, one is tempted to treat his biography and his teaching in parallel in one study. If the researcher chooses this path, he will first present Machiavelli's activity as a "uomo politico" and especially emphasize the experiences that would later characterize his work. Around 1512, Machiavelli's public activity ends; the researcher will recapitulate its substance and will pursue the question of how it was incorporated into the literary activity that Machiavelli carried out continuously after 1512. Almost all of his writings, with the exception of his diplomatic reports, were written during this period. This approach (often followed by renowned Machiavelli scholars) has the advantage that it can be developed along the reference systems of life and doctrine. The disadvantage is that it excludes from the outset a consideration of Machiavelli through the prism of a more general methodology with broader premises, a methodology that could also formulate explanatory claims for the life and work of other personalities. Thus, factors that were of particular importance for the development of Machiavelli's thought could fall out of the analysis, even if they are not immediately evident from the course of his life. Thus, those who orientate themselves on the external form of Machiavelli's life and from this base their methodological approach on what happens to be coherent, run the risk of finding only the limited and particular in their object of research, but not the threads that lead to more general phenomena. In this way, the understanding of a complex thinker is narrowed and one does not do him justice.

On the other hand, there is the common and now somewhat worn-out method of looking at a personality within its time. In the worst case, this approach collects the general characteristics of an epoch (provided their selection is apt and they are presented unadulterated)

and immediately next to them the characteristics of the respective personality are listed, without reference to the former. The single enumeration of general characteristics of a time is supposed to represent a personality exhaustively - as if this was only the mirror of its time. But then all personalities who lived at a certain time would have to be the same. A better picture results, if the nuances on the time table are put in relation with the nuances on the bio graphic table and if these tables stand not only parallel, but are connected besides by horizontal lines. The representation becomes more complete, however, when the points on the chronological table are connected to the points on the biographical table not in a straight line, but by oblique, curved and broken lines - that is, when a serious attempt is made to uncover and interpret the many complex social and psychological factors. But regardless of whether this method yields sufficient insights, it has the weakness that it necessarily moves on the level of abstraction and fictitious construction. The artificial entity in this case is the "epoch", whose basic characteristics are summarized, classified and reflected retrospectively on the people who lived in it. A general and abstract picture of an "epoch", however, is created a posteriori, and this cannot be otherwise: it is a logical construct, an ideal type, an instrument of research and understanding, which by definition has a strong character of convention, which, moreover, depends directly on our reliable knowledge and consequently must be revised for methodological reasons alone. An abstract apprehension and treatment of historical forces implies, directly or indirectly, their existentialization (which is perhaps the idealized mental relic of primitive humanity); they are regarded as separate, independent entities standing above human beings. But these forces are depicted as non-personal only because they are in reality incomprehensibly manifold and exist and act through innumerable carriers. Only these more or less scattered carriers can be grasped in reality - the "epoch", as systematization of material data or as "time spirit" of objective idealism, does not exist as such.

If this is true, the interpretation of a personality via its growing into an epoch, which is a posteriori theoretically constru-

lized, basically only a tautology. For we then take the living nucleus of an "epoch" (which by itself is also a part of the personality under investigation), project it onto our fictitious board, and then, transformed into an explanatory principle, reinsert it to analyze an area of the world from which precisely it was just taken. (The following must be noted in this regard: When the theoretical construct is done a posteriori, the "epoch" is characterized by criteria that proved to be prior in retrospect, but may have been equal to their counterparts at the time). Consequently, the coincidentally general characteristics of a

The tendencies of an "epoch", which are in any case found modified within the personality, are not taken up by this personality in their unchanged, pure form - a form in which they are represented in this theoretical framework - even if the existence of this theoretical framework with its clear characteristics makes such a deceptive assumption obligatory. The tendencies of an "epoch" are absorbed by a person by means of concrete, everyday individual life circumstances, by means of constant and countless contacts with the experiential aspects of society. In this way, a personality is penetrated much more deeply, much more comprehensively by its time than if it were to concentrate on a particular place and assimilate all at once, and therefore in an indigestible way, the general characteristics of a time. And since the epoch permeates a personality precisely by means of manifold carriers, each of which partially and inadequately embodies the general characteristics of the time, the personality forms its own world with innumerable facets and refractions, but with fewer universal and abstract aspects. The differences from personality to personality come about because the many and manifold refractions in one individual do not allow congruence with the refractions in another individual and also because all refractions together meet in principle different physiological and soul-spiritual structures in every human being.

So, if one wants to classify the people in their epoch, one can imagine this epoch as a common base of innumerable and dissimilar pyramids, each of which deviates more or less from the other and therefore shows more or less common characteristics; this goes from the greatest deviation, which the common base allows, up to complete agreement. The perspective from which one looks at the base, the epoch, (if it is to be seen in cor-

relation to the personality,) differs according to the angle of each individual personality pyramid and according to the view that the angle opening offers. Thus, we do not try to see the epoch as a basis that is the same for all, but as a general tendency that is taken up by each individual in a particular and fragmentary way. Admittedly, this does not mean that the scheme "personality - epoch" has been overcome; with the present state of knowledge about social phenomena, this is not even scientifically possible. But this is no reason not to constantly keep in mind the limits of this scheme.

I

The difference between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance lies, roughly summarized, in the difference between feudalistic and early capitalistic economy and society. However, this distinction does not represent two historical stages which followed each other separately, but rather the cornerstones of two historical phases are placed in two ideal-typical frames. The sharp contrast between these two ideal types is not so much due to the fact that the contents would have been so clearly delimited historically, but rather due to the fact that, by consciously setting up these ideal types, the opposing characteristics are selected and emphasized, because one wants to strictly distinguish one type from the other in order to obtain the clearest possible guidelines along which one can polarize the multifarious partial phenomena. Since the aim of this book is to explore the sources of Machiavelli's thought, the comparison of these ideal types will be used only when necessary for the treatment of this question.

The human type that is created by the self-sufficient economy or at least corresponds to it mentally and spiritually, lives in a community or at least corresponds to it mentally and spiritually, whose principles of everyday life are expressed in such a strong tradition that their presence is as natural, as imperceptible and as natural as breathing. In this community, man lives by necessity in solidarity with others, a solidarity that shows itself in an obligatory exchange of services (to use Durkheim's phrase, this is a "mechanical" solidarity, not an "organic solidarity").

The individual is not free, but for that he lives in security. He has no precise knowledge of the limits of his individuality and its contents, he does not order his experience chronologically, he does not "live" time, and his willpower is blurred. This intellectual inaccuracy shows itself above all in the inability to calculate, to calculate goods and quantities of numbers precisely. In the Middle Ages, people were content with approximate estimates, they did not grasp the concept of the exact either, and the simplest calculations that have been handed down are full of errors1- The dissolution of this communal form, idealized without success by Romanticism, entailed surplus production, sales, trade and the money economy. Money appeared last in this series, but it is the most tangible element as an immediate driving force and it allowed the individual to break away from the group. Now the individual was free, but he was no longer secure; the unconscious consensuality and traditionalism of the community was replaced in the inner life of the individual by the personal abilities he needed to assert himself in competition with others.

Trade now fundamentally directs thinking to the countability and measurability of things. The pre-capitalist producer, farmer or craftsman, saw only quality and regarded his products as use values, but the merchant has his eye on quantity and exchange value; he has no personal attachment to the commodity. The medieval producer identified himself with his products, the merchant, however, maintains a superficial, cool relationship to them, they are for him only quantities, which he measures in money2- The essential function of his thinking becomes the arithmetical conversion, the calculating of commodity into money, and thus the mental grasp of tangible objects becomes more and more abstract. The activity of man is also expressed in numbers, numbers are systematized arithmetically, they show us assets and liabilities and thus also the result of our efforts3- Money becomes reason, the abstract general denominator of all goods, and reason, the ability to pre-plan action, is transformed into money. There is a correspondence between money and reason: both are supersubjective and apersonal elements, emotions and moral boundaries are alien to them, which surround the world abstractly, and they are a yardstick to evaluate and classify people4.

Of course, there is not much room here for moral contrition and repentance or for the metaphysical visions of middle-aged man. The man of calculating and deliberating thought is shallower and more superficial, he merely wants to weigh a realm correctly and conquer it by the rational use of the means at his disposal, whereas man in feudalistic society did not know at all how to exploit his means and his time rationally. Moreover, his sphere of activity was determined by tradition, while deliberative thinking set its own limits.[5] The differences between these two types of man became greater the more the younger man deepened his calculative thinking and applied it in ever wider spheres, first in the home, then in his business, and finally in its many ramifications. As has been rightly said, in the Middle Ages the household of the feudal lord was a moral product, simply a higher natural product6- Only the Renaissance strives for a rational organization and also realizes it.

The place taken in the ideal type of the Middle Ages by the belief in the in the ideal type of the Renaissance, the metaphysical and theological takes the place of the rational. The universal predominance of religious thought presupposes, as the earthly equivalent of its millennia-old unchanging models, conditions that are so permanent and so unshakable that they of themselves make the idea of eternity compelling - which is, after all, the essential predicate of God as well. It presupposes political structures that endure for centuries, or institutions such as kingship that reach so far back into history that their historicity is forgotten and they are perceived as metaphysical concepts. In this sense, theological medieval thought is related to the blunt experience of time, mentioned above as an essential psychological element of the members of feudalistic societies. (On the other hand, theological thought that emerges in times of social upheaval can contain an almost existentialist sense of time, as Augustine shows). The fragmentation of society into commodities and competing individuals brings with it a series of uninterrupted shifts and rapid changes that necessitate a different way of thinking (namely, one that can follow these changes.) Now one phase takes over from the next, and the destiny of man changes so rapidly that everything worldly cannot even be associated with any transcendental category and appear as its representative.

Then the metaphysical frames of reference dissolve, the spirit demands dynamic and hand firm reasons, according to the facts, which it wants to interpret.

If the divine and supra-individual order thus breaks down, then the task of shaping and ordering the world like a work of art according to free purposes (which go beyond tradition) passes over to the individual7- Within the framework of these ideal types, individuality in the Renaissance is naked, despotic and self-sufficient. The Christian conception of the meaning and purpose of self-sacrifice and the negation of individuality is obsolete; we no longer find these concepts, but they return in a modified form - namely, when individuality is again placed under a universal ruling principle as under the principle of reason in the Enlightenment and, above all, the principle of community and people in Herder and in Romanticism. Between these two epochs, i.e. in the period of early capitalism, the individual stands for a time naked and fulfilled by himself. In the Renaissance, apart from certain groupings that developed an elementary worldview for themselves, there is no universal and official ideo logy that would have filled the consciousness of the individual and given him his errors. Spiritual postulates and disputes express themselves in symbols borrowed from antiquity, for the Renaissance man imagines antiquity as a time of free, unbound individuals and projects his own postulate or ideal onto it. (We have still not completely freed ourselves from this reception of antiquity, which regained strength at the time of liberalism and vastly underestimated the role of religion and ideology in the life of ancient man). To this nakedness of the individual, his relative freedom from "ideology," corresponds an early phase of capitalism and its knighthood of fortune. Capitalism is not yet a supra-individual, insurmountable system expressed in an equally supra-individual, if individualistic, ideology; it is individual striving, the sum of daring deeds of individuals. In the eyes of contemporaries, it is the act itself that is important, not its social content or the social perspective toward which it is directed. Therefore, the action, the deed, is valued more highly than its result: the wealth, which was initially considered a mere means or mere consequence. The entrepreneur must possess three basic abilities, and all three are strictly individualistic: he must be strong-willed be,

(i.e., courageous and free of prejudicial attachments,) he must be organizationally adept, (i.e., he must have a sense of priorities and be able to make distinctions,) and he must have negotiating skills, (i.e., he must be able to achieve his individual goals and defeat opposing goals[8]).

The emergence of individualism was also helped, especially in Italian cities, by the lively political life, which displaced idleness and was thus a challenge to action and a trigger for the emergence of individualism. The more often the parties in power changed, the more opportunities for advancement the individual had[9]. However, in order for an individual to achieve this advancement, another condition was indispensable: It was not allowed to be hindered by the shackles of blue blood and it had to aner know that superiority has its roots in personal abilities and values. This conception, already emerging in the late 13th century and clearly found in Petrarch, is an important weapon in the hands of the bourgeoisie against the feudal nobility in social conflicts.

This radical change in the place that the individual has in the
The new world is expressed in all the literature of the time, which now abandons the motifs of the medieval allegories and paints a picture of man, his inner being and his passions; it shows the peculiarities of the individual and his differences from others. In this way, the individualism that gave rise to this literature is consolidated and self-awareness increases[10]. The Aristotelian psychology of the parts of the soul and Galenus' doctrine of the four humors are also abandoned, and as early as the 14th century, the observation and study of the human being begins.The concept of reputation, fame and public praise, which the Latin writers constantly emphasize, falls on fertile ground in Italy when the legal class barriers fall and the medieval troubadour stops singing only about the works and names of the nobles. The art of biography, which develops in connection with the fame of individuals, no longer deals with rows of colorless chronicles of popes and kings, but selects individuals and attempts to write about their personalities12. Works are created about famous men, and the birthplaces or birthplaces or graves of great personalities become places of pilgrimage. Parallel to biography - and autobiography - the description of places develops, also following the same motives: fame and recognition.13

In these place histories (Ortsgeschichten), the attempt is made to describe the unique characteristics of a place in the same genius as the precise description of psychic or physiognomic traits is done in other fields [14]. As an expression of a developed individualism, irony, mockery, and sarcasm are the reverse equivalents of fame and honor. In contrast to the satirical poetry of the Middle Ages, which mocked the weaknesses of entire groups, mockery now targets a single, specific person and is often unbearable, but it ultimately prevails even in good society[15]. And finally, as the culmination of individualism, the type "genius" replaces the type of the medieval "master "[16].

The rationality of calculating and weighing, worldly and objective reason also combine in another manifestation of Renaissance thought: in the concept of virtuosity, to exact technique, to planned, masterful construction. This concept clearly takes shape in the creation of a work of art, a painting, a sculpture and a building - where reason works for a specific purpose, it creates order and form out of chaos. In this struggle of the subject with the object it is true that the subject, the planning ratio, plays the essential role, because the more important work is not the final and practical taming of matter, but the planning of this taming, a work that takes place exclusively in the mind. Matter, the object, plays a role only in the second phase, but no longer claims much attention because the problem has already been theoretically solved. (I think this is one of the main psychological-spiritual reasons why many plans of da Vinci, for example, or Michelangelo were never realized). The ratio is understood here as an independent, legislative instance, but behind it is the imagination; it has already from the beginning an idea of the construct, which the ratio is then to plan concretely. Ratio and imagination are interdependent17 and together give the hand the right and safe direction in which it should act. This concept of virtuosity and planned construct does not stop with the work of art - it was not born there, but is based on the experience in manufactures and in technical construction, where the working hand is linked with ratio, which is governed by rationality of purpose -, but rather, as a scheme of dealing with things by means of pure reason, it also penetrates into a thousand other areas where it can be applied. where it can find application, above all, of course, in politics

(this should be emphasized here because, after all, our subject is Machiavelli). In Italy of the 15th and early 16th centuries, it is considered possible to face the endless political conflicts through the formation of a perfect form of government, consisting of correct balancing of all the factors and camps involved. In various cities, especially in Florence, statesmen or constitutionalists appear in public who take the same attitude to the state as the artist does to his work. They weigh power in their constitutional constructions as if with tare scales, they distribute power with care and thus create an artificial balance based on detailed institutional regulations, but in the end these constructs turn out to be hollow18- The social facts cannot be weighted with the same perfection as the data of a work of art within a theoretical construct, because the data of a work of art are determined by the creator himself, whereas in the first case they are outside the object and are not even known in their entirety. Although the way of thinking was not equally productive in both cases, its root, from the point of view of thinking, was the same.

In the case of ideal types, the law of nature is clearly different from of the independence of the individual, the divine element from the secular, moral action from the calculating, but in the reality of Renaissance society these elements combined and blended into two-sided attitudes and ambiguous ways of thinking.

First, ratio is not independent of its practical application to extend to the last consequence and to classify nature and society into a strictly causalistic philosophical system (after it is the main claim of ratio to investigate the relationship between cause and effect in all areas). In contrast to the positivism of the 19th century, the rationalistic positivism of the Renaissance has no philosophical claim and is accompanied by a metaphysical agnosticism. Science and philosophy go separate ways, and the first does not want to subjugate the second as in the 19th century19- This is on the one hand because the ratio is not self-sufficient in itself; it also integrates intuition and contemplation and goes together with them when a problem is to be solved.

In Leonardo da Vinci - and also in the Platonism of the Renaissance, which was completely alien to him - it is evident that empirical observation and observational philosophy were not mutually exclusive in the thinking of the intellectuals of that time. On the other hand, the pronounced individualism does not allow to grasp the concept of social law; where the attempt is made to subsume the activity of the individual under a certain regularity, this regularity is led back to psychological quantities - for example, to human nature - and returns to the individual in a roundabout way. A lawful comprehension of individual activity is also prevented by the fact that productive activity has not yet become impersonal. There is still a direct relationship between producer and consumer, the "fetishism of commodities" does not yet function in its entirety, and the mechanics of production are not yet fully developed men are still open [20]. Nevertheless, the idea of individualism and competition do not completely replace the concept of law, especially the law of nature, and admittedly this concept, which the theologians counted among the causae secundae, now emerges more clearly, which is a victory of the bourgeois worldview. Finally, the intermediate formula of a free competition, which is carried out within the framework of the law of nature - it is driven by this very law of nature and is its expression[21] - was found. (This view was clearly held by the ideological fathers of bourgeois liberalism in the 18th century).

Secondly, the separation of the divine and the secular is not realized in an open struggle against the theological to the point of its disappearance. God is not directly attacked; he merely goes into honorable retirement. In real economic and political life, the element of calculation and weighing prevails, and this is used by the individual in his quest for dominion over things and over other people. But in ideological life, as I said, agnosticism prevails, and the religious element remains untouched as one side of this agnosticism. The Papal Church is also entangled in secular undertakings, it too has to move within the framework of the calculating mind and has no time at all to defend the metaphysical concepts of its worldview, which only makes the collision of the divine and the secular weaker. Third, the separation of morality and practice is also weakened in this sense.

Morality is not completely abolished, nor is it fundamentally rejected by anyone as something desirable and higher, but it is clearly felt and also explicitly stated that practical action, if it is to succeed, must be regulated by other standards. I will return to these three points below; they are fundamental to understanding Machiavelli's thought. I will just note here that the main vehicle of these moderate divisions in Renaissance Italy was their own creator: the bourgeois. As a type, the bourgeois was a revolutionary insofar as his practical actions required him to reject the medieval outlook on life and the world. As a member of a class, however, he was conservative, especially after he had reconciled himself with the remnants of the old classes. In his social and business life, the burgher developed arithmetic, planning and abstract thinking, he possessed self-confidence and shrewdness. In his private life he was a good family man, an average pious person and he followed tradition; in it he perhaps found security and safety in the face of the constant dangers that threatened him[22].

These two sides of the citizen are reflected in a pair of terms that were very common in the Renaissance and found great resonance in Machiavelli's work: virtu and fortuna. The first term expresses the active and rational, the second the passive and irratio nal element of the bourgeois conception of life. The word virtus lost its moral meaning early on, it was equated with studium and then developed into virtu, which means: weighing and including all abilities - physical and mental - without emotions playing a role. It is characteristic that at a time when the separation of the intelligentsia from the bourgeoisie begins, the term virtus begins to refer to the contemplative man and virtu to the acting[23]. Fortuna again, the fate, is the power that fights virtu and sometimes destroys it. Fortuna is reminiscent of classical antiquity, to which Dante also refers. The humanists, on the other hand, personify fortuna, although the root is different. In a world where the competing relations become so complex that the calculation of the consequences of each action becomes impossible (and, consequently, there is also the possibility that the action will fail or produce a result quite different from the expected one), fortuna is inevitably an "ideological," a fractured expression of this situation. But capitalism did not have to develop to the point of complex social relations for the meaning of fortuna to become clear within the ideological superstructure.

Even in the early days, when virtu almost corresponded to the knight of fortune (and the citizens adopted much of the knightly striving for new horizons), it often could not cross the sea of adversity to the other shore; then fortuna entered the scene and declared shipwreck. Fearing fortuna, the uncertainties of the market and the prospect of bankruptcy, the citizen retreats, opens up only with need, and prefers the few and the secure. And yet he takes refuge in astrologers and seers, in an attempt to fathom the counsels of this mischievous goddess, who is also mentioned in public documents in Florence[24] - Astrologers are not only officially employed in civil societies, but also in monarchies, and at the universities of the 14th to 16th centuries astronomy is taught alongside astronomy. Even the popes consult the stars, and in the "philosophical circle" of Lorenzo de' Medici there is a heated debate about the meaning and purpose of astrology - Marsilio Ficino defends it, while Pico della Mirandola rejects it25- At this point the view of the ruling class coincides with the superstition with which the mass of the people is beaten[26-].

One can hardly seriously doubt that in those times calculating spirit, faith in reason and individualism on the one hand, and virtu and fortuna on the other, were from the very beginning interwoven with the human type of the bourgeois and the bourgeois organization of labor. Whoever tries to cast doubt on this, puts forward the argument that the same mental-spiritual conditions are also found in many other areas of society, especially in areas outside the sphere of influence of bourgeois relations, which were not yet comprehensive at that time; consequently, these conditions would have to be attributed to the general "spirit of the age". If, however, bourgeois thinking also prevailed in non-bourgeois spheres, this only means that the relative power of bourgeois relations was greater than any other counteracting social power. The world-view and outlook on life of the socially strongest group are imposed on the opponents even before they have been completely defeated in this tangible social struggle; but this does not prevent the ideological remnants of the defeated social strata from living on in the long term.

The way of life and the general views of the strongest group correspond better to the social conditions, and the opposing groups cannot but adopt a smaller or larger part of them in order to better meet the requirements of the struggle; thus they unconsciously contribute to the spread of the views formed by the group they are fighting, which perhaps prolongs the life of both. But the strength of the opponent is not based on this conception of life per se, but on the social conditions and above all on the conditions of production which give rise to it and which the opponent controls; therefore the adoption of the views of life of the strongest group by the weakest social subgroup basically changes nothing in the relations of forces, it only facilitates their leapfrogging and unintentionally gives the stronger group the ideological weapons of its future supremacy. But if the members of the weakest groups, although they will disappear as groups, adopt in advance the latest views of their opponents, they have more opportunities, now as individuals, to find a place in this new structure.

Apart from this and apart from the imperceptible and almost

If the more assertive views and ways of life automatically seep into the body of society, the methods and views of the economically dominant group can also spread because their representatives happen to exercise other functions at the same time as economic management (in which this view is condensed in its purest form), namely in politics or war; thus the spirit that governs them in the exercise of their economic functions in the narrower sense is also sown in these areas. Such a double function was fulfilled in Florence by the Medici, whose members, at least in the first period, combined in one person the art of economic organization and political talent. The technique of economic management was introduced in other areas by people who initially had no connection with the economy, but whose sphere of activity bore a strong resemblance to the characteristics of an economic enterprise; for example, the condottieri, the leaders of mercenary troops, had all the characteristics of entrepreneurs. They put their capital at risk - their soldiers and their reputation; they had to look for the best investment opportunities for this - and were confronted every day with provisioning and equipment problems that could only be solved through planning, calculation and logistics.[27]

Thus, politics, warfare and diplomacy - which are treated separately in their particular relation to Machiavelli - gradually became items on the debit and credit pages of a ledger and the subject of what was essentially statistical analysis. The vanguard of this trend among Italian cities was Venice; in Florence, however, the statistical view becomes richer and more complex because it also includes art and culture. Real estate, offices, revenues, taxes, expenditures for public commissions and works of art - everything is counted and calculated, while the pure class order in Florence and its social development allows a general and abstract representation of political life better than elsewhere[28]; a development that took place in successive phases and was characterized by the rise and fall of one class and its clear replacement by another.

Whereas in the Middle Ages the ideological foundation of the political system was law and justice, which flowed from divine commands, a ruler was merely their living embodiment, and subjects theoretically owed him no obedience if he was not[29] , politics in the Italian Renaissance was a thoroughly secular entity, and the Catholic Church regarded it as such; the Church quietly leaves aside the Gregorian reforms and pursues its political goals without still invoking too much its divine legitimacy. Politics fits into the set of calculable quantity, and everyone, regardless of his personal involvement, can rationally perceive it in the technical sense as an interdependence of factors whose respective constellation produces either the one or the other result. In Italy, also for the first time, the medieval, chivalric concept of war is abandoned, according to which it is the institution of divine justice and a proof of individual bravery, not rationally adapted to the efforts of the whole. There is now a "neutral pleasure" in the proper conduct of war itself; this feeling corresponds to the position of the condottiere, who inwardly does not belong to any social class, therefore serves everyone according to his pay, and is concerned only with the technical side of warfare in connection with his own entrepreneurial interests. It is characteristic that in the Italian literature of the time there are numerous descriptions of strategy that deal with the technical aspects of warfare;

here, of course, the winner is not the one who is right (nor is he glorified), but the one who is more adept and thinks more about technical problems in battle than about the moral purpose of war[30]-.

The new perception of politics and war is expressed in the Italian Renaissance not through a single vehicle, but through many, although each uses them to different degrees. Nevertheless, depending on the structure of the political status quo, these vehicles can be essentially divided into two types that populate the political stage of Renaissance Italy - on the one hand, the princely states, and on the other, the republics that the bourgeois societies of the late Middle Ages developed into. More problematic are the social roots and the conditions of origin of the princely states, which must be attributed to a variety of factors. The Norman state under Roger II or the state of Frederick II can also be described as a princely state - in the sense that the word took on later - but the correspondences with the absolute states of the 15th century are not as great as many would like to think; after all, the power of Roger II or the Staufer Frederick II was based on feudalistic legality, from which they themselves derived, at least officially, the legitimacy of their actions; there are similarities in other respects, which I will come to later. In southern Italy, where feudalistic structures were much more pronounced, the princely state could not, in any case, have the same status as the princely states that emerged in the civil societies of northern Italy. Thus, the claim that the southern Italian princely state owed its administrative rationalism primarily to Ottoman models does not seem entirely unjustified. The northern Italian structures, on the other hand, seem to have been determined by the corresponding political power of the bourgeoisie (independent of its economic power). As the threat from below grew and unrest hampered trade, the bourgeoisie trade, the bourgeoisie, willingly or not, handed over power to other power to other authorities who could guarantee stable conditions for the conditions for the needs of the bourgeoisie. Often, however, the princes also wanted to interest and not to take power into their own hands as recipients of orders. they sought political support among the lower classes, and the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie had to tolerate this blackmail as long as there was no other way[31].

Nevertheless, a tyranny cannot be understood in all cases as a mere reflection of the concentration of wealth in a few hands, because it has been shown that cities of lesser economic importance were ruled by Des poten earlier, while in richer cities such as Florence or Venice it happened only indirectly or later, depending on the political strength of the ruling class32-.

A great camp, from which princes very often recruited, were the soldier-leaders, the condottieri, who had become indispensable for the Italian political scene, since the social power and therefore the warrior virtues of the feudal nobility had experienced their decline, while the citizens, although sufficiently trained in internal conflicts, could not systematically fulfill the war duties and therefore recruited mercenaries. The life of an army commander was extraordinarily hard and it also made the man himself unimaginably hard, but in equal measure it also sharpened his mind. His personal reputation was his most important asset, and only through it could he attract mercenaries. Only talent, skill and the absence of moral qualms could secure his ascent. He ascended to the ruler's throne either by direct usurpation or through a territorial dominion that he had received as a reward for his services or as winter quarters and was able to extend33- In this respect, the prince is a "democratic" phenomenon, he could easily come from any social class and work his way up like a scholar or an artist only thanks to his abilities - and, of course, a lowly origin helped him to rise, because he had no moral and religious ties from the beginning, and the birthright that the nobility represented applied to him just as little as feudal chivalric virtues and feelings of honor. The power base of the Italian princes, according to the divine hereditary right of kings by the grace of God, was alien and as foreign to him as the bourgeois enterprise, which he strengthened by rejecting feudalist views on interest economy and the "just price" of goods. This illegality gradually consolidated itself in the collective consciousness. The holders of the legal feudalistic hereditary right, the emperors, were distant and could not exert much influence on developments. Since it was well known that they could not impose themselves by force of arms, they were ridiculed when they stubbornly invoked their divine titles, and even more so when they traveled to Italy to meet with the emperors.

illegitimate rulers, exchanged their God-given rights for some modest tax, conferred meaningless titles, or legitimized illegitimate children. The ruler by his own power does not grow up in noble circles, nor does he associate exclusively with them; thus he runs no risk of forming political prejudices that might weaken his political acumen; on the contrary, he associates with people of all kinds and knows their trades and attitudes at first hand, he can judge them correctly as to their usefulness, and does not display the arrogance of the nobles toward the people who used them[34].

The ruler had to constantly fight for his throne and conquer it anew every day. He fought against the aristocracy, against the people and against the opposing soldiers of fortune. In order to succeed, he had to know and take into account the social phenomena, he had to have administrative skills and, of course, a general political understanding, the germ of a theory.[35] Since the political battles usually took place within the narrow confines of a city and the opposing side consisted of certain people known by name, knowledge of personal passions and human nature was particularly important. Victory in these political battles was a victory of one individual's skills over another individual's abilities, and the individual was finally seen as the ultimate determining factor in the shape and destiny of a city. Italy was finally fragmented, and the same game was played over and over again until it was considered normal and universal; thus, the individual's capacity for the political theory of the wise legislator became the sole regulator of the polity.

The means that give power to the absolute ruler must be rationally balanced, they must be chosen with proper foresight and prudence. Even murders must be committed out of necessity and with the consistency of prudent thought; they must be rational acts, or rather a succession of acts combining rational motives and purposes. With regard to the exercise of power, rationalism means that the state presents itself as an individual enterprise of the ruler (even if its basic variables are political rather than economic); consequently, the ruler must take entrepreneurial risks and have the appropriate skills[36]. The state is thus like the ruler, and when the ruler acts rationally, the whole apparatus of the state appears from the outside like a living and rational unit, like a living bearer of reason.

In the bourgeois republics of that time, reason, on the other hand, is not integrated into the community through the ruler, but it presents itself in a fragmented form; it is a weapon of the various social groups striving for power. Thus, reason does not encompass the whole, it only supports the parts that fight each other; consequently, it does not appear outwardly, in relations with other communities, as a state power and wears out inwardly. Thus the Republic (even a republic like Florence, which in its internal manifestations adopted the spirit of calculation and deliberation more than any other) does not present itself as strong outwardly, it had neither a unified and unbroken will nor a constant line; I will come to the point that Machiavelli was well aware of this weakness. Although the political struggles were fierce, outside the periods of great uprisings they were limited to the vanishing part of the population that had any political rights; in Florence, out of 80,000 to 9,000 inhabitants, only about a thousand families had political representation. Within this framework, power was deliberately fragmented, for fear that some might gain more power and become tyrants. Elections were held by lot, the term of office for dignitaries was very short, ranging from two months to a year at the most, party-based elections were strictly forbidden, the higher offices and honorary diplomatic legations were filled alternately by representatives of powerful families in order to maintain balance and prevent dissension, while appointments to the highest offices were made through a complicated procedure that allowed for compromise and balance. All in all, there were many poles of power, and the most important ones were not, of course, found within a governmental apparatus that reconstituted itself every two or six months and was thus exhausted. When the leaderships of the great merchants' guilds and tradesmen's guilds or of the other poles of real social power could not occupy positions of their own, they participated as representatives of those poles in the distribution of governmental offices and thus ensured that the balance was maintained. As such, the members of the government apparatus only exercised a supervisory function; when it came to the question of real power, they negotiated directly with those who held or claimed it, even if they were only simple private citizens.

But the weakness of the government not only allowed an artificial equilibrium to be created, it also allowed a state power to be exercised permanently without even a title to it, as in the case of the Medici in Florence.

Despite the difference between the forms of rule, both the absolute and the republican state, each in its own way, realized to a great extent the postulates demanded by the new socioeconomic character of the time. In both systems, the privileges of origin were abolished by law, theocratic ideas were abandoned, and attempts were made to subordinate all areas of life to rationalism.[37] In both systems, wars were fought that no longer bore the characteristics of anarchic, predatory warfare between people, but rather the characteristics of conflicts between states. Both the external wars and the internal fiscal state arrangements benefited only certain groupings, but there was nevertheless, if often only in approach or in pretense, a striving for the unification of goals and for the exploitation of economic resources for the benefit of the state, of the fatherland as an entity of value to all, whatever their social level. This laid the foundation for the emergence of an administrative, fiscal and judicial bureaucracy[38].

However, the development did not go so far as to reach the proportions of a nation-state - quite the contrary; from about the middle of the 15th century, the restraining factors are stronger than the driving ones, and a period of economic and social crisis dawned in Italy. Around 1530 the country was completely subjugated by the Spanish, and a long period of stagnation began. Precisely in Machiavelli's lifetime, this crisis and the sensation of it were the main characteristics of Italy; the quintessence and the innermost driving force of Machiavelli's work were the desire and the search for political solutions that would lead out of this crisis (Machiavelli calls it "depravity" and thus blames its most extreme consequence, namely the destruction of individual and collective virtue and prowess, and the softening). In Florence in particular, the social causes of this for this "depravity" seemed to lie in the preponderance of bank capital over industrial capital and the emergence of a class of idle bourgeoisie citizens who soon merged with the remnants of the nobility and adopted a courtly lifestyle.

The success and the sophisticated methods of the banking institutions and credit entrepreneurs delayed a productive capital investment[39]. At the same time, the political foundations of the dominance of the bourgeoisie were shaken, which now split into two camps with opposing interests, namely that of the bankers and idle privateers and that of the factory owners. From the middle of the fifteenth century, the production of woolen cloth was in decline, and the production of silk could not stop its decline, because the circle of its customers was much more limited. At the beginning, the crisis only hurt the productive camp of the bourgeoisie, because the banks relied on foreign companies and on long-distance trade, which had strengthened with the conquest of Pisa (Pisa was indispensable to the Florentines as a port; therefore they fought fiercely for it). For lack of prospects, industrial capital is slowly being pulled out of production and the door is opened to pure profiteering and parasitism[40]. Capital is invested in real estate and government bonds - the wealthy lend money to the state so that it can wage wars, and receive interest for it. The wealthy thus distance themselves from the lower strata of the ruling class (who basically pay the interest on the capital of the wealthy with their taxes) and prevent a capital accumulation that could have benefited the development of production, while the state itself loses its sources of income in the long run due to the decline in production[41]. Previously, the rich, fearing the small entrepreneurs and artisans, placed their savings in the hands of large entrepreneurs; But when the production capi tal declined, they too were dragged into the economic catastrophe - the economic concentration on private hands, once the top was broken, led to a spillover of the crisis to the broad masses. The same thing happened later to the banking system of Florence, which the Medici had monopolized by either destroying their competitors through direct taxation or killing them outright; that they were excluded from the competing banks that sprang up all over Europe around 1400 shook the city as a whole[42].

The class of the idle privateers, the oziosi and sciope rati, was fully formed in the time of Lorenzo de' Medici, and he himself was a respected member of this class. The privateers now represent the core, the most important part of the bourgeoisie and set the tone for conservatism,

the reemergence of feudal elements. By abandoning production and bourgeois labor in general, they moved away from the deliberative and calculating spirit; at least they were prevented from making it the axis of a world view. In the intellectual world of the educated, on the other hand, rational positions gave way to a wave of neoplatonism and mysticism. In contrast to the strict mores of the old bourgeois enterprises, aesthetic values are now placed above political and martial values, mores become effeminate, one strives for delicate pleasures as well as for vulgar pleasures of body and mind. Luxurious extravagance reaches a peak, while the decline of the collective spirit among the bourgeoisie is consolidated in art in a decline of public building activity - in which a general sense of power and collective convictions are expressed - in favor of sculpture and painting, and in the latter in the decline of the fresco in favor of the transportable painting mani43. (For similar reasons, mutatis mutandis, ancient art developed in the transition from the 5th to the 4th century B.C.) The renaissance thus followed the arc of the social class that had shaped it - it began republican and ended courtly. Competition, as the most important characteristic of early capitalism and as a trigger that had released innumerable skills, now gave way among the propertied classes to a desire for security, for the integration of the upper classes into the courtly classes, and for the adoption of their lifestyle. This feudalization of bourgeois life was reinforced by the subsequent "Hispanization" of life (after 1530); work was openly despised, only titles of nobility counted.

Parallel to the republic of bourgeois society, the princely state also becomes conservative. The previously illegitimate tyrants become hereditary rulers who are only interested in preserving what they found before. The state becomes static, stuck. The relationship between ruler and ruled is based on the greatest possible mutual "benefit" in the narrow sense. The bourgeois notion of "order" is supplemented by the notion of "care," and the upper middle classes are no longer interested in preserving their traditional republic - rather, they are willing to transfer power to a ruler who will secure their privileges[44]. The rule now becomes the political manifestation of the fusion of the bourgeoisie with the remaining city patricians and the remnants of the feudal aristocracy or the new feudal lords,

which rose with the decline of bourgeois conditions. (In literature, this fusion found expression in the resurgence of medieval genres imbued with the spirit of renaissance; among them are the epics of Ludovico Ariosto and Torquato Tasso). They all formed the courtly environment of the prince, who, as mentioned above, is now a very different type from his predecessors. Thus the ruling class unifies itself in a certain way, but it is drained, weakened and powerless; inno vative striving and the earlier dynamism are buried once and for all. The Spanish conquerors are only their tombstone.

The weakening of early Italian capitalism was caused above all by external factors. The emergence of the great European states and the beginning of their trade-oriented policies, the closure of the Orient with the Ottoman conquest, and the opening of new routes through the discoveries, narrowed the scope for the economic activities of Venetian, Florentine and Genoese capitalists in a suffocating way. But there is another reason: because of its early development, Italian capitalism depended on a market that was almost entirely feudalistic in structure, namely on the consumer needs and money needs of princes, bishops and kings. With the fall of this feudalistic market and the decline of its natural bearers, as well as the great bankruptcies of the sixteenth century (after the new nation-states refused to pay their debts), Italian capitalism was deprived of ground, and it became clear that its imposing expansion had no stable foundation[45]. Added to this were other external factors and the internal fusion of the bourgeoisie with the feudal nobility.

A dramatic and bloody feature of this decline was the constant wars that ravaged Italy throughout the 15th century. Since the city-states had become economic and political centers, they also waged war against each other. (This happened with the strengthening of the bourgeoisie internally, which eventually gained autonomy and whose autonomy was approved by the Pope in order to undermine the influence of the Emperor, who, as holder of the crown of the Holy Roman Empire, had legitimate supremacy in Italy). The beginning of the outward orientation of the cities, in order to secure the largest possible living space for their sustenance, entailed conflicts between the bourgeoisie and the noble landowners, whose base was eventually broken up and

forced into the cities. But it did not end there; the five largest Italian states - Milan, Florence, Venice, the Holy See and the Kingdom of Naples - continued to strive by all means, albeit sometimes for purely economic reasons, to expand their territories and, with few interruptions, waged wars almost non-stop. Despite these wars, the goal of the opposing parties always remained the preservation of equality or the securing of small gains, for no party had the power to destroy the other parties once and for all. These wars had limited objectives (and were therefore deeply conservative both in terms of their means and the spirit with which they were fought), and they always led to shifting alliances, the crushing of the enemy, and the wearing down in fruitless wars in which states spent themselves politically and economically. When the French and the Spanish then invaded Italy, no one could oppose them.

The arc, as I made it with the criteria considered so far, begins with a living and dynamic principle, with calculating observation and ratio, and it ends with the image of a dissolved social reality; it leads right through the Renaissance ambiguity towards the notion of legality (i.e. the extension of ratio to all domains) and towards the moral structure. This schema can be conveniently set up as a framework that integrates Machiavelli's thought because, after all, Machiavelli's intellectual approach is nothing more than the pursuit of adequate remedies for an injured social body through the means of ratio; Machiavelli unconsciously isolates one extreme of his time and forms a theory from it to deal with the other extreme, while at the same time, as will be shown below, he shares the Renais sance's indecisiveness toward the questions of legality, morality, and reli gion. Applying this approach to Machiavelli's thought, while sound from a logical point of view, would not do him exhaustive justice and would be basically the same mechanical application of the "personality - time" scheme that I criticized at the outset. It is not enough to illuminate the epoch from the perspective of the problems found in the individual. Above all, it is necessary to look for as many of these broken lines as possible, which the epoch has followed, in order to make the individual

and as many focal points as possible, concrete and tangible focal points, in which the personality encountered the general characteristics of the time, in order to individualize them and make them the fun k of its thinking, turning the objective social reality into a subjective-psychic and spiritual one.

II

If one enters Machiavelli's world of thought, one sees that the intellectual characteristics of the Renaissance were not integrated there on the basis of their ideal-typical foundation (and consequently do not form a system consistently governed by the new intellectual attitude in its pure form, as it appears when it is contrasted with the pure form of the intellectual attitude of the Middle Ages), but in their mixed, impure form, in which these characteristics existed and functioned in their time. Therefore, the opinion that Machiavelli, with his hidden materialism, represents the most intense affirmation of the new worldview[46] must be taken with all due restraint and, in any case, considered in relation to the enlightened bourgeois liberalism of the nineteenth century, the most extreme manifestation of which was scientific positivism, the complete rejection of what was then considered medieval-religious thought. The characteristic features of the new thinking are so well known and widespread even before Machiavelli that he does not consciously choose them - he simply takes them for granted and integrates them with all the limitations they had even in their historical manifestation; consequently, Machiavelli himself is not their embodiment, because there was no such embodiment. It is still easy to get such an impression; Machiavelli's secular and anti-religious spirit is not expressed so clearly and intensely in new discoveries or in the pioneering systematization of circumstances, but rather in his general attitude to the questions that preoccupied him. The new thinking in Machiavelli's work is most noticeable in the separation of morality and politics. Through this separation, and to the extent that Machiavelli undertakes it, he is able, if not to create a new science, to treat political phenomena with elemen tary scientific presuppositions.

In classical antiquity, the highest value was the state, and the highest quality of man was to be a citizen. Politics and morality were therefore not in contradiction; state morality and common morality coincided. State morality - and reason of state - were then still linked to the personality of a ruler and were not regarded as deriving from any supra-individual state authority, (in the person of Creon this view becomes immediately clear.) In the Middle Ages, however, according to the Christian view, morality was above the state, and the state was nothing more than the means of enforcing morality and justice in the religious sense of the words. For the Christian man, state morality and state reason were a sin against laws established by God, while for the ancient man they were a natural and neutral force; besides, the concept of "sin" had no metaphysical depth in antiquity[47]. In theory, the Middle Ages makes no distinction between personal and public morality, between the morality of the individual and the morality of the ruler; the system of divine values had to permeate equally all spheres of human life, because in all of them it had to answer to God. It was precisely on this subordination of morality to politics that the secular intentions of the popes were based: The ruler was, after all, only a governor of divine right, represented on earth par excellence by the pope, and as a ruler he had to justify himself before the pope before answering to God.

It was therefore only natural that the first objections to the pure medieval worldview came from the Ghibellines, opponents of papal power and advocates of the emperor's temporal power. In his treatise *De monarchia,* Dante considers the basis of society to be law, given in the form of imperial power and papal power to each separately from God. The pope has jurisdiction in supramundane matters, the emperor in temporal matters. However, Dante's argument remains scholastic and sophistical and is full of allegories. The power of the emperor is proved by biblical passages and not by reasons arising from their worldliness itself. Also, the concept of nation is missing, because the emperorship and the papacy are universal powers; to them corresponds a universal theory of state, influenced by Catholic thought, theology, and written down in the Catholic language, Latin. More radical is the view

of Marsilius of Padua in *Defensor pacis* [written around 1317 in Verona, first published in 1559 in Basel]; in these theses, with regard to the relationship between state power and divine command, the state is clearly separated from the church, while there are more general concerns about the relationship between God and nature. The state is an end in itself; the community of citizens replaces the community of believers. The law is not imposed on the citizens, but created by them. What is important is not so much the form of government - power should be conferred by the people and should always be answerable to them. The clergy descends to the same level as the other citizens, and the secular ruler has the right to appoint and depose popes and bishops [48]. Nevertheless, Marsilius moves in the same frame of thought as his predecessors; everything new, he thinks, is due to intuition, not to a new point of view. The perspective begins to change only when the question of the world domination of the pope or the emperor gives way to the concrete existence of the newly created nation-states and new theorists (albeit theologians and scholastics) emerge who try to defend the right of the young nation-state to exist, such as John of Paris and Pierre Dubois, who want to prove that the French king is autonomous 49-, that the French king was autonomous [49- Possibly] these efforts were ideologically supported by the separation between divine-theological and secular-philosophical truth, which comes to bear in the late medieval Averroist doctrine of the "duality of the two-world theory" and the "twofold truth. "[50-] This doctrine found great resonance in the West; Starting from the University of Paris, it found a firm home at the University of Padua, which at that time was under the influence of pragmatically placed Venetian merchants. However, it was professedly influenced by Petrus Pombonatius (a contemporary of Machiavelli), who - with regard to its errors - equated Moses, Jesus and Mohammed and declared that the purpose of religion was a political one[51]- But Machiavelli did not come from this camp, nor is his thinking its extreme consequence. Only in retrospect can one explore the various manifestations of this current and place them in a logical and chronological series, which, however, is only significant for the history of ideas, because this current did not exert a comprehensive influence on general views. These ideas did not reach Machiavelli as a constant thread of a philosophical and political problem.

tics - conversely, Machiavelli remained attached to this problematic, which he himself did not know as a coherent entity and thus reacted spontaneously to the stimuli of the environment, which always repeated and deepened it.

The fact is that in Machiavelli's work the world of morality and the world of politics are separate. Morality is an individual, personal matter; political activity is independent and autonomic, and stands outside the sphere and imperatives of individual morality-although political activity does not initially contradict morality, nor does it regard the elimination of individual moral as an indispensable condition for its development. The idea of a public morality and a public consciousness required two mental preconditions, both of which had been rendered impossible by the general character of Machiavelli's time: first, the theocratic subordination of politics to morality, which, as has been said, was predominant in the Middle Ages; second, the ideal of civic liberalism, the community of conscious and informed citizens who participate in public life with a sense of responsibility and govern by means of their elected representatives 52- To the failure of these preconditions was added the fact that the feudalistically religious 52- To the lack of these conditions was added the fact that feudalistic religious morality in Italy, in all its manifestations (from the chivalric ideal of masculinity and honor to monastic asceticism), decayed much more quickly than in other European countries, leaving the individual free but to his own devices53- Certainly, this affected above all the upper strata of society, but only they participated in public life; Thus, one can say that the closer one was to the top, the more extreme was the difference between individual and public morality in social reality. However, the elite of the society of that time not only realized this distinction very clearly - they also expressed it, for just as politics was their sole field, so was intellectual life. The separation of politics and morality ultimately means that, both in the reality of the time and in Machiavelli's perception, there was a gap between the governed and the governed, and each side had its own value system.54 On the other hand, in the view of the time, the separation of politics and morality corresponds to the separation of science and philosophy; moreover, in the view of the time and in Machiavelli's view, the distinction between politics and morality corresponds to the distinction between the kingdom of heaven and the earthly kingdom; nevertheless, these multiple distinctions can be seen as a distinction between the kingdom of heaven and the kingdom of the earth.

Distinctions do not grade as a logical series - they merely existed side by side.

There are two other elements in Machiavelli's thought that underpin the distinction between politics and morality. First, man is by nature bad, greedy, and ambitious; and since politics is the art of leading men as these men are and not as they ought to be, any practical success in politics becomes impossible if politics and morality are equated, that is, if men are taken as embodying moral postulates when their nature forbids them to do so-and if not as individuals, then as a unity and community, that is, as the potential that interests the politician. Machiavelli does not have the concept of an innate moral feeling in man55- Man's bad nature is not governed by any such innate feeling, it is merely kept in check by social norms and social morality, and these, as before, are achievements of politics; they are not derived from a moral law of divine origin, but are established by the legislator and society for practical purposes and independently of the measure of ontological truth they contain. This is precisely the second point that deepens the separation of morality and politics: Virtue and justice are not God-given concepts, but arise when people join together and found the first cities. For the first time, society accepts and rewards the good and condemns the bad *(Discorsi* I,2). If morality is secular in origin, then it is not binding as a metaphysical entity; it merely does good because it performs useful social functions by keeping man's bad nature in check. But Machiavelli believes that morality can better fulfill this secular role for which it originated if it presents itself in association with some, whatever, religious and supernatural entity. Consequently, the separation of morality (also of divine origin) and politics does not mean that the two do not cross in practice, even if they are opposed as attitudes; on the contrary, morality is a quantity that politics must fathom; the reverse is not true. It follows from this that politics does not always have to trample morality underfoot; it can even follow it unconditionally if this is the best way to achieve its goals. Thus there are always only a few situations in which the difference between these two magnitudes is temporarily attenuated; and this

This is not because morality has taken possession of the politician's soul, but because morality as a political means is more effective than any violence (see *Discorsi* III,20). As long as ethical values are upheld by people and occupy an important place in their spiritual life, they must be taken into account and used, regardless of how we ourselves evaluate them. We do not create the social factors that we have to deal with - they already exist. We can only rationalize them according to their objective, not their value-related moral weight, even if we would like the two qualities to coincide; but the nature of man does not permit this (*Fürst* 15).

It has been argued that Machiavelli retained certain framework notions about the difference between good and evil, but basically he strove for a new naturalistic ethics56- The constant exercise of politics outside a moral framework can possibly lead to (and this is necessary) a secondary morality whose highest values are strength, prudence, and the like, elements, therefore, that constitute the Machiavellian virtu. Although Machiavelli's view may imply this, however, he himself did not intend to create a new mo ral explicitly or indirectly. Rather, he probably never had in mind to use the term

In Machiavelli's view, "morality" had an activist and heroic content, which only in more recent times was associated with a different and admittedly contradictory "morality" to the Christian moral doctrine. In Machiavelli's case, "morality" meant the traditional, positive morality that was basically experienced as part of Christian doctrine in the immediate environment in which he himself lived. Although he leaves room in politics for actions that are clearly distinguished from the content of that morality, he has no intention of violating it, subordinating it to politics, or displacing it entirely, thus creating a new "naturalistic" morality out of politics. Machiavelli knows only too well that politics transcends the limits of the traditional morality that he himself accepts and applies and lives in everyday life; certainly he is also concerned that he will be forced to abandon it. Nevertheless, he does not replace it with politics or with the ideal of the "fatherland," which was even easier to grasp57- The realms of morality and politics remain strictly separated for him. A deed can be good in moral terms, but bad in politics (and vice versa), but the two spheres are not successive, nor is one considered a priori superior,

because there are no value criteria that apply to both. Every person has the right to be guided by the realm he chooses, only he must not mix the two.

Thrasymachus (see Plato, *The State,* Book 1) and Thucydides, who speaks with the tongue of the Athenians (see Melier Dialogue, end of Book 5), place the political logos sovereignly in a complete and exclusive world that surrounds and subordinates every mental and everyday world that opposes it. Here there is no room for a separation of politics and morality; there is only room for the former. In this isolation, the political logos becomes despotic and corrosive; the way the Athenians and Thrasymachus use it results in a one-sided relationship between ruler and ruled, for the sole aim of the logos is the consolidation of the ruler's sovereignty, without other purposes being pursued or resulting from it in the superstructure. On the other hand, as will be shown below, for Machiavelli every mischief that arises from the ratio has a purpose that in itself overrides the political ratio, for it harms the diseased part of the social body and benefits the healthy one. Nor does Machiavelli perceive political ratio as a compact and autonomous value that could fill out his entire world and displace every other element, but he does perceive it as indispensable and places it alongside traditional values without making it an independent (and sole) principle in a system of values. And because ratio remains so close to morality, its presence becomes more conspicuous and eye-catching, while morality's position is always at risk. Thus Machiavelli introduces a substantially heterogeneous principle into the world of morality, while on the other hand he carries with him the memory and longing of morality by extending the principle of ratio into the world of politics[58]. This ambiguity is not so intensely experienced by Machiavelli that it affects his

"It does not happen because this duality arose from the social conditions that I mentioned in the first chapter and that were simply widespread at that time. It does not happen because this duality arose from the social conditions that I mentioned in the first chapter and that were simply widespread in those times, it was entirely natural and accepted, and in a certain way life was based precisely on it. The contrast that arises from the coexistence of these two different worlds did not tear Machiavelli apart (as many thought and gave his feelings infinite understanding and sympathy, after they had first transformed these feelings into a temporal and spiritual reality).

The author's own words (which he had not yet placed in the contemporary framework) must have caused him a certain helplessness. This helplessness explains the frequent digressions (especially in the *Prince) in which* he tries, in an apologetic tone, to justify the use of "nefarious" means, although they were available in everyday life at the time; It seems as if Machiavelli, in his attempt to make the rulers aware of the means they had been using for hundreds of years without anyone having taught them, was shouting unnecessary concerns at them59- But moral concerns exist only in the soul of the subject; if Machiavelli had been born a ruler, he might have viewed the relationship between politics and morality differently.

If one examines Machiavelli's train of thought logically and theoretically, the separation of politics and morality appears as an indispensable prerequisite for the creation of a political or politological science. However, one must not imagine that Machiavelli consciously based the science he founded or the scientific vein that drove him on this separation. The separation of politics and morals, the separation of science and philosophy, and the separation of living and scholastic research existed and functioned in parallel in him. These are not stages which the mind must of necessity pass through one after the other in order to harmonize the course of its own research with the abstract exploration of the problems. As already mentioned, of the above pairs of concepts, the pair politics - morality are in conscious opposition to each other, both in Machiavelli and in the spirit of the epoch. But in Machiavelli we cannot prove the same sense of opposition between the lived and the learned spirit - there is no opposition because the second link is missing. Machiavelli is in no way concerned with medieval thought, which he considers necessary to combat and which he wants to set in conscious opposition to his own thought structure; he is completely caught up in the worldly, in the living spirit, in the direct experience of things, without thinking about them at all. Machiavelli does not deal with medieval problems and ways of looking at things - he simply ignores them. When Galileo leveled the celestial order, when he found laws that apply to all celestial bodies and dissolved the hierarchy that had been established in the Middle Ages, he had to be-

the author who was aware of the reactions of the medieval worldview and dealt with them in a variety of ways. In contrast, Machiavelli leveled the medieval social order (the earthly pendant to the celestial order) without being concerned at all with its existence60- One could say in general that both Galileo and Machiavelli were animated by an antischolastic spirit-although the elements of this thinking, its course and its result show fundamental differences in each case-a spirit that was not the result of situational and personal inclinations, but can be traced back to two different conceptions of the term science.

The first view with respect to Machiavelli (as expressed by de Sanctis, Dilthey and Cassirer) ascribes to him, up to the establishment of a naturalistic system, a highly logical approach to the problems that arose from the modern worldview. According to this view, Machiavelli's thinking is structured as follows: First of all, it is based on the idea that human nature is unchanging at all times and that, because of this uniformity, the same phenomena are constantly repeated; likewise, that the life of states repeats itself according to a mechanistic and natural law scheme that Machiavelli adopted from Polybius. The cyclicity of the phenomena, which is ultimately made possible by the immutability of human nature, gives rise to a balanced system that functions mechanically or almost mechanically, and which offers itself to ratio as a field where it can excellently fulfill its demand to classify and investigate the individual circumstances in a theoretical system (consequently, only the cyclicity of the phenomena makes the existence of a political science possible). So, from the moment when the system functions mechanically, the ratio can foresee what will happen if it knows the antecedents of this function. Thus, it can turn to action, having learned the laws of its unfolding through the study of phenomena. In this framework, Machiavelli is merely, or par excellence, a technocrat of politics, one who knows the reliable cyclicality of phenomena because he has studied their history in depth and thus can take the appropriate measures to face the eventualities - already known. In this view, it is only logical that Machiavelli and Galileo should be fully recognized as founders of a naturalistic and causalistic science.

The first two of these were the "Theories of the Renaissance" and the "Theories of the Enlightenment "[61] , which consequently took the rationalist worldview of the Renaissance to the extreme and theoretically anticipated the mechanistic system of the 18th century Enlightenment and the vulgar materialists of the 19th century.

But the premises of this view do not find any consistent support in Machiavelli's work, and their articulation is based much more on an abstraction of those characteristics of the Renaissance that distinguish it from the Middle Ages and place it close to the scientificity of the nineteenth century. However, if these characteristics are to be found in Machiavelli (and they are), they fulfill quite different functions and exist in quite different contexts from those in which they are placed when they are represented on an abstract scale by univocal attributions, abstractly formed by those who want to write a history of ideas. Two points emerge in the analysis: First, more than one conception of a mechanistic naturalism is found in Machiavelli; two tens, none of them is unmixed; nor does any of them form a foundation on which an edifice of thought can be consistently erected. One only sees that they are articulated at one point and revoked at another, or that they are completely forgotten at the very point where they should be theoretically exploited, had Machiavelli founded political science as Galileo founded cosmology.

A first conception of mechanistic naturalism is, what
The anaclosis theory, which Machiavelli adopted from Polybius (Vl,4-10) and formulated only once in his entire work *(Discorsi* 1,2)[62]- The anaclosis theory is well known, and this is not the place to analyze it in all its details. Essentially, the point is that the forms of government [polyteumata) describe a circle and each establishes a different cycle. Monarchy becomes kingship (, "First, without special intervention and by nature, a first, primordial form of autocracy is formed; this is followed and from it, by planned construction and by improvement, kingship arises." Polybius (VI,4,7) and kingship becomes tyranny, aristocracy overthrows tyranny and becomes oligarchy, oligarchy is succeeded by democracy, which in turn slides into ochlocracy and finally brings back monarchy. How this circle opens and closes is not clearly determined by Polybius; apparently, however, he was inclined to regard it as autonomous and impermeable, without any cycle connection with a preceding or

Polybius' thinking was dominated by the assumption that between two cycles a catastrophe occurs that brings the human species back to its origin (VI,5,5; these catastrophes are known only from mythological accounts, but Polybius adopts them as they have been handed down because he wants to give his scheme full independence and full automatism). Since all six cyclical forms of state are imperfect (three are good, three are bad), a mixed form of state emerges that eliminates deficiencies and ensures stability and duration. Cyclicity takes place without deviations "according to nature" ([kataphysin], VI,4,13) or according to the "housekeeping of nature" ([physeos oikonomfa], VI,9,10). Exactly on this temporal automatism also the possibility of a prediction is based, because in this scheme one can see clearly which form of state replaces the other. And it is no coincidence that exactly at the point where Polybius emphasizes the natural law character of cyclicity, he simultaneously underlines the possibility of prediction (VI,4,12 and 13 as well as VI,9,10 and 11; cf. a. VI,57,4).

Polybius' anaclosis theory has fundamental contradictions;

The way Machiavelli avoids them indicates how far his thinking was from the creation of a mechanistic, naturalistic system to classify constitutional phenomena[63-] Polybius uses a threefold conceptualization: Cycle, mixed form of state, and the law of growth, flowering, and decay of all that exists (VI,51,4 and 57,1); this is indispensable to elucidate the decline of the mixed form of state and the completion of the cycle-not as six stages, but as a whole that is replaced by another whole. However, these three factors cannot be part of the same regularity. The mixed form of state stands outside the six forms of state that repeat themselves cyclically; consequently, its appearance on the historical stage owes something to forces other than those that cause the cyclicality of the other six politeumata; (in fact, Polybius writes, the mixed form of state arises either "on the basis of theoretical consideration" [dia l6gou], as in the case of Sparta with Lycurg, or "through many struggles and efforts .. for [they] always chose the better from the experience they had gained in failures.... ", as in the case of Rome; VI,10,14). At which point of the cyclicity does the mixed form of state appear? Where does the chain of the six cyclical forms of state break? And if this chain can break, how is

it then possible that cyclicity is a universal law? If certain deviations from the scheme of cyclicity are lawful, how does one know that the reasons for these deviations do not continue so long that cyclicity in the end loses its essential content and is merely an expression of the lack of preconditions by which the forms of state of Sparta and Rome arose? Thirdly, the mixed form of government is contrary to the law of the rise and fall of all things; why does it also perish, when it does not have the defects of the other forms of government? Finally, the very notion of cyclicity contradicts the notion of the rise and fall of all things; the latter is an ascending line that arrives at its apex and then descends, while the former is a closed circle in which there are phases but no peaks. Presumably, the law of rise and fall is limited to the phases of the cycle; but what force completes and closes [it64]?

Regardless of how these contradictions can be explained historically and psychologically in Polybius, what is of interest here is that Machiavelli circumvents them by deliberately limiting the scope of the mecha nistic validity of cyclicity, (it is not of interest what he adopts from Polybius' scheme, at least in its intellectual core). He does concede that cycles can theoretically repeat themselves infinitely often, but in the same passage he points out two major limitations in practice: Almost no state is so long-lived that it can undergo these changes so many times; moreover, these changes leach a state so that an outside adversary can subdue it and its course suddenly undergoes a deviation. Machiavelli does not deny that states rise and fall; however, this is merely an empirical and pragmatic observation and not an emanation and manifestation of a system with a naturalistic or metaphysical foundation. In examining the rise and fall of states, Machia velli refers directly to the virtues and faults of their statesmen and legislators; the weight he gives to this analysis convinces us of his view that it is there - and not in any "natural order" - that the reasons for the rise and fall of a state are to be found. But the fact that virtu (today one would say "merit" of a man) plays such an important role means that cyclicity is not seen as a naturalistic inevitability, but as a direction, as a tendency of things, which is also changeable.

or can be brought to a standstill, namely by one who wants and has the power to bring about this deviation from the scheme. In this flexible inevitability there is, of course, also room for the mixed form of state - which was (logically) excluded by the immutability of the recurring cycles. The possibility for the realization of the mixed form of state also goes back to the virtu, to the merits of the legislator, to his power to change and direct the historical factors [65-] (As quoted above, in Polybius the establishment of a mixed form of state takes place "on the basis of theoretical consideration"; but this "consideration" [l6gos] has no ground to develop in the naturalistic approach to cyclicity; it is an exogenous factor, an alien principle, which Polybius invokes to underpin something that is also alien to mechanical cyclicity, namely, the mixed form of government.) There are now two other points in which Machiavelli departs from Poly bius's natural law approach. The idea of a periodic destruction of the world by earthquakes, famines and the like, which occur in Polybius between two cycles[66] , is completely absent in Machiavelli. Secondly, Machiavelli still has an antinature legal conception, which he cites as an acting factor both with regard to the changes of government and with regard to the way in which the mixed form of government came into being in Rome: the caso, the coincidence, the coincidence *(Discorsi* 1,2).

In addition to cyclicity, there is a second manifestation of naturalistic thinking in Machiavelli's work: the epochs are conceived as uniform; this uniformity is based on the fact that the passions that drive man are unchangeable. This conception of natural law takes on its most extreme form in the introduction to the first book of the *Discorsi*, where man is seen as something unchangeable with the elements of nature and the -phenomena. But at this point Machia velli wants to emphasize how important the study of ancient history is for contemporary conditions, and feels compelled to an extreme formulation; he levels the epochs and thus generalizes the didactic value of ancient history. This idea appears more analytically in *Discorsi* 1,39, where he declares that the same "grievances" exist in all epochs because people do not know the analogies between the present and the past and are thus incapable of remedying them. But with the hypothesis that someone, based on the study of the past, has found the solution for

found the problems of the present, one would negate the analogy of epochs, because that someone would have eradicated in his epoch the errors that make it equal to all previous epochs. (Here the difference with Polybius is quite clear; Polybius writes that knowledge of the cyclicity of human things shows us what will inevitably happen in the future, while Machiavelli believes that knowledge of the past can show us what to do and what not to do). In the introduction to the second book of the *Discorsi,* Machiavelli strongly emphasizes the active, dynamic aspect that counteracts mechanistic law. Human passions are and always remain the same; thus, historical epochs have a relatively equivalent content among themselves, but this equivalence cannot be translated as a correspondence of historical results, because the static nature of man is opposed to the dynamic virtu, a primary and autonomous element that fluctuates and changes from nation to nation and from epoch to epoch (like the Hegelian "spirit"), without these changes being subject to laws and without passing through the established phases. In *Discorsi* III, 43, other factors besides virtu are used to interpret the differences in the outcome of historical events, despite the uniformity of the historical substrate (human nature, that is). These factors are education, customs and lifestyle67- These differences of the historical outcome allow a multitude of approaches, dodges and predictions - to such an extent that the criterion of the only correct one, which is necessary for a natural law view, is lost. These differences are clearly expressed in *Fürst* 25; there they are so emphasized between the concrete circumstances (if not of the historical epochs as a whole) that even the use of history, which can be drawn from it by means of examples and indirect appeals, becomes problematic. The change of situations, of the respective individualized historical results, is now understood as such a dynamic and driving element that the static human nature can no longer quite keep up.

A third natural law conception is found in *history*
V,l. The first conception was the cyclicity, the second the straight line, the third is now the scheme of the pendulum. In this representation, the phenomena of the existence of states seem to oscillate between two extremes, falling from one to the other: from

order into chaos, from rise to fall, from good to bad; the movement described here does not coincide with the static historical substrate (human nature), nor with the dynamic and autonomous virtu[68]. But clear limitations come into play here. First of all, Machiavelli makes a point (and perhaps it is even more important if he does so unconsciously) of saying from the beginning that it is something that happens "most of the time". And just below that, using Cato as an example, he shows once again how important to him is the volitional, subjective counterpart of the tendency to a regularity x or y - so much so that one might think that regularity and volition appear together and are inseparable in their effect, even though they are opposed to each other. But the apersonal law cannot extinguish the personal merit, and Machiavelli's sympathy is undoubtedly with the second, the will-power, it being the child of an age of marked individualism.

Thus, the analysis of naturalism, or rather of the naturalis
men found in Machiavelli's work that his thought is far from forming a natural law, mechanistic system that ratio and reason would employ to interpret it and measure man's actions against it without being able to change it. Ratio, fundamental element of the way of thinking in the Renaissance and in Machiavelli, does not unfold in theory to the last consequence to create an unbroken system of regularities, it is only available for scientific use, it is the sharp eye, the penetrating ray, a worldly, healthy and anti-metaphysical view of things. Completely and consistently (namely, up to the separation of politics and morality), ratio unfolds only in practice, because there it is of immediate use as a calculating, weighing instance. In practice, ratio becomes the determinant of phenomena and the negation of any mechanical regularity. Consequently, its unfolding in the practical realm makes its full unfolding in theory impossible. How can ratio theorize a regularity which it itself negates in practice before it has even penetrated the realm of theory? Nor does it penetrate the realm of theory entirely, because it is basically a practical ratio, and its theoretical interests are concentrated on practical things. The ratio thus remains an epistemological

attitude and does not become the key to the formation of an ontological system, even if it crystallizes here and there in general and contradictory ontological formulations that have been considered here. At this point, Machiavelli is a true representative of the spurious rationalism in the Renaissance that I outlined in the first chapter; Here, in the general consideration of the epoch, in connection with the real elements that produced this epoch, lies the key to solving the problem of Machiavellian naturalism69- If one examines Machiavelli's naturalism, the difficulty is not in isolating the extreme and obvious elements and then reassembling them in the form of an idea len consistent method; what is difficult is to explain how they coexist with other, heterogeneous elements. Nevertheless, as said, the individual naturalistic elements are so clear that they have been intelligibly emphasized. It has been argued that Machiavelli tended to compare the state to a living organism and extended this analogy by establishing an anatomy of the state, diagnosing diseases and indicating cures70- Machiavelli's naturalistic and organic sensibility is also evident in the metaphors taken from living nature and in his anthropomorphic grasp of phenomena71- On this background, he is also depicted in intellectual kinship with Leonardo da Vinci. In the late Renaissance, when neo-Platonism and irrationality prevail in the ideology of the ruling class, science separates from philosophy (which corresponds to the separation of politics and morality), and their opposition becomes perceptible as the contrast between this world and the next, between the limited and the infinite. Leonardo directs his attention to the mathematical discussion of the former category, where he meets with Machiavelli, who also deals with science, politics, and the finite and leaves the occupation with philosophy, morality, and the infinite to others72- Leonardo also did not found a systematic naturalistic science, he did not even attempt to subordinate the individual phenomena to abstract conceptuality. His thinking was directed to the concrete, specific, the ratio was also for him a way of looking at things73- Like Machiavelli, he was also interested in empiricism, the observation and the completion of technology. But in contrast to Machiavelli Leonardo believed in the progress of man (in the

Leonardo, on the other hand, was closer to technology, where progress is more visible and each new stage of development neutralizes all previous ones; Machiavelli, on the other hand, deals with historical phenomena, where progress is anything but obvious); consequently, previous historical stages have a much greater importance for Machiavelli74- Considering the limitations mentioned above, these parallels undoubtedly help to fully understand Machiavelli.

The fact that reason [logos], the ratio, does not establish a closed system of regularities has the consequence that the ratio feels free and creative in the field of practice. It only takes into account the flexible regularity of the equality of human bodies, but this also represents an orientation aid rather than an insurmountable wall; (the extreme opposite pole of the mechanical regularity, i.e. the extreme individualization, makes acting just as impossible). The orientation aid gives the ratio a direction rather than reminding it of the relativity of its power. This intermediary position of ratio, committed neither to extreme abstraction nor to the positivist turn to the real, is reflected in the isolated formulation of general observations, comparisons, and conclusions about life and history with instinctive and unbending me thodical dynamism. It is also reflected in the intermingling of purely pragmatic and theoretical considerations often found in Machiavelli's work75- Since the mind does not penetrate to the utmost theoretical limits, the grasp of the ontological way of the world and of history is not an issue in Machiavelli; his attitude is purely phenomenological, his intentions are practical nature and must, in order to be realised, have an efficient connection with the outer world as we see it and as it is independent of its depth and its interior, its "eventual" essence.76- But the preoccupation with the phenomenological appearance of the world is never vulgar-positivist and conservatively restrained, because Machiavelli does not exclude anything, even if it is contrary to the contemporary view of things; it is enough that the ratio considers it feasible. Since politics is a daughter of reason, of ratio, it adopts the equation of the logical and the pragmatic.

From the structure of the ratio, from its positioning between theory and practice (with a noticeable inclination towards practice), also the

The structure of the instrument which practically applies the ratio, namely the (political) technique. If the world in Machiavelli's work were perceived in a natural-law and mechanistic way, and if an equally natural-law and mechanistic knowledge were to correspond to it, this technique would be nothing more than the knowledge of and reaction to an unchangeable order; it would be only a way of bringing things into conformity with an unchangeable coerciveness-and in the course of adaptation to an unchangeable natural order, the question of moral does not arise, for it lacks the freedom of the human will, without which every moral postulate is weakened or extinguished. But the world and history do not manifest themselves in this way for Machiavelli, and political technique is not a mode of adapting to an objective order of things; it is merely a holding of ratio that seeks to investigate its field (politics) by separating it strictly from all other fields (from morality) without negating or leveling them, as would be the case with a natural law order. Politics emancipates itself from other fields, but tolerates innumerable interrelations and connections within it. To be the expression of a practical and calculating spirit, this technique must therefore be extremely inventive and calculating. (If, on the other hand, the spirit had a mechanical order of things before it, it would not be calculating, but theoretical and contemplative[77].

As a result of the separation of morality and politics and the existence of the mind as an instrument of advancing mainly practical needs, political technique is objective in the sense that it is not interested in the psychological motives of the acting people, but only in the results of their actions and in the external procedure that will follow the unfolding of the " means-end " scheme. Machiavelli lacks any Kantian evaluation of actions (if not of people) on the basis of the intentions that led to those actions; an action is evaluated according to the measure of its success. If a prince committed a crime for the sake of the common good, and that crime failed, Machiavelli would certainly disapprove of it just as he would disapprove of a crime that was against the common good. Intent is not enough; it also takes intelligence to succeed. A virtue that is not balanced by a corresponding merit can easily be listed in the ledger of results with

the worst intentions[78- As] much as the good intentions are a conditio sine qua non in the field of morality, the flawless technique is an indispensable prerequisite for all those who move in the field of politics; since morality and politics are strictly separated from each other, the results (the pro ducts of political technique) also remain separate from subjective intentions.

In the concept of political technique, one immediately recognizes the ideal of virtuosity and the construct, which, as mentioned above, is a fundamental attitude of mind in the Renaissance. In its extreme, pure form, this ideal presents itself as isolated from the psychic and moral motives that lead the individual to work in a field, so that he devotes himself to the purely technical treatment of that field. Thus, it is easy to be seduced into forgetting this extra-technical foundation - which, as will be shown below, is clearly present in Machiavelli - and to regard him as a pure technocrat of politics and [power79-] But in truth Machiavelli considers only certain (extra-technical) ends and moves on this basis toward the formation of the technical side of his thought, without constantly recalling the connection between ends and means, so that technique finally appears as an independent and autonomous quantity. The confusion becomes even greater because, on the one hand, the ends that Machiavelli sets belong in the same realm as technique (i.e., in the realm of politics and not morality) and because, on the other hand, Machiavelli is so fascinated by the technical side of the means that he often loses sight of the ends themselves or puts them on the back burner and delights in virtuosity, in immaculate political craft as an end in itself; and if the "immoral" means do not ultimately sanctify the "moral" end, then we have "Machiavellianism" in its common conception. The impression of "pure technique" is also reinforced by the fact that Machiavelli's relativism regarding the value of the form of government drives him to address his technical advice once to republics, once to monarchies, once to leading individuals (cf. *Discorsi* III,35). However, as long as the different forms of government (not as a relative concept in which Machiavelli conceives them in relation to what he himself considers important for a state, but in their real independent existence) may have conflicting intentions and conflicting practices, the technical advice also contradicts itself; it loses the ability to adhere to a

ideational system and get a meaning only if they are considered as a service for the rulers. The inexistence and displacement of values can thus turn the technocrat, the policy expert, into a will-less instrument of anyone; here I recall the critique of "value freedom" that Max Weber considers an indispensable quality of the scientist. Perhaps Machiavelli sought to become such a polititechnocrat in the last ten or fifteen years of his life, when he persistently strove to enter the service of the Medici, constantly proposing new solutions to concrete problems; When the first proposal was not accepted, he submitted one modified plan after another, as if it were a game of chess that could be played with very different moves, without it being of great importance which move was finally made (this was the case, for example, with the plans for arming Florence, which he submitted to Pope Clement VII, rather unsolicited and with the intention that his services would be respected). First he suggested the creation of a national army, and when this failed, Giovanni delle Bande Nere was to be helped to form an army, etc.). But Machiavelli did this in this form in a time of personal, psychological and ideological contrition.

The worship of pure political technique and virtuosity is clearly shown in Machiavelli's work in the fact that he finds pleasure in the wisdom of the persons acting, regardless of who these persons are and what their disposition [is80]; in this he resembles Thucydides81- At every outstanding personality he pauses for a moment and identifies with him as an initiate with the initiate, regardless of whether this personality was a republican or an aristocrat, a general or a prophet; in the *Florentine Histories,* therefore, he follows with interest the fate of the knights of fortune in the field of politics and their achievements, such as those of the Duke of Athens, Michele di Lado, Francesco Sforza and others82- It also contributed to Machiavelli's intellectual agility that he had neither a one-sided class orientation nor a systematic theory, Machiavelli appreciates power, he sees that the world is ruled by power, but this power is largely perceived as prudence, as the correct use of technology and as the correct topos in relation to the circumstances, i.e. as partial intellectual greatness84. Consequently, the defeated, the weakest, must simply be a little stupid.

Since, for Machiavelli, prudence and virtuosity are at the core of power and occupy the highest place on his scale of values, it follows that the criterion for the personal worth of the individual cannot be the external adjuncts of power, but the heart itself, and that is prudence and skill, not origin and social position (cf. *Discorsi* III,34). That individuality can have no other supports than those it creates for itself is one of the essential points in Machiavelli's thought, which is manifestly anti-medieval and anti-feudal. Because of precisely this conception, the citizen makes use of all means - and their interrelated use as a form of a certain technique - to obtain a social position, while the feudal nobility, which invoked high titles that have nothing to do with personal merit and insisted on moral principles such as respectability and senseless bravery, disappeared just before86- The Ratio, The ratio, the technique and at the same time the displacement of a factor like the social origin lead Machiavelli to another important conception, namely that a prince, in possession of the ratio and master of the technique, can without further ado deny his social roots and his personal ties and follow the path that the reason of state and the consideration of things, which underlie rationalism and the right political technique, point out to him. This belief is one of the reasons (and perhaps the most disinterested) that led Machiavelli to dedicate the *Prince* first to Julius II and finally to Lorenzo de' Me dici, in the hope that they might embrace ratio and pursue a very different policy (in terms of ends, if not means) from that which would understandably be expected by someone who, like Machiavelli himself, knew the history of their fa milies so well. Partly for the same motive, he also submitted his famous memorandum to Cardinal Giulio de' Medici a little later.

Although Machiavelli is deeply attached to the spirit of calculation and measurement and constantly has the technical and virtuoso side of things in mind, behind rationalism there is a heterogeneous, alien, psycho-spiritual force that directs him towards technology and aligns him with it, even if this often becomes an independent principle. This force is patriotism, the idea of a fatherland and love for it, which is presented as something self-evident and

absolute without being given any further rational foundation and without the concept of patriotism being relativised on account of the existence of many fatherlands, as was the case with Machiavelli through the existence of many religions with religion. Machiavelli does with the concept of religion due to the existence of many religions.[87]-Overall Machiavelli nowhere articulates in detail his attitude to the fatherland as the highest value. to the fatherland as the highest value, just as he does not consider the reason of state explicitly as the goal of politics; no matter how much he likes punchy words and epigrammatic formulations, in everything that he places on the highest level of his scale of values, he does not bother to support and condense it with words and arguments, he simply takes it for granted, and his personal inner inclination was substantiation enough for him. Thus, although Machiavelli treats and develops the empirical and calculating element of the Renaissance like few others, he does not draw from it his power of faith in the postulate and in the vision of a political and state reorganization, but he draws it from his patriotism, for which he seeks a model in Roman antiquity[88]- This derivation of patriotic sentiment from antiquity is the first source of Machiavelli's patriotism, which brings him close to the humanists. From this point of view his patriotism has nothing of the nationalism of the national movements of the 19th century in itself. It is neither mystical nor organic, as it is Machiavelli is humanist, he upholds the memory of the Roman grandeur that had shone in the same lands; he seeks in it the mode and method for the resurrection of modern Italy and contrasts the high culture of the Italian fatherland with the "barbarism" of the foreign invaders and occupiers. A second, though not subordinate, source of Machiavelli's patriotism is early bourgeois patriotism, the patriotism of bourgeois societies that militantly defended their independence from emperor and pope. In Florence in particular, patriotism had flared up as a counterpart to the papal excommunications, and the Ghibellines had fought against the pope, seeing themselves first and foremost as Florentines and secondly as Christians[90]- But even the Guelfs, who were initially allies of the pope against the emperor, later turned against him in many cases and embodied Florentine patriotism in an even purer form than the Ghibellines - the state there had already begun to be linked to the ruling class and to take their interests into account in its political actions.

visible. The remarkable works of art, the towers and churches that were built at that time, do not owe their origin to concrete or rational necessities - they were built as testimonies of civic patriotism, they are symbols of the greatness of the community and the sacrifice of its citizens[91]. And there is a third source from which Machiavelli's patriotism springs: the conception of fatherland as the field of realization of a certain ideal conception of state as such. Here, unadulterated patriotism seems to be subordinated to the political scientist's considerations; but this is not absolutely so, if we consider the close connection between theory and practice, or rather: the dependence of theory on practical necessities in Machiavelli's work. The theory, which ultimately arises because of patriotic aims, but is to some extent independent, makes a turn and rushes to the aid of the fatherland; but now, after strolling around in general politological phenomena, the spirit comes back to the fatherland differentiated; it had set out only with a patriotic longing, now it returns theoretically enriched. His initial zeal is not diminished, but through the broader consideration he can approach his goal again, objectifying it at the same time. Although the desire to serve the fatherland remains his driving force, he can now also feel it as a necessity to be of service to a theoretical framework. Thus, the fatherland acquires yet another dimension and appeal; now, in addition to the patriot in the narrower sense, he also attracts the theorist; theorist and patriot become one[92].

Psychologically, the passion for technique can also be readily accompanied by motives that are intrinsically alien to technique; thus, a chess player must think coolly in any concrete situation, but he must also harbor a passion for chess in general; moreover, he must put this presupposed passion behind him when he chooses his moves. Generally speaking, as already mentioned, the combination of the spirit of technique and virtuosity with more or less irrational inner forces and inclinations is an essential feature of the Renaissance mentality, which was particularly pronounced in Machiavelli's homeland. In Florence, whose development most clearly represents the separation of the Renaissance from the Middle Ages from an ideal-typical point of view, rational thinking not only unfolds strongly, but precisely through this development it necessarily penetrates into areas where it is confronted by heterogeneous

elements must coexist. Thus, the particular Florentine mind assumes a duality that manifests itself everywhere, especially in art, where understandably the interpenetration of rationalism and imagination, for example, becomes even more perceptible in a representational way. Apart from economic enterprises, rationalism had no other field in Florentine thought to develop in its pure form. Strictly scientific professions did not exist (nor were there any appropriately trained scientists), but art had many patrons; people more rational than artistic studied in the artists' workshops, and science, which could not be pursued independently, flowed into art, which became an instrument for solving problems and passing on knowledge. In the painting of the Florentine school we see much more often and more clearly than in others the tendency to display technical elements, even if this was at the expense of the meaning or other elements of the picture; at some point, what was depicted took on a mathematical rather than a psychological significance, because a problem created by the depiction was of greater interest than the depicted itself, and color is secondary to form (the opposite is the case with the Venetian School)[93]. This is not to say, of course, as is often suggested, that in Machiavelli's thought political technique combined with patriotism in the same way that artistic technique combined with artistic vision; However, it clearly shows that the clear separation of politics and morality in Machiavelli's work does not necessarily imply a separation of political technique from certain goals and values - such as the fatherland - values that are admittedly political in character, but which at the same time are or can be associated with postulates that in the final analysis do not belong to politics in the strict sense. This was possible because the spirit of technology worked in (more or less unequal) connection with other inner forces.

If we look at the relationship between political technique and patriotism from this point of view, the relationship between politics and morality, means and ends, is also revealed from a new angle. If the fatherland, the state, is a self-evident value and if its existence is useful for the common good, then violent and "immoral" means are not only justified by this, they must even be regarded as necessary, not out of political necessity, but for a higher end, which is the common good.

has a legitimacy that goes beyond the political, if it is not already distinctly moral. The means are bad and immoral only on the level of appearance, but not in their inner essence. Is it moral to reject the use of "immoral" means if one thereby allows the truly evil to continue to rule94? In this indirect way, and not as a direct conclusion, but as a logical derivation, we arrive at a kind of reunification of politics and morality, through the introduction of an intermediary third factor, which operates entirely in the realm of politics, but whose legitimation Machiavelli does not undertake through political criteria (nor through explicitly moral ones). This third factor is the fatherland, the state; its doctrine emerges from the critical study of historical and political events and subordinates itself to a passionate inclination to patriotism, that is, to the service of the state's interests and

to the common good. On the other hand, one must not think that this inclination is moral95 because, as said, for Machiavelli "morality" is is mainly a conformity of individual behavior with precepts that present themselves as having religious origins.

Also, noting the connection between rational technique and patriotism in Machiavelli's worldview helps to deepen the notion of Machiavelian "science." From another perspective, one can again see how the practical, the patriotic, the rational's conquests and necessities set limits to its broad theoretical expansion. First of all, the political system that we can establish from the more or less consistent conceptions that we find in Machiavelli's works is fundamentally based on the axes of practical-political necessities that he dealt with; in an accomplished form, this system emphatically emphasizes those points that occupied Machiavelli as tangible political postulates and not as abstract logical foundations on which a system could be built. The prism of practical and historical content in Machiavelli's work makes it extremely difficult to judge its purely theoretical and scientific value.96 Machiavelli does not summarize his political science as a theoretical system (as do those that emerge as a scientific or ideological response to other systems that, by convention - and for appearances - ignore the real situation underlying them and subsequently conduct the dialogue at a level of operationalized, abstract quantities),

Machiavelli is not a philosopher, but he presents them by means of practical advice on concrete problems, advice which, however, requires depth and historical generalization. Machiavelli projects the historical situation of his epoch onto the canvas of history as a whole; but he does this less out of purely theoretical consciousness than out of political sensibility97. Thus, there can be no final theoretical judgment on the value of Machiavelli's political science, for the ana lysis within the framework of abstract politological theses must examine the historical circumstances that gave content to those theses. However, this is no reason to abandon the attempt to determine recurring elements in Machiavelli's work, which are considered fixed theoretical quantities and can be used as keys to understanding history in its entirety. Moreover, all theories and systems are inseparably linked to a concrete historical foundation that nourishes them much more substantially than any direct intellectual and theoretical influence. But if this histo rical foundation clearly contained certain typical, recurring elements, and if the mind could recognize in it in parts the regularities and the general characteristics of the whole, the immanent relativism of social knowledge is fundamentally overcome. What is the spiritual "eternal good" that Machiavelli bequeathed to mankind would have to be investigated through the study of innumerable other factors outside Machiavelli's historical position, to which this study is limited.

Thus, the adoption of one or another history philosophy in Machiavelli's work is practical (and is done for factual reasons), not theoretical; it is an indispensable consequence of the statesmanship that Machiavelli wanted to teach98. The coherence is missing not only in terms of the establishment of a system, but also in the arrangement of the material, as can be seen in the organization of the *Discorsi*. Nevertheless, all the problems that Italy had to face in that period are examined, albeit digressively and in connection with other, seemingly unrelated issues. There would be coherence if Machiavelli had remained consistent with the tangible political problems that preoccupied him, but he wants to give the proposed solutions historic breadth, and so he arrives at a point between contemporary view and abstract, general view99. Its (spontaneous) position at this intermediate point has the following result:

By examining the real political problems that concern him, Machiavelli arrives at certain theoretical generalisations or he first adopts general theoretical approaches (such as general theoretical approaches (such as Polybius' theory of the cycle) because he feels that they they are related to his problems; but he does not take the trouble to develop this relationship in a complete logical series. However, since his basic interest is not theoretical, these theoretical problems do not return to him.
"climaxes," to call them so, do not always return as logical peaks to the realm of tangible politics, but it seems as if they were forgotten exactly where they should have been applied to the study of contemporary situations. Once again, Machiavelli returns to his preferred field of the concrete and partial, and now gives his advice not on the basis of the generalizations towards which his thought process is heading, but from the dialectic of the particular situations and on the basis of a decision of the agent, The ease of this change is due to the fact that Machiavelli does not separate a purely theoretical from a purely practical area in his thinking; at the same time, he does not connect theory and practice with a logical transition from one to the other area, but considers their parallel existence simply as a matter of course. He does not set any dividing lines between the theoretical and practical treatment of political issues, one follows the other, one alternates with the other, without feeling the need to justify or even control this succession or alternation. The unified structure of this whole seems to him self-referential insofar as everything is related by virtue of its immanence in the political realm.

The same attitude can be found in the way Machiavelli treats ancient history. The constant intellectual engagement with the problems of the present, that is, the primarily practical purpose of his reflections, leads Machiavelli to draw from his recursions to the people of antiquity and their actions primarily practical patterns and only secondarily underpinnings for his theoretical theses. He does not see antiquity and history as a whole in its abstract and lawful development, but looks at it from the perspective of historical (and often personal) events. Instead of theorizing about the effect of one factor or another, he is not interested in the

When it comes to discussing the history of the Roman state, Machiavelli prefers to draw immediately on an example, and to deal with events through names and actions rather than through apersonal forces.[101] Even where he refers to antiquity not as the bearer of individual patterns, but rather as the representative of supra-personal achievements, as embodied by the Roman state, it is noticeable that he contrasts it with the physiognomy and postulates of the present, and follows in such detail the actions of the persons who helped these supra-personal achievements to come into existence, that our impression does not change significantly. However, as far as history and the world of his time are concerned, Machiavelli does not move, driven by purely theoretical interest, out of the circle drawn around him by his experience and direct information. He does not examine all possible variants of a form of government in order to draw parallels and draw up comparisons as Montesquieu would later do (for example, he knows little about England, although he could easily have obtained information from Florentine merchants. Florentine merchants. France and Germany, on the other hand, which he knows from his own experience, and also Switzerland, whose armies often fought on Italian soil, give him much to think about). He also did not deal with the world historical events of his time, with the great discoveries, the importance of which Guicciardini understood very well[102]. However, this is not due to a narrow-mindedness of Machiavelli; his edifice of thought was built on the realities of the Italian political situation, and the passion with which he deals with it does not allow him to transgress these limits. However, since these conditions were varied and typical, while at the same time the general intellectual reflection of his time provided the necessary logical tools, his thought did not lose any of its dynamism.

In short, Machiavelli does not distinguish between a causalistic and a normativistic science. Therefore, for him, the ideal normativist reception of the present coincides with certain events that have taken place and have been proven[103], and this congruence does not mean a mechanical repetition of the past, but, on the contrary, it puts the emphasis on the active subject, who uses models to create his own world, and does not settle for turning the wheel of some lawfulness that will surely turn one way or another. The hour for the creation of causalistic systems (and consequently the development of the disparity of being and ought) was not yet

come. We are still in a time when the medieval religious system of thought has just been destroyed, the world is fragmented into dewy pieces, and man does not know where to start first in order to lay a new foundation. He leaves the one and tries the other, he hurries from one point to the other, he does not succeed in setting up a system, he experiments and wavers without ceasing. So it is understandable that not cohesive, organized systems prevail, but open, unbalanced constructs.

Up to this point, I have traced the main features of Machiavelli's thought and created a logical series. I have shown how the relationship between morality and politics and between natural law and individualistic, will-oriented observation is represented in his thinking, and how the concrete connection between these variables, in connection with his patriotism and the tangible political problems with which he is intensively and passionately concerned, forms the character of his "science". Moreover, I have related, so to speak, the ambivalence and the double nature of his reflections to the corresponding ambiguity of the outlined intellectual world of Renaissance. Nevertheless, the theoretical exploration of these correspondences is in a sense a tautology rather than an interpretation, because it does not elucidate through what real situation these correspondences were transferred from the whole to the partial, from time to the individual, nor does it explain why this transfer occurred in this way and not otherwise. In order to find this interpretation in relation to Machiavelli, it is necessary to delineate a field in which the fundamental themes of his thought found an applied form - the separation of politics and morality, and his tendency to create a theory that emerges from practical-political necessities and in which patriotic sentiment interweaves with and forms the basis of general assessments. This field exists not only in the history of the time, but above all in Machiavelli's personal life, in his everyday activity, where it occupies a central place, so that his thought and his spiritual life are connected to this field by innumerable threads - it is the civil service and above all his diplomatic activity. Here one can trace one after the other in a tangible form the cornerstones of his thinking, which have been logically sketched above. According to the scientific technique, this should be done in the following way: First of all, the diplomatic and civil service

If Machiavelli's early activities were to be reorganized biographically from the point of view of the influence that certain events may have had on his thinking (here, however, conjecture is unavoidable), then his diplomatic reports would have to be analyzed in connection with the entirety of the diplomatic writings of the time, and thirdly, these would have to be compared with his later writings - not only to find congruent thoughts, but also to find similarities in style and thought as well as in the consideration of the whole and the partial. This approach requires an exhaustive study and comparison of the texts and would constitute an extensive undertaking in itself. In the following pages, however, only certain central passages of the text will be used for the general and fundamental observations, which also means that the whole bandwidth from the abstract reception to the real form of the problems can again not be taken into account. It is sufficient, however, to trace the direction.

Contemporary, modern diplomacy began in the Renaissance period with the appointment of permanent ambassadors and the development of a corresponding protocol and is a consequence of the emergence of a modern conception of the state and at the same time its characteristic symbol. Now, the international society appears on a horizontal level as a realm divided into even native and independent states, in contrast to the medieval conception which knew no states, but only a world divided vertically and hierarchically. This change is beautifully illustrated by the fact that rulers lose the right to punish themselves those foreign envoys who were accredited to them and were convicted of espionage or conspiracy (this right derived from the medieval conception that morality was above politics). Now the envoy has the right of extraterritoriality; he is merely expelled, and thus it is indirectly recognized that the individual is bound by no other obligations above his duty to his country. Politics in the form of patriotic duty as an ideology, which in any case also justifies "immoral" means, is now above the former morality and includes it1°4- That an envoy lies and intrigues and is caught in the process is no longer regarded as a moral failure, but as a failure in the technical performance of his self-evident duty; this is also how his opponents understand it.

ners who assert the same rights for themselves. Obviously, this new perspective first emerged in Renaissance Italy, not only because the general conditions here rationalized diplomacy, but also because the concrete political perspective favored the development of diplomacy. The influence of the German emperors had diminished since the second half of the 13th century, and through the Avignon exile of the popes, which lasted throughout the 14th century, a system of equilibrium between certain states that had emerged within the Italian borders slowly unfolded in Italy, now freed from the two great powers. When the Pope returned, it was not as a reinstatement of one of the two former ruling powers that had survived and now wanted to take its place again, but he inserted himself as a simple link in the system of equilibrium that had been created. (Nevertheless, an indispensable condition for the functioning of this system was that it remained untroubled from the outside, which was the case for a long time; this led to the fact that the idea of an external danger became alien to the consciousness of the Italians, and therefore they were surprised by the incursions of the French and Spanish).

There was also a geographical reason that favored the development of diplomacy in Italy: the system of equilibrium was established in a relatively small area, which facilitated a convenient and frequent exchange of diplomatic representatives and envoys; this was of great importance, considering how difficult distances were to overcome at that time. (The same geographical reason was also a helpful factor in the development of state cohesion in the Italian middle states; their small spatial extent meant that they could easily be covered by the new state police, judicial and tax authorities, and the like). The bearers of the new diplomatic art were now those who also embodied the new character of the state. Diplomacy was the state occupation that was tailor-made for the unwarlike big citizens; wars were the business of mercenaries, there the citizens could not prove themselves. Moreover, because of the entrepreneurial character with which it was fought by the paymasters, mercenary warfare became a battle of wiles and angles and demanded political rather than soldierly skill; it did not drastically resolve differences, but only exerted pressure and created an atmosphere in which the political leadership of the burghers could

diplomatic advantages to be able to play their negotiating games. Thus, in the eyes of the citizens, war appeared as something subordinate and dependent on politics, and their faith in the superiority of politics and in the art of rhetorical persuasion was strengthened even [more1°5-] Equipped with all the rational elements of the Renaissance intellectual world, this system of equilibrium of the states on the Italian boot produced a political and diplomatic technique that functioned according to fixed rules and sought criteria and taught a sober view - and at the same time a subjective and patriotic view through the prism of the interests of one's own country. The wars after 1494 added more players, and at the same time their connections and changes increased; thus they applied and deepened this political spirit, relating it no longer to the technical question of maintaining equilibrium, but to the ge waltige event of the rise and fall of states. In this mature form, we find this spirit in Machiavelli [106-].

The importance of information in shaping policy became apparent early on in the Italian merchant states, which also maintained overseas business relations. Initially, this information was possessed by the leaders of the respective local trading colonies (in some cases, of course, these men then also became the first permanent ambassadors) or the bank brokers who, due to their close contacts with the rulers to whom they lent money, had first-hand knowledge of the political situation of the countries in which they became active. After 1434, a Medici banker was little different from the diplomatic representatives of the state of Florence. The social background and the activity of the informants also immediately reveal that a pondering and calculating view prevailed in their reports, an exact, enterprising and perceptive assessment of the situation and the possibilities arising from it. By 1450, the Italian states had well-organised authorities that received written reports, created archives and, at the same time, handled an extensive correspondence. The direct incorporation of diplomatic activity into the sphere of state authorities had a serious impact on the exercise of this activity. In the beginning, the ambassador was sent to his destination alone with his personal servants, whom he maintained himself, and, if he wished, with a secretary, whom he also had to pay out of his own pocket.

This may have been more economical for the state, but the relationship with the envoy was rather loose. Now the post of secretary was created, who accompanied the envoy and was employed by the corresponding state authority (Venice and Florence were the first to hire such secretaries). He was paid directly by the state, he was directly subordinate to its authority and he had the right to represent the ambassador in case of his absence or indisposition. Since the secretaries were directly subordinate to the state, they were much more imbued with the spirit of the reason of state than the envoys themselves, who, because they came from old noble families, often accepted their posts on an honorary basis and often had outdated ideas that lagged behind the immediate political necessities. Slowly, therefore, the secretaries became the real axis of their country's diplomatic activity, becoming, in a sense, bureaucrats who, by virtue of their permanent employment, always knew how things were and had a sense of how things were going. The Venetians therefore never removed the secretary when an envoy was recalled; they left him on the spot to train the new ambassador and let him share his experience 108-.

Particularly in Florence, the diplomatic reports submitted to the
The diplomatic envoy and his secretary had to submit reports on a regular basis and at intervals of a few days. But in addition to these many reports, which were of course very informative pieces of writing, the diplomatic envoy also had to write general reports from time to time in which he gave a broader overview. Often these reports were whole treatises full of general political considerations and general analyses of political situations, and they were supported (in the manner of the humanists) with examples from antiquity and an empirical and unproven philosophy of history. On the basis of these general reports (which enjoyed great attention - which the author knew and therefore put all ambition into doing his best), the authorities assessed the author's ability to observe, make connections and analyze; he was judged as if he had submitted a dissertation. Thus, he put aside topical issues and appealed to the general knowledge, intellectual sensibility and education of those who read his report, and he made every effort to introduce intellectual elements that were fashionable at the time and that he took from texts that had no direct relation to politics.

(It must be remembered that the ruling class still determined politics and writing; the intelligentsia had already begun to secede, but this was more in the service of the rulers than as their opponents). In time, the huma nistic style was adopted, and the reports or treatises were expanded to include geography, history, government, and customs of the foreign country. The humanistic rhetorical style certainly intensified in the final version, when the envoy returned and, at least in Venice, the report was read before the entire council. All these reports were kept in archives, the best ones were transcribed and compiled in collections that were studied not only by experts but also by a wider educated readership[109-].

Given the importance of the written report in the diplomatic activity, as well as the oral expressions at the ceremony of conferring the accreditations or at the account given by the sender after his return, it is easy to understand the role played by the humanistic education - the only one at that time that could guarantee an impeccable exercise of these duties - in the practical exercise of the diploma tie, in addition to the capacity for entrepreneurial and calculating assessment of the situation. The humanists, professional and amateur, were indispensable for the writing of letters or festive speeches, and a whole philology of practical indications developed around the art of writing. Epistolary theory, rhetoric, and diplomacy combine here in a straight line, and the humanistic mode of expression mixes with and often weakens the rationalistic, naturalistic observation. Since rationalism had not become the axis of independent education, it was normal to follow other patterns when new circumstances demanded it, and to be "learned," which at the time meant being familiar with the topoi of the humanists. But even if the forms of diplomatic activity were characterized by those who carried out the visible part of diplomacy, namely the educated envoys from great families, who resorted to euphemistic phrases of the fashion of the time and sometimes got stuck in them, the ratio nevertheless prevailed in parallel at the core of the diplomatic work. For they who did this work, the secretaries and the permanent civil servants, and who would have liked to have possessed more humanistic education in order to be able to present themselves to their superiors in the same way as they did.

The people who felt responsible relied on reason as an instrument of observation and persuasion, i.e., as a well-chosen argument that could defeat the opponent if he was inspired by the same spirit.

The political conditions that preceded Charles VIII's invasion of Italy triggered an unprecedented diplomatic activity. All other intellectual activity was initially suspended in favor of the writing of diplomatic letters. Countless letters and reports were written, in which the Venetians distinguished themselves by their practical thinking and reason, while the Florentines distinguished themselves by their excellent psychological analyses, studies of character and passions, their detailed descriptions and their elegant [style110]. The events that followed benefited Europe, where the ground was prepared to exploit them intellectually; besides diplomatic writing, there was already a rich tradition of historiography, family archives, diaries, market studies and commercial correspondence[111]. But the new political point of view emerged above all from the treatises of diplomats and ambassadors, which, thanks to the realistic view of things -as their subject required-, completely broke away from the medieval tradition and the Latin language. All the material of the diplomatic activities had only to be systematized in the framework of certain orienting ideas and could thus shine as the core of a new politological reception [112].

If we look at all the features of diplomacy one after the other and relate the starting points, the consequences and the interconnections, we see that they correspond not only to certain features of the epoch that emerge from a general observation, but also to the general premises in Machiavelli's thought. In theory, the diplomat accepts the separation of politics and morality as a matter of course, while in practice he can go further and subordinate morality to politics. He also has to believe strongly in the virtuosity and abilities of the individual, in the possibility of rationally dealing with a reality that is not mechanical but results from certain actions planned by certain persons - if he does not believe in this, he cannot see any sense in his activity. On the other hand, patriotism is the foundation of rational confrontation with the din-

It is a very important aspect of the diplomat's work. Even if it is not a passionate personal feeling, it demands in any case both a subordination of the diplomat's technical skill to the interests of his state and a consideration of the problems from the perspective of the necessities for his state. This leads to the fact that in time his whole mental world is formed around the axis of these problems, because the daily preoccupation with certain problems gives these questions universal dimensions and primary importance in the mind of the individual. The inevitable contemplation of general political questions is reinforced by a prism which is sharpened by the constant necessities and the consolidated attitudes which the diplomat takes with his experience, and it is further reinforced by the way in which he must draft his reports. He must give general assessments (even if they were often only a repetition of humanistic topoi) and cite historical examples. Thus the diplomat reaches certain theoretical heights, his theory being a consequence of the preoccupation with concrete questions and its scope being naturally limited, just as it is limited because of the patriotic way of looking at things that flows into it: the practical mind produces the theoretical mind, but it prevents the latter from being unmixed. The common theoretical views manifest themselves as axioms derived from experience, and although they serve as points of reference, no attempt is made to prove them. Their only but inadequate proof is the mention of Jialles that supposedly confirm them. The diplomat (the individual who takes his intellectual world from politics and diplomacy) can escape this relativity of patriotism, which limits thinking, to a greater or lesser degree only by taking a completely technical view of the issues, that is, by turning his attention to the forces at work on the diplomatic stage, weighing them, and judging what will happen when one or the other event occurs. In this sense, Machiavelli, although an ardent patriot, often escapes the barriers of patriotism and even more the limitations that cloud the perception of all those envoys who come from great families and see the exercise of their profession as an opportunity to do honor to their name, while they likewise, and according to the same criterion, strive to honor their fatherland with magnificent speeches and speeches of humanists rather than to serve it practically and according to the reason of state.

Machiavelli belongs to a lower level; he is one of the permanent secretaries in the civil service who are much more imbued with the substance of the reason of state than with its full-bodied epithet.

It is not unusual that Machiavelli highlights all these correspondences so clearly, even if we look at it from a purely statistical and technical point of view: He devoted fourteen uninterrupted years to intensive official and diplomatic activity - these were the years of his greatest vigor, and this period precisely preceded the period of his life of primarily literary and intellectual activity. The official reports that he wrote during these fourteen years make up almost half of all the texts that have come down to us from his hand. This external criterion alone makes it clear how close the connection is between his professional activity and his later works; this connection does not arise merely as a theoretical conclusion, but it is tangible as a unity of style and thought that can be demonstrated by a detailed textual analysis. Machiavelli wrote his books as he wrote his reports: as if he were presenting his arguments to colleagues who had the same interests as himself, or as if he were presenting them to a ruler whom he wished to instruct[113]. The early texts he wrote as a political man and the later books also have in common that and the later books have in common that he derives general values in axiomatic values in an axiomatic form and also makes historical references where this would not have been necessary[114].

As a transitional link between his diplomatic reports and his books, the short political texts he wrote during the fourteen years he served as Secretary of the Council of Ten are particularly important. Here one can clearly see how his views are formed in the confrontation with concrete questions; some of these texts are official reports and motions, others are written-down speeches, still others elaborations of topics that he had addressed and submitted in earlier essays. In these texts, which do not exceed a few dozen pages, are found, in a first but very clear form, very many of the fundamental themes that recur in his later works; here are also consolidated his fundamental criteria and his way of grasping things. What is clear is that he deliberately bypasses direct practical necessity and sets forth general theses with which he indirectly takes a personal, independent stand-

Machiavelli's thought is a kind of "thinking" that stems from the obstinacy of the knowledgeable and seems slightly sarcastic to the indolent and ignorant rulers. The core of Machiavelli's thought, as well as his individual attitude toward problems, formed in an early form from 1500 to 1503. It is difficult, however, to find a year of the many years he served in the Chancellery that did not stimulate him to themes or thoughts that he later gave expression to [115-] This core can be found not only in his political writings; as has been said, they occupy a place in his diplomatic reports and the later works-it can also be discovered in these reports themselves. The most comprehensive and fluently written reports tend to place the information within an overall theoretical framework. In his reports, Machiavelli often goes stylistically beyond the way a simple official would write when addressing his superiors: He lends levity to the text, he generalizes, he [lectures116]; sometimes he also seems to adopt the attitude of a neutral observer, impartially assessing developments and not hesitating to praise the opposing side when it has mastered the political craft well-which was certainly quite disturbing to the readers of his reports. In one report he even praises Cesare Borgia, at a time when the latter was so hated in Florence that some people speculated that Machiavelli had written all this only because he was speculating on some favor from the duke. His friend and colleague Buonaccorsi wrote him a letter on November 15, 1503, advising him to be more careful (Villari (1877), p. 479f.). As the years go by, Machiavelli's style becomes more fluent and betrays more self-confidence; of course, the author remains within the bounds of his instructions with regard to the activities he reports on, but in spirit he works out the situation independently and does not hesitate to pass judgment on crises of his government. He uses literary references or proverbial phrases more freely and abandons any apologetic and reserved tone. Admittedly, one also reads from his sentences a hint of the contemptuous attitude of the ruling class towards the masses, who are not privy to the game of politics [117-] This turn becomes quite clear in 1503; in this year he also writes three of his most characteristic short texts. To some extent, this certainly reflects his personal rise in service after Piero Soderini, who was favorably disposed toward him, was appointed to the highest office in Florence.

It must be noted that Machiavelli's experience as a diplomat and public servant is directly related to the way in which certain fundamental features of his way of looking at things entered into his thinking. First, through his diplomatic activity and exposure to international politics, he had the opportunity to view Italy and its states from the outside. Thus Machiavelli arrived at a conception of the state not as an independent entity standing alone, but as an organism in constant struggle with other state organisms opposed to it. This struggle is the most important event in the life of a state, because its outcome determines its survival or death. Consequently, all the elements that the State has at its disposal (institutions and citizens) must be set up in such a way as the objective requires in order to obtain the best possible result in this perpetual and merciless struggle. The form of the state, beyond the satisfaction of the classes or citizens, must be fundamentally designed in such a way as to permit the greatest possible union of forces in confrontation with hostile states and to ensure the integrity and continued existence of the state or even its expansion. Secondly, Machiavelli, through his diplomatic experiences, personally arrived at one of the fundamental orientations in the Renaissance conception of life. His practical work brings him in constant contact with people who possessed the power to make important political decisions, and he also comes into contact with the immediate environment that prepares these decisions. Thus, the apersonal and abstract perception of historical powers disappears from his view, instead he sees only the persons who possess these powers and the concrete necessities and circumstances in which these persons make their decisions. It was thus nor times that Machiavelli always saw the dependence of historical events on the individual decisions of single individuals, decisions made in particular and accidental situations. But historical factors cannot be understood in their full scope if their observation does not go beyond the form of an experiential process. Meaning can emerge only in the totality, while the individual manifestations are usually and essentially as misleading as they seem convincing. But the reduction of historical factors to individual actions and decisions was, as I have said, an essential and complete area of the individualistic and will-oriented view in Machiavelli and in his time.

In place of abstract causality, which cannot exist under these conditions,

there is a concrete causality, which can be traced back to tangible human factors and which, in turn, is also dictated by diplomatic experience. The fact that he explains the actions, which he regards as determining the outcome of historical events, first of all by the psychology of the people who carry them out, entails a projection of psychological factors and human nature as causal factors into the realm of history. This was also the highest conception of a regularity to which the spurious rationalism of the Renaissance arrived in the field of social sciences.

III

In the previous chapter, I touched on the way in which Machiavelli evaluates history, as well as the role that humanistic education played in the exercise of diplomatic activity. Both of these points now lead to the general study of the phenomenon of humanism in the Renaissance, which was the most widespread of all the intellectual currents of the time because it became intertwined with the ruling sections of society that, as mentioned, had essentially monopolized intellectual life. Since this current was now so widespread and since Machiavelli's personality was formed in a social environment permeated by the corresponding views, it follows that an examination of Machiavelli's relationship with humanism is logically indispensable and reveals to us another concrete source through which "the spirit of the times" shaped him, forcing him to react in one way or another and, in contact with this spirit, to form a new synthesis.

This is not the place to undertake a genetic analysis of how and why much of the ideological needs of the Renaissance needed the veneer of said turn to antiquity. If one considers this phenomenon as already formed and examines it in terms of its functionality, one can say that Renaissance bourgeois culture found in antiquity an ancient and tested authority that it could contrast with, if not erase, ecclesiastical authority, at least to that extent,

that it seemed to be independent of it; moreover, medieval scholasticism already used Aristotle in its own way; this was a convincing precursor of recourse to antiquity to underpin contemporary ideologies. Antiquity fit well with the postulates of an individualistic culture, and its paganism went hand in hand with a necessarily worldly and pragmatic approach to the citizen and his aspiration to be an all-round developed individual, especially since the volatility of the system still demanded great personal skills on the part of social leaders. The individualistic and action-oriented view of life corresponds, in the field of far-sightedness, to the aversion to any categorization of ideas within the framework of a closed system, which suited the nature of scholasticism, and to the preference given to everything partial and concrete. But antiquity does not become an absolute authority, as the Church was in the Middle Ages; rather, it assumes the position of a "limited authority" which is, on the one hand, an unsurpassable model, and on the other, a driving force. Above all, the Roman era is perceived as "one's own national past," as the common history and heritage of all citizens [118]. The idea of a national, unifying element makes the turn to antiquity in Italy a matter that can be internalized even by the more popular classes; by people who see with their own eyes the ancient monuments as souvenirs of the glory of Italia and of their own fame, while in other countries the love for antiquity cannot leave the circle of the educated and cannot reach the lower classes, because antiquity is for them something completely foreign and invisible. Moreover, the Latin language is related to the Italian one, and for all these reasons, especially the first generation of humanist poets and philologists believe that antiquity is the glory of the Italian nation par excellence[119].

With the monopolization of intellectual and political life by, as already mentioned, the same social class, humanistic education was put at the service of politics at an early stage, already with the generation of humanists represented by Salutati (1330- 1406). This was initially as beneficial for politicians as it was for intellectuals, insofar as it facilitated the suppression of the mystical and moral-religious approach and the turn to experiential reality. However, these conditions, which had shaped the structure of the politics of the ruling class and, at the same time, the

The new structures of humanistic education, as a result of the combination of politics and education, also gave a certain eloquence in a short period of time; They made it possible to misuse learned phrases and adroit argumentation in the pursuit of political goals, thus turning the application of humanistic education in politics into a commonplace and a hollow phrase [120]. Among the characteristics of humanistic rhetoric and the corresponding writing of diplomatic texts, which also played a role in general political writing, included the frequent (whether or not it missed its target) reference to historical examples to reinforce political judgments or to enliven contemporary [themes121] Such outward and, at best, conventional references to events in ancient history (or rather: to the lives of great men of antiquity) can also be found in the politological discussions of the humanists, where they are, however, rather rhetorical exercises and comparisons of classical passages, while at the same time brimming with character-building suggestions - they do, after all, pursue a moral and not a scientific goal. In spite of everything, these treatises no longer refer to supernatural causes to explain worldly events; they are always worldly causes, because they are based on human nature [122]. Nevertheless, these thoughts and these remarkable conceptions are neither expanded nor cultivated, and finally suffocate in a flood of phrases. Thus, antiquity entered the world of the Renaissance only in the form of a turn to the real; the ancient way of life and its knowledge became, from the beginning and even more so since the second half of the fifteenth century, one with the theft of ideas and the contentless transfer of ancient rhetorical patterns to situations of public and private life, which were indispensable for the formation of the appropriate attitude. Incidentally, evidence of this superficiality is the esteem in which the Humanists held mnemonic methods, good memory in memorizing and fluency in quoting passages [123].

This hermaphroditic ideology of the humanists reflects in a certain way the indecision of the intellectual world of the Renaissance. Humanism did not try to establish an objective social theory, it was concerned with the individual, his psychology and morality; this explains the love for biography.

The ideal of the humanists, the all-round personality, was also as individualistic and aristocratic, as moral and psychological as the ideal of bravery, efficiency and virtue in antiquity and was closely connected with the social elite[125] This orientation, however, could lead neither to a rigid and independent synthesis of the new conditions nor to a precise definition of new methodological principles. In the end, the humanists were only interested in discovering those accidental elements that seemed to remain in their world from the citizens and customs of antiquity. Even when they studied sources and archives (as Bruni did), they were quick to delete the local and temporal peculiarities in order to make it easier to refer to the ancient model. On the other hand, this approach of studying universal features in the comparison of the past and the present, at some point, even if very indirectly, revealed certain historical-philosophical and general-political criteria [126] The contradictions in the ideology of the humanists become greater because they themselves do not form a unified stratum that reflected a unified society: Here they defend the princes who guarantee them otium, idleness, there they surround the first citizens of the republics who give them protection (thus the dual current of monarchism and republicanism emerges). Towards the end of the fifteenth century, a synthesis occurs, which, however, has no organic structure, but rather arises from the general slackening and the tacit abolition of the opposites, when the citizens resigned themselves to the monarchical system and accepted it; thus, the various promoters of the huma nists were united in one layer [127].

That humanism is a basically bourgeois current is not only shown by the fact that it reflects the postulates and the contradictions of the bourgeois worldview; it is also shown by the origin of its natural bearers (although this is an Epicurean criterion: the essence of an ideology is its function and the question of whom it benefits, not the origin of its founders and advocates). Many humanists, especially in Florence, came from bourgeois families; they were the first to make humanism an indispensable component of intellectual and political life, from them the princes and the popes adopted it[128] It is very interesting that quite a few Florentine entrepreneurs took as a basis of their

They were people of action, and in the classics they only found, in an idealized form and as a moral and practical call to life, rules to which they followed in their daily lives. This reading did not determine their economic orientation; they were people of action, and in the classics they merely found, in idealized form and as moral and practical life appeals, the rules they followed in everyday life to achieve greater economic return. (Here the classics played the role that Protestantism played elsewhere in the early stages of capita list development.) The bourgeois values above all the idea of a moral law, as found mainly in the Stoics; to this law he subordinates the instinctive urges, while he equates the spirit with the rationalization of all spheres of life; the inclination to "discipline" and "diligence", so favorable to capitalism, demands a suppression of unreasonable impulses 129- Admittedly, the influences of such a structure go back to the initial, heroic and ascetic period of the formation of the type of bourgeois. Also, the bourgeois structure of humanism is shown in its connection with the idea of the city-state and life in the city-state, the bourgeois republican society, that is, which nourishes the corresponding political spirit and allows, through the external equality of the political structure, the use of symbols of the political life of antiquity and an ideal reference to antiquity and its spirit. It is precisely this predominance of the city-state in Italy that reinforces the turn to the ancient doctrine of the state (which was not taken into account by the Arabs and the scholastics because they did not know any concrete points of reference, although they were concerned with other aspects of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy), while at the same time the contrast with the universal worldview of the medieval theorists of the state becomes greater. Now the humanists hasten to compare the emergence of the Italian states with the founding of Rome (by a founder who established laws, etc.) and to trace their historical development, establishing analogies and drawing parallels130-.

Since humanism was so closely interwoven with the bourgeoisie, it also followed it closely in its evolution from progressiveness to conservatism. The humanism of the Salutati generation, and even more so of Bruni, does not subscribe to the ideology of inner peace; this generation associates the idea of a warlord more with the idea of soldierly discipline and the virtues of the people than with the idea of personal glory, while at the same time it follows its role models from the early and late Middle Ages.

middle phase of the Roman Republic. Virtus is understood as a masculine virtue with heroic-warlike content and antiquity as the high school of this virtue with the goal of patriotic devotion and sacrifice. In contrast to this, the second and third generation of humanists, which goes hand in hand with the social compromise of the bourgeoisie, transfer their highest postulates to an ideal world, and instead of service to the fatherland they set the ideal of the educated personality; humanism becomes an inner attitude and a mental attitude, while the soul itself becomes an object of worship under the influence of Platonism and Christianity. Humanism distances itself from reality and turns antiquity into a world of unattainable perfection that belongs not to the citizens but to the initiates; it serves them as an ivory tower and, at the same time, as an instrument of insurmountable distinction from the rest of their contemporaries who, of course, cannot share with them the experience of this wonderful world. But the reception of antiquity does not remain pure, while humanism separates from its roots, becomes clouded, mystic and religious. In the deistic thought that blossomed in the "Platonic Academy" of Florence and that we find again in the hymns of Lorenzo de' Medici, the idea prevails that the objective world is an image of God that he himself created with love and that the soul grasps as a unity with the world and the infinite. The soul is thus immersed in the worldly and material in order to attain the spiritual; here we have a mixture of contemporary spirit, medieval mysticism and Platonic ideas131- Nevertheless, as a contrast to this new scholasticism, a naturalistic and lively renaissance is again emerging, even if tacitly; This current is represented by Leonardo da Vinci, it is a secular, empirical and spontaneous attitude towards reality - an experimental attitude132- Machiavelli, who completely bypasses the neoplatonic development of humanism, now spontaneously joins this original attitude towards the world, while he remains faithful to the political and patriotic orientation of the first humanist generation with regard to his image of antiquity and its content. Thus, his intellectual world once again stands at a crossroads of contradictory currents.

But if Machiavelli stood quite apart from the development of huma nism in the fields of philosophy and metaphysics, lies

This is not due to his personal one-sidedness or his limited perception[133], even if the persistent devotion to merely certain topics can at some point be interpreted as one-sidedness or lead to it. If this alienation existed, and it really did, it is explained by the fact that Machiavelli was inwardly alienated - by virtue of his origins and living conditions - from the social stratum that nurtured and reinforced this latest humanist current. In relation to the elite of the ruling class, Machiavelli is not at all in the same position as the Humanists of his time and, as part of the intelligentsia, he therefore does not follow the upper bourgeois stratum in the gradual turn from "left" to "right" like the humanistic intellectuals. (The latter, however, did so only through clenched teeth, because they realized that their leaders kept them socially in the role of bending assistants, even though they had generously ceded to them the pastures of the beautiful world of ideas). Machiavelli's distance from the highest circles of the ruling class also distances him from the humanism they promote, while his professional and internal integration into the state apparatus, as well as the reason of state, lead him to the humanism of the first generation, which was animated by an intense political and patriotic breeze, by a republican and antipapal orientation, and by the glorification of temperance and virtue[134].

Machiavelli's social background is an important point that explains his attitude toward humanism. He did not come from an upper-class family like many humanists, but from an old family of nobles, which in time became bourgeois and played an important role in the heroic era of the Republic of Florence, at the marriage of the Guelfs. Gradually, however, the Machiavelli family began to decline, and by the end of the fifteenth century it possessed only a few small family privileges, which it vigorously defended, holding fast to its republican tradition, which clearly bore the characteristic features of the humanism of the first generation. Machiavelli's family situation allowed him to live a spar tan but dignified life that was not, however, entirely free from the preoccupation of relative poverty, which was especially noticeable in comparison to his wealthier friends [135] Thus, at a time when the wealthy young people of Florence were learning Greek and indulging early in the latest currents of humanism, he received a relatively limited education. He could not speak Greek

or, in any case, had only a rudimentary knowledge of this language; on the other hand, he diligently studied the Latin classics in the original, he read not only the historians but also the poets, while of the Greeks he read only those works that were available in Latin translation, and here he apparently limited himself to the historians[136]. Machiavelli's education was thus not very broadly based, and it alone did not provide him with any theoretical focal points that he could have developed further himself; only later did his indulgence in the classical historians make sense to him, when, with the broadening of his horizons through his political-diplomatic activity, he was able to form the axes on which to base the educational elements of his stu dies, and when he oriented his thinking not toward a general education and its corresponding cultivation, but toward approaches that persistently focused on certain fundamental themes; it was in this confrontation that his way of thinking finally formed[137].

Nevertheless, the frequently held view that Machiavelli drew his views exclusively from his experience and was guided only by real events in his understanding of the past is one-sided. The humanist vision and its striving to find ancient models was very widespread and it was an essential part of the intellectual atmosphere of the time; thus, Machiavelli must simply have been influenced by it from his early years, which preceded the time of his political experiences (this explains, by the way, that one of his earliest texts - *about the uprising in the Chiana Valley* - is structured in such a way that it could also quite excellently form a chapter of the *Discorsi*; see II,23). In comparison to the Hu manists, the source of Machiavelli's independence is found elsewhere - not in the simple interpretation that he completely betrayed the reception of the ancient model, that in him the conventional reference to antiquity is limited to the minimum, and that this reference also becomes a combative, antagonistic reference. Machiavelli does not hold up the ancient model in order to emphasize current events by referring to them, as the humanists do - he juxtaposes it with events and emphasizes them in order to animate them with a meaning that he draws from the historical analogy, and not in order to draw an ethical, but a theoretical and at the same time practical lesson from it. It has been very nicely remarked that Machiavelli was a son of humanism, but a prodigal son, who did not return and who was in

in his intellectual structure differed from the humanists even more than in the orientation of his studies 138-.

Undoubtedly, the intertwining of the rhetorical and epi stolographic achievements of the humanists with the official activities of the state of Florence also played a role in Machiavelli's relationship with humanism. As I noted in the previous chapter, the display of humanistic learning in diplomatic circles and outside political relations was a habitual phenomenon and protocol requirement. A certain competition developed among the higher officials, who usually competed with each other on the level of philological banter and learned allusions in official reports. These elements created a certain climate in the exercise of daily work, and those who did not master them automatically isolated themselves from the others, the more advanced. Machiavelli, a great friend of social intercourse and normal relations with his environment, certainly did not want to swim against the current and probably quickly familiarized himself with the "official-humanist" commonplaces; after all, he had superiors like Marcello Virgilio, a professor at the studio of Florence. Of course, his thinking was not significantly influenced by this, and the humanistic elements that flourished in this environment were obviously not related to the neo-Platonism of the ruling elite; nor did Machiavelli approach the diffuse humanistic spirit in this way, so much so that certain features of the humanistic scriptural doctrine are quite evident in the texts from the time of his civil service (e.g., the topography of Sinigaglia in the *description of the way in which the Duke of Valentinois* ... , 1503, and the echoes of Tacitus in *Political State of Germany,* 1512). Of course, Machiavelli regarded it with satisfaction and vanity that he had mastered this humanistic veneer, and he considered this an important achievement, since it was the only way for him to come into contact with people who were socially higher than himself; (fortunately, the illusions and avarice of great minds cannot destroy the core of their thinking). In the following period of his life, when he made persistent attempts to rehabilitate himself with the Medici, the same criterion was, consciously or unconsciously, at the forefront of his mind, and in general he cultivated closer contact with philologists and the educated, while at the same time he devoted himself more systematically to the lower and more sophisticated.

This "philologism" was his ticket to the upper echelons of society.

But Machiavelli's contact with these circles was again not such as to influence the essential direction of his thought. First, after the exile of the Medici and the subsequent upheaval of political and martial events, the interests of these circles had to a large extent turned away from philosophical and artistic issues and back to broader political issues, especially where they had turned away from the Medici, as in the Orti Oricellarii [Debating Club of the Rucellai (also Ruccellai), a family of humanists and patrons of the arts; translator's note]. Second, Machiavelli's personal relationships with members of humanist circles never became close friendships. He first made acquaintances from the upper social strata through his work, and if he later interacted with these people outside of work, it was because, as mentioned above, their interests were again largely in politics, a field in which Machiavelli was at home, while he would have felt completely alien in the atmosphere of the Platonic Academy; as mentioned, he did not even know Greek, which made matters worse. He tried to consolidate his relations with the tone-setting members of these circles mainly for the sake of personal gain; in fact, he showed no inclination to maintain contacts with people whose star was in decline. But all those with whom he sought contact did not actively help him, perhaps he was also secretly annoying to some, or they considered him fickle; on the other hand, they could not ignore him because he was anything but inferior as a thinker and discussant, which certainly helped him gain some admirers from the circles of the Platonists. However, Machiavelli's wavering relationship to humanism, which was also connected to his personal circumstances, left certain traces in his way of looking at things (especially after 1516); above all, traits such as individualism, striving for fame and honor[139] as well as his anti-Kaiserism[140] manifest themselves humanistically, but these traces are not particularly relevant if one takes into account that he began writing the *Discorsi* as early as 1513.

One can now characterize Machiavelli's attitude toward humanism and the Humanists in general terms, noting first of all that, with respect to antiquity, he has no interest in maintaining the ostentatious attitude

of the humanists. He does not use his knowledge of the classics and his general knowledge at all as an instrument to distinguish himself from the masses like the humanists, for whom knowledge, just like wealth, was a criterion of social distinction. Nor did he follow the literary productions of the humanists, (they wrote in Latin, indulged in pedantic and hollow discussions of philosophical subjects with which only "initiates" were familiar); their primary and sole purpose was to emphasize the distance between themselves as the educated elite and the rest of the world. To be sure, there are enough conventional stylistic elements in Machiavelli's writings that he took directly from the humanists, but they do not penetrate below the surface and are a tribute he paid more as a social being than as a thinker. There is, moreover, no reason to suppose that Machiavelli's distance from the Humanists was intentional and conscious; as an individual he must have regarded them as the truly educated people of his time and wanted to be somewhat like them, but fortunately for him, his origins and inner constitution were entirely different. From the outset, Machiavelli was opposed to two elements, namely those which namely, those which the existential condition of the humanists and the lifestyle of the bourgeoisie, which had become conservative. individual wealth and otium, the idleness of the humanists and the of the humanists and the privateers, the "pensioners". For Machiavelli, these were clearly and explicitly elements of depravity that, where they prevailed, were fatal to the fate of the state. Intellectual leisure, the ideal of the humanists, weakens political virtue, the practical devotion necessary in political affairs. The philosophers exploit the peace, writes Machiavelli, that the warlords created with their victories, degenerating it into inertia *(Histories* V,1). Moreover, in Machiavelli's social order, intellectuals occupy the last place and they are by no means "the salt of the earth," as a diehard humanist claims *(Discorsi* 1,10). Taking these points into account, one immediately sees that the view that humanism is a main component of Machiavelli's intellectual world141 is not tenable.

Even though Machiavelli is altogether unfamiliar with the fundamental aspects of the humanist worldview, he does share certain assessments with it on specific issues. However, this happens

not because he took some opinions directly from the humanists, but because their common views go back to general features of the intellectual life of the time, which are neither specific nor exclusively borrowed from the humanist view, although they are also contained in it in a characteristic way. Such agreement in opinion on particular questions is shown in some places by Machiavelli's aversion to insurrections and uprisings, and by his ignorance of the idea of a social law. A common attitude can be seen above all in the evaluation of religion, an element which, regardless of its dogmatic and ceremonial form, is generally useful for social cohesion and normality. Humanists avoid open conflict with the Church because they consider religion useful for the people. Thus, they maintain a polemic towards the Church or religion that cannot penetrate and influence the people; they are content with skepticism and sharp irony. Moreover, the Church was not really opposed to the basically conservative political ideology of humanism; the upper circles of the Church had, of course, also internalized to a great extent the secular and pagan spirit of the humanists, who, even if they were not reformers, were in any case modernists with respect to the narrowly conceived ecclesiastical ideology [142-] Thus the humanists had one less reason to fight the Church openly. Moreover, the humanist, who does not believe in any particular religion, believes in all of them together in terms of their social utility, and through this very indifference to the form of religion reaches the point of not changing his denomination and remaining formally Catholic [143-] More generally, the mood of the upper classes against the Church brings with it a sarcastic displeasure and an adaptation to the hierarchical order, insofar as it is interwoven with external life, while contempt for the Catholic Church and its popes is diffuse in the room, especially in Machiavelli's immediate and wider surroundings[144-] Nevertheless, Machiavelli's opposition to the Papal Church has an additional and independent significance for two reasons: First, it is expressed at a time when the upper class of the bourgeoisie has compromised with the Church and is openly cooperating with it, and the Church, for its part, has made considerable adjustments to its doctrine regarding the relationship between economic activity and the salvation of souls.

it is distinguished by a Florentine, at a time when the government of Florence and the Holy See are one (after 1512).

Machiavelli's attitude to the Church, as he saw it from his vantage point in its real essence, also explains the way he valued Savonarola as a person. The Florentine monk had established the postulate of moral purification and strict moderation, which of course had direct political implications and aims; it manifested itself, however, not in the form of a programme for political reordering, but in the form and style of a heavenly commandment that he transmitted as God's placeholder. In his thinking, Savonarola did not distinguish the purification of the Church from the purification of the state, all the less so because in his eyes the quality of the citizen coincided with the quality of the believer. Thus, Savonarola's entire mode of expression, his style and ethics, stand in stark contrast to the secular and pragmatic tradition of Florentine politics, depriving him of the possibility of creating more than a passing limbo in the political reality of his city [145]. Machiavelli, from his point of view, must have liked the more popular character of Savonarola's government, regardless of his opinion of its main leader[146], just as he must have liked the demand for moderation per se[147]. But even if there could have been agreement in such assessments, Machiavelli strongly senses that Savonarola doubts some of his fundamental convictions, especially the clear distinction of political positions from moral-religious postulates. The justification of a policy by invoking its higher mission is incomprehensible to Machiavelli-not because the notion of a higher mission, if patriotic and political, is foreign to him, but because Savonarola equates that mission with the divine, thus blurring the lines between politics and morality, while at the same time seeing the purification of the state and the church as intimately connected. Machiavelli, while seeing the plight of the Church, does not demand of it a moral purification, but merely a readjustment of its policies, which are so damaging to Italy; for Machiavelli, the Church is what it is: an organized, secular force, and if its moral degeneration must be halted, it is primarily so that the Church may properly play its political and ideological role. But for Machiavelli any postulate of a purely moral order is and remains alien to the Church, any Lutheranism. Such a postulate would also be foreign to him in any

If it comes from a cowl-wearer (and it is known how the cowl was generally valued at that time and especially in Machiavelli's environment), it is more, then it is suspicious, because behind it only personal self-interest and ambition can be hidden. Basically, Machiavelli sees Savonarola as a man who thirsts for power, who knows how to dress his motives in beautiful sermons, and whose heroism is based on the fact that he is ready to go down with the whole city [148]. Savonarola's religious zeal is alien to Machiavelli; he sees the prophecies of the monk as a means to ensure the cohesion of his camp and is mainly interested in the political effects of his deeds. Machiavelli sees Savonarola's activities not as naïve politics or naïve morality, but as concealed cunning politics; he does not see Savonarola as an untainted "ought" that fatally and unjustly perishes because it is a corrupt and inventive "being," but he sees him as part of this rotten "being" that tries to maintain its power by hiding behind an "ought" that is outwardly exalted but in essence false. As stated, Machiavelli does not reject the notion of an "ought" per se, but only its religious character. In this respect, his conflict with Savonarola is not a conflict between a Renaissance man and a medieval man, nor a conflict between political "being" and moral "ought," but it is a conflict between two "ought" of different structure. Machiavelli is not a pure and dry technician of power, nor is he a mediocre politician of the "technique of the possible" - in his own way and as the patriot that he is, he is also a dreamer and passionate man, even if he does not strive to change reality himself; he simply sets out what must happen, since with it changes[149].

The independence of Machiavelli's view from antiquity, and consequently from the view of the humanists, is evident not only in the way he sees antiquity as a political model, but also in his loose relationship to ancient state theory. In the past, persistent attempts were made to trace Machiavelli's political thought back to ancient political thought, but the result was meager. [150] There are, of course, plenty of references to this, especially to Aristotle *(Politics* V), but this has nothing to do with anything, because Machiavelli's underlying view is quite different, even where he almost literally refers to the ancient world.

The same is true for the anaclosis theory of Polybius (and it remains to be seen whether the commonality of the articulated ideas must really be drawn from the text of antiquity, if the passage taken over is not extensive). Machiavelli is above all inspired by the Roman ideal, which contains exclusively the political idea, while the Greek state ideal also contains the idea of a spiritual and moral culture - this point of view Aristotle repeatedly touches upon by speaking, quite in contrast to Machiavelli, of politefa [translated by Gigon as "constitution", in contrast to p6lis, "state", politefa "states"; translator's note]. Aristotle applied a kind of historical method to a normative-moral purpose, to the search for an ideal politefa whose broader purpose is the happiness of the citizen as well as its inner balance and fullness. Thus, Aristotle interweaves the ideal of the state with the well-being of the citizen, while Machiavelli thinks first of the state as an apparatus of power and its ability to survive in competition with other states; this competition, rather than an individual-centered approach, determines the form of the state. This is obvious, because for Machiavelli, the problem with regard to the individual is not to bring him higher, even in the moral sense, but to govern him[151].

A field in which Machiavelli's encounter with the humanism, but also its departure from humanism, is historiography. Humanistic historiography takes its actual shape when humanists and humanism combine in the above-mentioned way with the exercise of diplo matical activity and the ceremonial and protocol part of politics and, more concretely, when the humanistic style finds wide application in the writing of diplomatic and political texts and its transfer to historiography, as it was understood at the time, was only a small step[152]. Among the most educated members of these state authorities dealing with foreign relations, it became a tradition to use access to public archives to sift through historiographical material[153]. Despite this interweaving of politics with historiography remained the most important ability and the preferred criterion of historiography remained the mastery of the humanist style and the ease with which its topoi could be and the easy handling of its topoi; what was special about the personality of the What made the historian's personality special was therefore not his quality as an active political man, but that as a humanist.

Consequently, historiography remained in reality limited to humanist circles and entered into relations with diplomatic and other offices only to the extent that these were influenced by the humanist style and the corresponding worldview154- For the rest, the drawing from the archives and the utilization of the historical material reached the level of historical criticism only in a few cases (and even then only sporadically), and thus no limits were set to the humanist character of historiography by systematic critical source analysis. The absence of this critical consciousness is not due to the fact that the humanists were intellectually inferior or that they consciously objected to accuracy; their general conceptions and their aims were simply different. In accordance with the precedence they gave to the ancient model, and with their tendency to cover and beautify recent events with the glory of the corresponding events in antiquity (but also with the motive of singing of personal glory and honor - an individualistic ideal and ideal of the Renaissance by the way, even if it is borrowed from classical antiquity), the humanists want first and foremost to lend grandeur and splendor to their historical depiction, thus indirectly recreating an atmosphere that they believe every accomplished deed in antiquity would have spread. They also want to praise personalities or cultures and thus portray them as exemplary. For these purposes, of course, rhetoric is the appropriate means, especially in its connection with historiography: the style of Titus Livius, which they adopt without reservation. In historiography, then, the humanists follow the Roman school of Livius (who writes with didactic and patriotic intentions) and Cicero (who moralizes strongly) rather than the Greek school of Thucydides and Polybius [155-] Nevertheless, this preference for the Roman school should not be seen only as the negative side of orientation to models whose essential virtues are rhetoric and moral teaching rather than a scientific view or inclination; This preference has a healthy element in it, it has a positive side, namely the revival of Italian patriotism, the desire to reconnect with the glory of antiquity that sprouted and flourished on the same soil.

Humanistic historiography thus competes with rhetorical, ceremonial literature; it is an extension and elaboration of elaborate eulogies. It does not tell the history of peoples, but above all the history of persons, and it confines itself to the description of events to which the rhetorical style is eminently suited, such as the description of wars and heroic deeds, which automatically leads to the displacement of the description of institutions and forms of government, the execution of which is necessarily more prosaic. The description is also spiced with elements that are rhetorical in themselves, with demegories, speeches to the people, which often appear on occasions that are not worthy of mention; thus their fullness sounds funny to our ears (the same can be said of the speeches that one reads in by Zantine historians, especially of the last period, for example in Kritoboulos). The organization of this account does not follow an order of the material according to criteria borrowed from a particular theory of history, but according to purely external topoi adopted from the writers of antiquity. Despite all this, the positive contribution of humanistic historiography remains undisputed, because the difference to medieval ecclesiastical historiography is obvious. History now becomes a worldly greatness, even though the worldly element that characterizes it is the higher, illustrious, and almost divine morality of the great personages, of the great moral and patriotic exemplars; but however heroic and semi-divine a historical person is portrayed, he always acts according to precepts drawn from a worldly, though idealized, system of values, and not according to heavenly commands or as the unconscious instrument of a divine counsel. The ecclesiastical dogma is not openly attacked, but the miracles are passed over in silence without polemicizing against them; the attitude of the educated secular circles of that time to all this is diffuse; they are skeptical towards the church and sarcastic towards its representatives, but they do not categorically negate supernatural powers. Under the influence of Livius and those classics who do not bring the clergy into history as an organized force (it was not such a force in Rome and in Greece either), the humanists do not consider the papacy as a spiritual force, but only as a power of disposition over a certain ground, as a political force. This power of disposition over a certain ground and a certain supremacy play an even greater role in the thinking of the humanist historiographers, after they themselves, as mentioned above, associate themselves as a layer with the existence of the Italian city-state.

and consider it as a political entity related to the anti ken models and allowing to refer to them; at the same time, the city-state is also the hearth of the burgeoning ita lian patriotism. Central to humanist historiography is usually the account of the development of a city-state (as Livius did for Rome), and this has two consequences: The conception of the state as a historical (and thus histo riographical) entity emerges. In parallel, it animates the historian with the notion of the interests of his fatherland as a histori c criterion 156-.

The humanist historiography that bore these characteristics set the tone as long as the system of the balance of the five major states prevailed on the Italian political stage, functioning without outside intervention and maintained with frequent wars and changing alliances, that is, as long as the external conditions of existence of the ruling class that supported the humanists remained untouched. However, when a change in the social structure of the ruling class led the humanists into mysticism and neo-Platonism, isolating them from the political and patriotic content that inspired the best of their historiography, and when the encroachments of extra-Italian forces upset the balance in Italy and tarnished the splendor of the city-state, humanist historiography was also irrevocably undermined; It was no longer able to understand the events that swept the country and that were so tangible and so tragic that an idealizing transference to antiquity became impossible. After 1494, in the years of terrible turmoil and bloodshed, the need arose for an interpretation, for a set of values that would guide thought and lead to an understanding of what was happening and which so stifled it. Now, there is neither the time nor the willingness to embellish and exaggerate events, to paint great pictures or to perform rhetorical heroic deeds. History becomes a field from which lessons for politics are drawn, it is no longer a reservoir of solemn inspirations; historical events are not considered a source of uplifting ideas, but examples to support general theses. The anecdotes no longer serve as mere style ornaments or morality lessons; they take on the meaning of pointing out more common conditions, even if the strict historical

Criticism of the traditional events is still scarce. However, in order to serve as a political lesson, history must be typologized, it must become a philosophy of history of one kind or another, and the individual events must be subjected to general interpretative principles. This is precisely what Machiavelli achieves by conceiving the development of Florence as the "course of life" of a supra-personal organism; such a conception would have been incomprehensible to humanist historiography, which substituted learned commonplaces or popular philosophies for general values[157]. Naturally, the new duties of historical writing also demanded a new type of historian. Of necessity, the humanist, together with his worldview, which was inadequate from the beginning and degenerated by Neoplatonism, now makes room for per sons who are politically active and have political interests that have to do with the exercise of politics in the heart and not with its pompous manifestations. Such historians are Guicciardini and Machiavelli.

However, the "new political historiography" in that period becomes comprehensible not as an opposition to the historiography of the humanists, but as its continuation. This is understandable, since its bearers do not explicitly express the intention of ignoring their predecessors in historiography (even if they may have felt strongly that they were treating essential points differently); in parallel, they share to a large extent the rhetorical goals, even if these are logically incompatible with the new spirit they embody, and retain learned references, demegories [speeches to the people], and often also the external structure of the historical account; as far as historical criticism is concerned, they were seldom superior, sometimes even inferior [158]. But the new exigencies and the new image of the world that these bring with them are so powerful that all these appearances cannot obscure the vital core. Even if Machiavelli's and Guicciardini's historiography was a continuation of humanistic historiography (in so far as it was), it goes beyond it in content and intrinsic value, and one notices at once that it is of an entirely different quality. In Ma chiavelli one can find many stylistic and also substantial points in common with humanistic historiography, from the extensive but demythologized description of the external conflicts in history (even if he would have liked to limit them, as he writes in the introduction to the Histories), to the fact that the history of the city is a continuation of humanistic historiography.

to his conventional belief in signs and wonders *(Discorsi* 1,56; where there is also a distant appeal to Neoplatonism). But all this does not affect his worldview significantly; even where he submits to outwardly existing forms, his skill is evident and the difference between form and content is clear (always in relation to our contemporary sensibilities).

Machiavelli does not look at and write history as a historian, but as a politician. He does not want to clarify events or find in each case the web of factors that shaped the historic moment; he wants to organize the whole through fundamental values that recur as motifs; only where a detail spurs him on theoretically does he devote his attention to it and search for more general connections. History serves above all to confirm conclusions that were fruits of his own way of looking at things and to surround them with its authority, although history as such is always presented as a fixed point of reference. The historical events on which Machiavelli bases his theories afterwards, he takes from the historics, of course from Livius, and he does not care if they are thoroughly fictitious. In the use of sources, he does as the humanists do - he draws on one of many and follows it, but also adds to it excerpts from other sources, often jumbling or exaggerating the events and paraphrasing or changing the text he quotes as he pleases. Machiavelli was thus neither a follower nor a pioneer of the historical method and the historical school. He uncritically takes out of history what fits his pre-formed views, and not infrequently twists events to prove his own ideas, especially his political-practical canon [159].

Machiavelli's position vis-à-vis the historical material, compared to the position of the humanists, is evident, among other things and above all, in the way he uses speeches. Whereas with his predecessors in historiography speeches to the people were a way of demonstrating a certain style, and were therefore always inserted with care, with Machiavelli they usually serve not to objectively reflect the theses of his opponents or the substance of their motives and way of looking at things, as with Thucydides, but his own ideas and comments, which perhaps only coincidentally coincide with the views of the persons delivering these speeches. If one also assumes,

that these speakers had ever expressed themselves in this way, they no longer did so as representatives of a particular camp, but in their own right as political experts, which Machiavelli so valued. This function of the speeches in the histories is evident from the fact that the speakers are not named (11:34; 111:5), while we can see Machiavelli's distance from the humanists in the fact that he quickly brings a speech, even if he begins it with classicist platitudes, into his natural language. Historical accuracy is once again sacrificed when Machiavelli treats persons who, in his opinion, would lend themselves to play the role of a prince, a man capable of finding the right way out of a political crisis and of steering the political life of his fatherland into new, even and smooth paths. Machiavelli twists the events to draw the characters according to the ideal image he has in his mind. He does this partly with Michel di Landos *(Tales* 111,16), but above all with Castruccio Castracani, whose life he recounts on the model of Diodorus' account of Agathocles (Diodorus Sicelus, *Books* **XIX** to XXI passim). Castruccio did come from a noble family, but Machiavelli portrays him as a foundling and also describes how, contrary to reality, he captures and kills nobles and then dies unmarried and childless. It would be a mistake to attribute these intentional distortions entirely to the humanist spirit, that is, to the desire to conform to Diodor's text. The reasons are internal: For Machiavelli, a low origin is a quality that increases the autonomy, independence and political mobility of the ruler's personality; also, the liquidation of the nobles is an essential part of his policy, after they constitute the main breeding ground for abnormality in a society; and finally, it is best for the prince if he has no children of his own, because, according to Machiavelli, he should not establish a dynasty, but rehabilitate the state with the right institutions and allow it to be succeeded by a republican form of government160- And thirdly, but not for the last time, one sees that Machiavelli is not concerned with objectively reproducing factual things, e.g., when he describes society in Germany as a whole.e.g. when he describes the society in Germany. But what is essential here is not the (noticeable) influence of Tacitus but rather the desire to round out the circumstances that distinguish this country from his own, and to emphasize what caused the rise there and what caused the decline in Italy.

The preference that Machiavelli gives to his general practical-political (and, by extension, political-theoretical) theses over the historical material is as evident in the *Discorsi* - the work that is primarily an exposition of more general views and where this preference is consequently self-evident - as in the *Florentine Histories,* where it seems that the author's goal must be to present and organize historical events according to their objective weight and not according to the significance they have for his own ideas. However, although the immanent structural differences between these two works make their divergence clear, their intent and execution are essentially the same. Both works are based on historical material that is evaluated from a certain characteristic point of view; the difference is that the historical material in the *Discorsi* is processed piecemeal and corresponds to each concrete event a general thesis, while the *Florentine Histories are* conceived coherently and organically and the individual parts of this coherent representation are connected by the same general themes, which are expressed in the same way in the *Discorsi, although they are* established and substantiated differently. Already in the first book of the *Histories* one notices that Machiavelli projects his favorite themes and arranges the events in such a way that they serve this projection: With Theoderic, he paints the picture of the good ruler in a rudimentary but very clear way *(Histories* I,4)[161]; he mentions in detail how the first Visconti asserted himself *(Histories I*,27), while he blames the pope for the division and weakening of Italians *(Histories* I,9 u. 23; *Discorsi* I,12); he also condemns the mercenary troops - as a conclusion of the whole recourse to the Italian history *(Stories* I,39, VI,1; *Discorsi* I,21 u. 43). On the other hand, the dynamics of Roman and Florentine history is deliberately presented as a dynamic of internal class conflicts, with the only difference that in Rome these conflicts brought internal equilibrium and external strength, while in Florence they brought decline; still, in both cases the key to interpretation lies in the internal conflicts involving classes, which Machiavelli clearly distinguishes *(Histories,* Introduction, III,1 u. VII,1; *Discorsi* I,4 u. 6). In both ancient Rome and Florence of the 14th and 15th centuries, Machiavelli traces and compares the alternately hard and soft methods used by the bourgeoisie to rise to the top.

and power; thus also the Medici come to power (see *histories* IV,27 u. 28; VI,6 u. 7, VII,2; *Discorsi* I,33 u. 52, III,28). In a comparison of Rome and Florence, the weaknesses of the latter in the exercise of foreign policy are also highlighted *(Discorsi* 1,38) and the decay and idleness that science and wealth entail are criticized, while the lack of need is praised (see *Histories,* Introduction, V,1 u. VII,28; *Dis corsi* III,16 u. 25 as well as II,19). Moreover, in both the *Histories* and the *Discorsi, the* behavior and premeditated actions of the individuals are traced in great detail and with equal attention, their psychology, the honorable - noble or base - motives of their deeds, the stratagems they use, and their political skill together with the ability to judge situations and foresee their outcome; it is a systematic presentation and assessment of the characteristics of Renaissance individualism, linked and crowned by the notion (central to the humanist worldview) of recognition, fame, and public praise. In both works, then, there are many common themes of secondary, but not minor, importance: conspiracies and how to organize them *(Stories* VII,33 u. 34 and VIII,1-9; *Discorsi* III,6), the expediency of founding colonies *(Stories* II,1 and *Discorsi* II,7), the unreliability of exiles (see, among others, *Stories* V,8 u. 9 and *Discorsi* II,31), and other themes.

Machiavelli thus always relates and illuminatingly contrasts concrete events and his concrete propositions in relation to general and universally existing values; thus he sees each and every phase of development as a moment and as a page in the endless and eternal progress of politics, as a moment in which the fundamental postulates of politics are condensed and at the same time reaffirmed. It is precisely this sense of the relationship between historical moment and historical development that characterizes Machiavelli's foresight and is the most important quality of his ideal politician. Therefore, also his reference to history takes the free and for practice fruitful form of contact with the lessons that can be drawn from historical events, and he adapts them in such a way that they are an aid in solving direct, but not marginal and insignificant, practical problems.

Machiavelli constantly deletes the stable points of reference of political and general human action and is thus always close to the essence of history as becoming and as teaching, even if he is fallible on the individual events. This is why Machiavelli's historical works (and in the way mentioned above, all his works are historical) do not read as res gestae, but as res gerendae, as systematic rem gerere - not as done, but as doing, as teaching action. For this reason, his texts are still felt to be so alive today.

IV

The analysis of the previous chapters shows that Machiavelli's thought is layered in a certain way and that these layers are sometimes a direct emanation of Renaissance foresight, but sometimes quite distant from the source of the time and need to be logically and pragmatically derived in order to prove their origin. The layers of Machiavelli's thought are: The priority of the secular in politics and the clear separation of politics and morality; the natural law conception as the contemplation of a reality that does not in itself function in a natural and mechanical way, but is merely "governed", as it were, by a flexible lawfulness that does not hinder the unfolding of the individual will; the historiographic technique as the estimation of variable but recognizable quantities and the formation of the right practical attitude in each case; patriotism as the force that guides this technique, without curtailing its intrinsic lawfulness - as an irrational attitude of mind that stands in a dialectical relationship to the rationalism of technique; and finally, the intersection with the humanist movement in its various phases, but at the same time a noticeable deviation from it, especially with regard to the critical point of dealing with antiquity and its utilization as a model. The complexity of this intellectual world finds great resonance in Machiavelli's style, and this resonance is all the more significant because it is directly interwoven with his thought structure and makes it easier for us to understand it if we start from its external means of expression - which is very valuable, because Machiavelli's thought is nowhere expressed in a filtered and systematic way, but the indications are scattered, and it falls to us to sort them out. So by

the fundamental features of Machiavelli's style, one checks up to a certain point to what extent one has correctly grasped the layers of his thought; however, one must not forget that the fundamental positions in his thought and in his methods are not concentrated at certain points, but are distributed over the whole work and form with it a densely woven net. If one scans this net, one notices how the mode of representation and thinking are connected, and one can follow one after the other the effects of instrumental thinking in the structure of thoughts, the function of irrational elements and phantasms, the stylistic expression of the naturalistic conception of the world, and the influence of learned, humanistic elements.

The practical and didactic, in the broadest sense technical, structure of Machiavelli's way of thinking manifests itself in a tangible way in both the *Discorsi* and the *Prince in the* extent that the examples occupy in the entirety of the texts. Probably more than half of these two works consists of the description of examples from ancient as well as contemporary history; this speaks for itself. The absence of examples in a chapter is very rare, but where it occurs (as in *Discorsi* I,30), the related examples are given in the immediately preceding chapter. Examples and conclusions are everywhere in dialogue, alternating, complementing, interdependent, interwoven, logical counterpoints, in a way that allows no judgment as to which of the two has priority, because for Machiavelli a theory that does not relate to practice (that is, cannot be reapplied by being clearly contained in an example) has no meaning, just as raw historical material has no meaning if the mind draws no substance and no lesson from it. Because the relations between example and conclusion are so close, they are present together in Machiavelli's texts in many ways and work together. For example, at the beginning, the correct behavior is postulated dogmatically, so to speak, and then a real incident is compared there with in order to find common and contradictory points and, consequently, the reasons for success or failure *(Prince* 3). Then again, a problem is examined in the following form: it is formulated as a question, after which opposing views are stated, together with examples supporting each side; the conclusion then follows; either it leans on a

of the previously listed opinions or it is completely different *(Discorsi* II,12). In other places, the "thesis" is taken as a starting point and follows the example or examples, then the first statement of the general corollary is retrieved, either unchanged or with modifications, enrichments and extensions *(Discorsi* 1,25 and 26). In other cases, an erroneous view formulated at the beginning is criticized, then corresponding examples are examined to illustrate the various forms this error has taken, while in the confrontation the correct approach is praised *(Discorsi* 1,23). Elsewhere, Machiavelli develops a chapter as a series of connected corollaries, each of which he accompanies with an example; thus, at the end, a chain of meaning (which is not always coherent, because Machiavelli does not omit digressions and momentary inspirations in favor of the structure) emerges, which engages in a chain of examples *(Prince* 19). In another case, which is characteristic of Machiavelli's structure of thought, after the chapter title, which already contains the theoretical position or the practical reference, he simply gives an example alone or with comments that do not contribute anything essential to the title thesis *(Discorsi* III,29 u. 30). Here it seems that Machiavelli secretly considers the direct contact with the events, presented in the appropriate arrangement, to be the most eloquent teaching, and so he lets the reader revel in the vivid impression and enjoy it, without an illuminating or detailed commentary intervening to steer interpretation and assessment of the example in one direction or another in advance. Indirectly, Machiavelli appeals to the reader's knowledge and acumen, taking it for granted that the reader will think as he does when confronted with the same event, which Machiavelli finds significant in itself; consequently, no explanations are needed, it is sufficient that the basic material is given. Incidentally, it is precisely this basic material that is essential, because it is entirely practice, thus homologous to the fundamental postulate of his political science, the postulate of the act, while the theoretical generalization is only the intermediary necessary point between the two important practical expressions, between the example and what results from the imitation of the example, an imitation that calls to mind the representation of the example in the form of a general doctrine. Since the memory of an action brings its imitation to the

Machiavelli is content with the description of the exemplary deed, as if he wanted to make the reader identify with it, and as if he wanted to put him on the right track, if possible without any theoretical intervention.

But the formulation of theses, which are theoretical generalizations, cannot be circumvented so that the actual "ought" is limited to the direct imitation of the exemplar. This would presuppose that historical moments and mechanical cyclicality of reality coincide; although this might be desirable and would certainly facilitate, it is, as he has already guessed, foreign to the essence of Machiavelli's thought. Therefore, action is also obliged to derive its practical principles and orientations not directly from the practice of the past, but from the general values that emerge from it, because only general values possess the flexibility and capacity necessary to grasp the changes that have occurred with respect to the concrete conditions of action. Thus, the example often supports (and plays along with) a general thesis that seems more theoretical than practical, and one gets the impression that the Bei spiel does not serve the didactic purpose of technical and practical thinking, but is used for the construction of an induced syllogism or for the confirmation of a deduced syllogism. But this impression does not correspond to the attitude and goal-setting that mainly drive Machiavelli's thinking. Even where the example is intended to support a proposition that does not contain a direct corollary intended to direct the action, it is not a retreat into the realm of pure theory, but only an indirect and summary formulation of general truths to which the practical man must subscribe, whatever the direction of his action, or it is a statement of general factors that are constantly operative and constitute the general conditions of all action. When Machiavelli

e.g. with reference to many examples he wants to prove that the Romans owe their greatness to bravery and not to luck (*Discorsi* II,1), he formulates deductively (deductively in relation to logic; for Ma chiavelli essentially "believed" in the thesis before he "proved" it) a truth of theoretical value; but the formulation of this theoretical truth contains an invitation to the acting man and an incentive to exert his bravery to the utmost, because he thus limits the factor of fate.

can. In this way, the theoretical truth becomes a call to action and a proposal for action; this is, by the way, also the sense of its uncovering and presentation. Now, the fact that the conclusions of the discovery have direct practical implications - the goal of the search is from the beginning a practical one, and so this search is from the beginning oriented to practical needs - makes its study a valuable and responsible work, on the outcome of which many and important things depend; consequently, this study cannot be left to the authorities, but it must be the concern of an independent mind (on the contrary, a humanist who has few or trivial practical goals risks nothing by blindly following an authority). Therefore, Machiavelli draws from the classics of antiquity not judgments but examples. He adopts their judgments or draws on them when he agrees with them; where he disagrees, he also says so bluntly *(Discorsi* I,58 and II,18), even if his tone is sometimes apologetic, and rightly so, because the historical authorities still ruled in his life environment, and it is very likely that he preferred not to come into conflict with them; he wanted to be on good terms with them and with the humanistic environment that welcomed them (albeit with more reservations than in previous years). Nevertheless, he is not ready to sacrifice the substance of his thought; this would be like sacrificing the practice that depended on it.

The priority of the practical-normative and the political technique in Machiavelli's thought are clearly manifested in the connection of general theses with individual examples. Machiavelli's thought itself is also expressed in another way, which is much more complex and indirect, and to the formation of which several and quite different intellectual criteria contribute. First, it becomes clear how the technique crystallized in the form of teachings grounded in examples, but then the example also departs from its relation to practical teaching and becomes an autonomous and exemplary scheme of action (an attitude that, as mentioned above, already shines through from the primacy of example over teaching). One can observe that this scheme develops lawfully, like an impeccable mechanism, like the unfolding of an ideally correct and well-balanced practice, whose individual elements have been consciously adapted and rounded off by Machiavelli in order to fit them into the scheme of thought and to make it an organic whole.

to be presented. The lesson is given indirectly, it is not clearly formulated (as an element arising from and drawn from practice itself, as an element that then becomes independent and acquires general validity), but is equated with the exemplary act (or a series of purposeful acts). The scheme of such an exemplary act, which is by itself a lesson in political art, is already apparent in a small early work of Machiavelli: *Description of the way the Duke of Valentinois captured and killed Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, the Signor Paolo Orsini, and the Duke of Gravina Orsini* (1503). There, the events are presented in such a way that they result in a progression whose phases Cesare Borgia knows; thus, he can present his plan in all clarity and accuracy and apply it with the appropriate accuracy [163]. Of course, it is difficult today to judge to what extent Borgia's activities in the years 1502 and 1503 were planned and not just a reaction to the needs of the hour; What is significant for Machiavelli's thinking, however, is that he portrays Cesare Borgia as preparing his actions as phases of a preconceived rational plan. And in the same way, ten years later, he will portray Cesare Borgia's political acumen *(Prince* 7), but this time not in terms of a specific political action, but in terms of his entire political activity.

But in the process of transformation of the concrete material, the example, into an exemplary scheme, which contains only the hand solid elements in a purified and fictitious form, a spiritual function intervenes, which stands outside the strict and clear limits of rationalism and calculation, in the way in which the rational criterion of technique is guided by the irrational criterion of patriotism. This function is the imagination. With it, the mind can transform the tangible, clear and concrete experience or rational assessment of a historical event into a general rule. The single event thus becomes the starting point, the tribune of the onslaught of the imagination, which with a leap starts to formulate general theses with rule-like validity, after it has first found in the initial event the sharp-sighted constant, the point of contact with the universal world of political duty - for if the single event, the example, contains no universal elements, the leap of the imagination to the general rule lands in the void. Through machiavelli's

diplomatic experience alone cannot explain this function of the imagination; perhaps the aversion to the binding and unbending nature of the general rule and the turn to the fragmentary nature of the tangible manifestation of phenomena is a skill of the diplomat, in the strictly professional sense of the term. Also many of Machiavelli's contemporaries, especially as diplomats, made a lot of astute and accurate individual observations, but without doing what Machiavelli did: formulating the general rule that follows from these observations, leaving rationalism in the strict sense of the word. For if rationalism remains dry and timid, it ends up becoming one with empiricism and short-sighted positivism (of which many "mature" older gentlemen are so proud) and can no longer grasp the general and thus the essence of phenomena. But Machiavelli does not hesitate, he leaves the rational calculation behind and transgresses the limits that the scope of the examples and his experience set him; his mind stands on firm legs, is not afraid to rise into the clouds; he is also not afraid to be consciously supported by the imagination and has a deep and direct feeling and a sharp eye for reality[164].

Imagination thus collects the fragments left by the individual experiences, it brings fundamentals and thought-provoking ideas into the same camp and assembles on a higher level what has passed through the first rational processing. This function is fulfilled by the imagination in the case of the prince, the fictitious figure, in whom one can analytically recognize all the strengths and weaknesses of real persons, who certainly embody many views of this fictitious figure to a greater or lesser degree, as constituent elements [165]. But the individual being, who harmoniously unites all these characteristics, does not exist; The personality of the fictitious prince is a postulate that certainly arises from the desire to change concrete circumstances, but at the same time is hypostatized and grasped in the imagination as an entity in itself, as an independent quantity that is designed to cover certain necessities, but is not fully absorbed by them and does not dissolve in them, but stands as an "eternal good," as an ever-valid example of political action. In addition, the last chapter of the of the Prince clearly manifests the intertwining and correspondence (as far as it goes) with the imagination as a function in Machiavelli's thought and with patriotism as an aspect of his worldview and his motives.

Here the imagination has freer course and becomes richer, it is no longer only the instrument that leads from the particular to the general, but it is the vision of the patriot, an element that no longer only crowns rational analysis, but that gives form to the irratio nal patriotic striving. Thus, the *prince* appears as an entity of the union of imagination and passion with critical thought, which faces and must fulfill pragmatic imperatives; thought thus takes shape in the antagonism of these elements, through a struggle, in fact, that finally comes to rest and presents us with a balance of all these elements. But this equilibrium is not synonymous with a compromise or a limitation of the dynamics of one of the two elements or of both; it is fruitful and substantial because it is not based on single and limited determinations, but on the essential sides of the theme in the *prince,* which the imagination found and worked on, and to which it gave, where it wanted to, more emphasis and more expression, The imagination found and worked on the essential sides of the subject in the prince, and where it wanted to, it gave them more emphasis and liveliness, without fearing that it could slip into one-sidedness (besides, one-sidedness would not seem reprehensible if the desired result, the desired impression and the desired attention were awakened). Now the imagination serves not only, as said above, to summarize the completed facts as general rules, but also to foresee the unfinished. Machiavelli's correspondence with Vettori reveals that in their letters they both put a political situation up for discussion and exchange predictions about its outcome, that they take into account moods and future acti vities of each factor involved. However technical and rationalistic - in the diplomatic sense - the character of this analysis may be, the imagination is nevertheless used here to supplement the indications contained in the criteria already known, to sketch the whole, to outline a situation in which certain developments are possible, and to grasp which of these possible developments will occur and which will not.

If these are the general functions that imagination fills in Machiavelli's intellectual world, one must also examine what its structure is. Machiavelli's imagination does not include the, so to speak, artistic aspect of his mind, which functions not only as a heterogeneous but as a diametrically opposed element parallel to rationality, which fights it and creates a spiritual split between the two.

Machiavelli's imagination is a positive one because it operates in the field of real quantities, even if fictitiously modified, and because it aims at purposes that do not irrevocably negate all reality. Machiavelli's imagination is a positive one because it moves in the field of real magnitudes, even if they are fictitiously altered, and because it aims at purposes that do not amount to an irrevocable negation of all reality and to a flight into irrational visions, but the achievement of which alone presupposes a rational consideration of human action and its adaptation to the dictates of ratio. Imagination aims at a situation in which reality and thinking would be identical, it does not reject logic and reality in poetic and artistic ecstasy - it is only visionary and reaches precisely in leaps rather to a happy outcome of the exercise of rational politics. Even if features can be found in Machiavelli's imaginary world that could be described as poetic in a broader sense, this is a function that, precisely when the mind works rationally in the field of concrete circumstances and experiences, acts there like an igniting spark; its primary task is to help the mind and to intertwine with its rational progress at a deeper level, at a stage when the individual examples are logically invalidated in order to be inserted into an exemplary scheme. But, as said, this is already a first separation from the service of the concrete, which is a negation of the imagination; this separation gradually continues, it becomes the schema that is found, for example, in the *description of the species ...* it grasps the Roman constitution as an image of climax juxtaposed with the image of Italy's decline (it is the central theme of the *Discorsi,* where the juxtaposition of these two images differs fundamentally from the way the humanists did it), and here and there it culminates in com mentaries such as in the last chapter of the *Prince.* Consequently, what is commonly called in its entirety by one word "imagination," to distinguish it from the immediately calculating functions of the mind, is not the same in all its layers, but there are gradations in it. On the other hand, imagination is not always a consequence of rational thought, which appears in a certain phase; for Machiavelli, imagination in its most restrained form leads first to a general truth, because it arrives at real magnitudes in the visionary and the intuitive conception, a truth that confirms rational thought a posteriori, whether-

imagination already believes in it a priori (as indicated above, when it was mentioned that Machiavelli's induction is very often a reduction). After that, the imagination clearly has priority in the representation of quantities that are not suitable as an object of rational and calculating consideration, as can be seen, for example, in the manifold ways in which Machiavelli personifies fortuna, because he wants to make its meaning tangible. We must not forget, however, that it is very difficult and risky to speak of the primacy or non-primacy that one element has over the other when we are dealing with a mental world as multilayered and at the same time as dense and organically connected as Machiavelli's, where reason and imagination, passion and calculation, analysis and synthesis, practice and theory, legality and will together make up an inseparable whole from which nothing can be removed - often it cannot even be isolated in favor of analysis.

The Function of Imagination in Machiavelli's Thought and Writing does not come into contradiction with his naturalism, because, as emphasized above, Machiavelli's naturalism does not mean the classification of the elements of reality in a mechanistic worldview, where they occupy a certain place as colorless quantities and are considered from the point of view of the function of the whole system. Rather, naturalism is an attitude of direct observation of things, a conception to which all mental functions contribute, from sense perception to logical thinking, while, on the other hand, the general rules derived from this conception of things are never lost in the pale realm of extreme abstraction, but always remain filled with lively empirical content. This naturalistic conception corresponds entirely to the naturalism of language and style, which is a source of pleasure for us, because in our time every thought, however naturalistic (outside of literature, and even that not always), is expressed in intellectualized language [166]. In the 16th century, after the courtly life of the time had been abandoned, the naturalism of the language of the time was not always expressed in intellectualized language.In the sixteenth century, after courtly life had absorbed the entire ruling class, the best stylistic patterns (such as *The Courtier of* Castiglione) are mannered expressions of a mannered society in which style, as weighty in the significant as in the insignificant, is conventional and cluttered; here the writer is quite distinct from man, he is quite a different person, and writes in a manner alien to the soul. At

Machiavelli, on the other hand, the man and the writer are the same; no artificial technique intervenes between the text and its author, and the writer spontaneously contributes to the work with his entire self; the form as an end in itself dissolves and now automatically coincides with the content aspect, which is formlessly present in the consciousness 167- Machiavelli is just as far removed from the common humanistic style (not so much in terms of the commonplaces, which he quite often adopts, as in terms of its substance), which as a rule reveals the strong individuality less than do the texts of the later authors of courtly society. On the contrary, he is much closer to the third and more dynamic current of the Renaissance style, realism, which manifests itself with great clarity in Boccaccio; his works also reflect how the turn to worldliness and the characteristics of individualism found their way into literature. This is evident in principle, for Machiavelli is a proficient psychologist and psycho graph, not only of individuals but also of groups. The psychograms in his works bring us tangibly and turgidly close to his characters; this happens not only in some of his purely literary works (especially, of course, in *The Mandragora),* but also in the historical characters he portrays, as the reader of the *Flo rentine Histories* knows very well. And just as in Renaissance prose the faithful representation of the psychological characteristics of a person, starting from the same secularly oriented current, merged with the realistic description of a place, so with Machiavelli the spontaneous adoption of the psychological elements that individualism and the naturalistic view of the world produced, does not stop with the psychograms, but penetrates all levels of the perceptible and goes as far as the expression of the most abstract contents with symbols and vivid images, while even the comparisons and metaphors are felt like a body, one with the thought that nourishes them 168-.

At the same time, this realism comes from a desire for honesty that has nothing in common with cynicism or shamelessness. Cynical honesty is irresponsible and simplistic, but Machiavelli is obsessed with the desire to face people and things responsibly, and it is only in this context that he sometimes makes statements or draws psychograms that sound cynical or impertinent 169- What speaks for this sense of responsibility is that Machiavelli, although he is a friend of the heart, is not a man of the heart.

of ridicule and sarcasm, has no liking for its final con sequence, the paradox, and that he also never sets puns in place of syllogisms, as a thoughtless cynic would. His truths, on the contrary, are positive and clear, while the term "cause" is often repeated together with consecutive conjunctions or the corresponding clause. The principle that the mind controls events by choosing the right course of action is also applied to the mode of representation, where the mind interprets events and examines their causes, not only immediate causes but also those that act retrospectively (e.g., in noting that the elimination of the belligerent Feudal lords had the effect of weakening Florence's fighting strength). The cause of one event is something in the succession of others; thus, as a grasp of reality, we are presented with a "series" of events that are not only individually tangible, but also each represent an inter pretatory principle for another, subsequent event. Of course, this series is quite different from the pyramid of Aristotelian (and scholastic) syllogism of upper clause, lower clause, and final clause[170]- The series also unfolds in a fluid and continuous style that is not constrained by stylistic conventions or mannerisms, for the content has absolute priority. Machiavelli writes spontaneously, his mind persistently focused on his fundamental idea, which he pursues passionately, constantly grasping it in new perspectives and new examples, without much concern for word choice and syntax, which often becomes anomalous, for example, when the real subject takes precedence over the grammatical subject. Where the subject interests him more, the style immediately becomes sublime, while on the other hand he writes less stylistically deftly when his interest is less (as it seems to be in some parts of the *stories*). The style often becomes dialogic and dramatic (as the frequent change to the 2nd person singular shows), because it combines there with a didactic and dialectical intention, while also possible solutions or ways of dealing are presented alternatively. Again, a principle that Machiavelli considers fundamental in political reality becomes a stylistic principle: the principle of avoiding the middle ground; already in his first texts, antonymous syntax and the use of copulative conjunctions are markedly frequent.

Of course, Machiavelli's style of writing differs from that of the features that make Machiavelli's writing style quite different from that of the humanists. Above, the diplomatic reports were mentioned, which at the end of the 15th century deviate much more clearly from the humanist style, after the humanists, especially in Florence, move exclusively in the narrow circles of rich privateers and humanist education generally declines, while in the permanent diplomatic representations there are now people who have less contact with humanism. The additional needs of these offices and the partial change of their physical bearers entailed an even greater revival of the style of these reports, which from the beginning were very clear texts written in the Italian vernacular. But the lively Italian language conquers these circles definitively where they are taken by the new political historiography. As already shown, the new historians who write in Italian are not specialized humanists, but above all people of political action who have directly and tangibly experienced everything they write about; experience and narration coincide. Thus, the writing style becomes natural by itself, while the description of dead things fits much more easily into a mannered language [171]. Lexicologically, Machiavelli's Italian contains Latinisms and Florentine peculiarities to a certain extent and is generally reserved with respect to neologisms; grammatically, he adheres rather less to rules and adopts unchecked the rich and spontaneous morphology of the various Florentine socio- and idiolects [172]. Thus, the Latinized style, even in Italian, is foreign to him. The Latin expressions that can be found unchanged in his texts are traces of the daily conversations with his colleagues and of his diplomatic epistolary style; They are therefore not a peculiarity that subordinates itself to the dead Latin word, but on the contrary, they transmit the liveliness of the daily discussions in the writing room, where certain texts written in Latin alternate with other texts written in Italian[173] in the exchange of opinions, thoughts and jokes in the spoken language, which is enriched with the respective intellectual and humanistic education of the discussants. Machiavelli's contact with humanist circles, as described in the previous chapter, also had certain effects on his style; The Art of War is written in dialogue form, which not only echoes the literary genre that was inseparable from the name of Plato, but also reflects the life of those circles that wanted to imbue their discussions and intercourse in the Florence of the time with something of the tone of the ancient academies, while in The Mandragora, in his second comedy where he imitates Plautus, large parts are literal translations.

But the content of The Art of War was not influenced by the archaizing dialog form, and Clizia does not occupy such an important place in his work as to affect the overall picture.

These characteristic stylistic features in Machiavelli, which betray a sharp, attentive and lively mind, cannot be transferred unchanged to draw the personality picture and psychogram of Machiavelli. In his style of thought and nature, in his spirit and character, there is not that consistency and uniformity which constitute the characteristic par excellence of, say, a Goethe. As a real and tangible personality, Machiavelli moved on much lower levels than those on which he was at home in intellectual history. The positive imagination, the intense juxtaposition of alternative solutions and the condemnation of the middle way and compromise, which determine his thinking and means of expression quite considerably and make him a great thinker for very many and a great man of letters for all, are not inherent qualities in his life's journey that elevated him, at least intellectually, above his contemporaries as long as he lived, or clearly distinguished him from them. As a man, Machiavelli not only interfered passionately in the conflicts of those around him, he also allowed himself to be carried away by them, without his general reception of things becoming for himself a perspective and a quality that would have allowed him, as an individual, to maintain the distance required by the broad perception of the mind and the integrity of character. In the daily and varied life as it unfolded around him, he spontaneously participated as a very sociable person who had relationships, interests and aspirations. But if this now seems to be devaluing for the image we have in our minds of what a "great mind" should be like (an image related on the one hand to the archaic figure of the seer and prophet and on the other hand to the more recent further development of this figure, which congeals in the idea of the unworldly ,,genius"), for Machiavelli himself it is precisely this relationship that shaped him: the imprint of the reality surrounding him in its characteristics and contradictions in the context of extreme personal situations and personal striving. As I wrote in the introduction, time penetrates the individual through a series of refractions and through a set of contacts with countless concrete aspects of reality. From this perspective, we can psychologically examine why Machiavelli's time and the constant historical elements it contains are experienced with such clarity in his work. But we cannot explain why other individuals, who were just as intensely imbued with concrete but also representative aspects of their time, can neither express nor generalise them, because our present knowledge of the transformation of social processes into psychological ones and also of the assessment of the extremely individual and unrepeatable element of personality do not permit this.

As a person, Machiavelli did not seem to have exerted any influence on his environment; what he did was either insignificant or hardly noticed 174- He did not hold high offices and never carried decisive responsibility; he always remained a reliable func tionary, a civil servant to whom delicate missions were entrusted, but who was not a prominent figure175- If one wanted to use the analogy, one could say, with regard to his professional position, that he was something like the secretary of state in a ministry, an honorable and serious cadre of the permanent state civil service, in whose eyes the conscientious performance of his official duties coincided as much with service to the interests of his fatherland as with the practical application of the dictates of the state's presidency - which linked his official duties to his general conception of politics and which gradually became interwoven into an unbreakable unity of his "theory" with the concrete conditions of his activities. For Machiavelli, the activity of office was a fulfillment of life, and within this framework he felt competent and at ease, and did not have the burden of a man whose profession did not allow him to devote himself to his true inclination. For Machiavelli, his profession was a condition of life that also satisfied his spiritual desires; he felt at ease, incorporated into an apparatus that allowed him to devote himself to his favorite game, politics, and so he was well prepared to stand not only on the upper but also on the lower steps of this apparatus. (It is worth noting here that in *Discorsi* 1:36 he praises citizens who are not above holding low positions, even if they used to hold higher ones). This attitude explains why Machiavelli was willing to take on unimportant missions in his last years, which the Medici entrusted to him after persistent urging on his part. insistence on his part.

What was important for him was to participate in ongoing politics, and the evidence we have suggests that Machiavelli enjoyed himself in the role of advisor and expert, without possessing any further ambition for leadership in addition to advancement in office[176]. But in concrete Florentine society, even this advancement had certain limits. For example, the ambassadors were chosen from the rich and upper classes, because only the upper classes had their own means to cover the expenses for their missions (one must not forget that the state organization was still in a less developed state); these expenses included travel expenses, the payment of servants and secretaries, bribes for the procurement of information, and the like. With the economic crisis in Florence at the end of the fifteenth century, these burdens became so great that the great bourgeoisie no longer took on such missions so willingly, even if they cultivated acquaintances at foreign courts and advocated for the family business [177]. This reluctance increased the be special burden on permanent officials and secretaries in the diplomatic service; in most of the missions in which Machia velli participated, he was their heart and soul.

This rise of civil servants in the state apparatus who did not come from the families, was particularly noticeable between 1502 and 1512.

1512, when Florence was ruled by Piero Soderini. Soderini came to power at a time of extreme weakness and insecurity in his homeland, and his lifetime appointment indicated a desire to restore stability and poli tical continuity to a city drained of bi-monthly and biannual governments. This continuity was also expressed in offices such as these in which Machiavelli served, and certainly officials regarded their superiors with some suspicion in their capacity as members of a temporary government. Republican and aristocratic citizens elected Soderini by a common consensus; but that consensus quickly broke, and the aristocratic wing, still mourning the Medici period, turned against Soderini. He now found support among the permanent state officials, people of low origin who obeyed him better than the aristocrats[178]. Such young people, keen on a political career, were already numerous in the state authorities, and their emergence was the result not only of the partial withdrawal of the upper middle classes as a consequence of the Medici banishment and the economic shortage, but also of the electoral reforms introduced after the banishment of the banishment of the Medici, which benefited many of the lower from the lower classes, because many offices were awarded by lot[179].

Soderini's turn to people of low birth and to the tenured officials (both groups evoked the rejection of the elite) displeased the aristocracy and made them even more hostile to Sode rini. Guicciardini and Giannotti, siding with the Florentine aristocracy, the ottirnati or optimates, condemned Soderini for his tendency to do everything himself or to promote persons of humble origin and oust the grandees [180]. In the new situation that had arisen with Soderini's appointment, it was only natural that Machiavelli's personal position also became higher; Soderini was quick to appreciate Machiavelli's respectability and diligence and to make use of him, placing his trust in him, which on several occasions provoked the wrath of the grand bourgeoisie (cf. Buonaccorsi's letter of 6.10.1506, Villari (1877), p. 504f.). Even if a certain personal relationship developed between the [two][181], Soderini never included him in the circle of those who decided on important issues. Despite Soderini's benevolence toward him, Machiavelli did not hold his abilities in particularly high esteem. Soderini was basically hesitant, compromising and protocol-oriented; his strengths - order, accuracy, economy, integrity, moderation - would have much easily made him a great leader in peacetime, but these were not the qualities of the strong man Machiavelli considered indispensable for solving the problems of that critical period Florence and all Italy were going [through][182]. In Machiavelli's attitude to Soderini, the irony of the professional towards the sincerity of someone who has no idea and no conception of things shines through. But this did not prevent Machiavelli from fulfilling his duties to the utmost, any more than it prevented him from the conceit of the expert, which, as already mentioned, is expressed in many of his diplomatic reports. When Machiavelli gave himself over to his political visions or when he did his work as a patriot, he automatically inserted himself into a refe rence system that was different from the reference system of Machiavelli the official. In the one as in the other, he moved independently, without the activities in the one interfering with the activities in the other

conflict. Thus he was able to think politically and at the same time act according to instructions. But the irony and arrogant tone of his reports reveal the brusque, but to him well unaware, otherness of his orientations.

This organic and unconscious duality in Machiavelli's psyche and intellect led to the fact that he could advance on the way of his politological conceptions without it hindering him in his life as a social man. The opinion is wrong, Machiavelli would have stood all his life at the edge, because he was conscious of his greatness[183-] The distance between him and the upper social circles had objective reasons: As said, Machiavelli did not possess a humanistic education, also he was relatively poor; this was perhaps psychologically compensated by the glorification of moderation and of the great Romans, who had not become rich either (as they were sung about by the first generation of humanists), but he did not have the means to lead the life of the upper social circles. In his private correspondence, but also in his official correspondence, money is often mentioned184- The feeling that these objective disadvantages produced did not allow the feeling of spiritual superiority to prevail in him subjectively, but it would have been intensified if Ma chiavelli had been an unsociable and isolated person. He preserved his independence as a professional in the questions that concerned him, and this independence, together with a self-conscious attitude, is expressed in extreme and sometimes provocative statements in his conclusions, as well as in the strongly individualistic character of his work - the result of an active mind, who wants to intervene in politics and in the development of events185- But as a social man who is disadvantaged in important matters of external life and strives to compensate for these deficiencies, he turns at the same time to the circles that could help him to rise, and enters into a series of compromises that forbid him to show off his superiority. This, of course, seems reprehensible and morally reprehensible to us, but this impression is greatly weakened when we revisit the atmosphere in that society at that time. It is not right to burden Machiavelli's relations with his environment with the psychological and moral problems that arose in the international society of the nineteenth century and especially in our time, since "ideology" in a certain way was the

identity of each individual and determines his relations, social intercourse, etc., so that in the end his morality is judged by the inflexibility he adopts in his general attitude toward members of the opposite camp. Here, however, we have a much more flexible and fluctuating society, less "ideological"; the individual's conformity to the theses he himself holds is not regarded by others as a self-evident obligation and bond as it is today. Man first of all participates in social life, and even intellectual creation (especially in fields such as historiography and political science) is a work that has a social purpose - not in the sense of changing the form of society, but by becoming the subject of discus sion and criticism or approval in certain circles, which is also linked to a great extent to the social destiny of the intellectual creator, - as the dedications in Machiavelli's work clearly show. Thus, the practical and social side of individuality is emphasized; in Machiavelli, to whom the pseudo-theoretical otium of the humanists was already foreign, this side is extraordinarily strong, which is an additional, psychological reason for the prac tical orientation of his theories and conclusions. At the bottom of his being, Machiavelli is a man of action, not only in the broad political meaning of the word, but also in the narrower sense of a social man. In all his years of service, buried under a mountain of work, he never complained that he lacked time to read and write. On the contrary, during the time of his writing activity he is far away from the current business, he feels like a fish without water and does everything to be able to resume his former life 186-.

It has been very nicely noted that the Italian of Machiavelli's time resembles in one person the conceited Greek citizen of Pericles' time and the graeculus, the "little Greek", of Juvenal's time[187-] On the one hand he is patriotic and has the feeling of belonging to a supra-individual society, on the other hand he is two-faced, materialistic and submissive. For Machiavelli, the first characteristic is the support of the vision of a flourishing state, while the second contains the human-psychological characteristics of decline, of "depravity," the elimination of which must be the fundamental goal of the ruler and the expert legislator. For Machiavelli, the first characteristic is the support of the vision of a flourishing state, while the second contains the human-psychological characteristics of decline, of " depravity", the elimination of which must be the fundamental goal of the ruler and the expert legislator. While Machiavelli, as a theorist of the state, condemns this depravity in no uncertain terms, as a human being he has no knowledge of the areas in his life where it takes effect, consequently he has no interest in finding and eliminating it (as I said, such personal-moral problems are beyond the horizon of time).

As a clearly socially oriented person, he spontaneously adopts a different attitude: he also takes pleasure himself in those aspects of depravity which sweeten his life with mistresses and which, of course, creep into his life not in the deterrent form of an evil devil and saboteur of social robustness, but with the smiling face of the most diverse pleasures. Compared with their roots, the ex treme by-products of "depravity" are sociologically insignificant; a much greater role, on the other hand, is played in individual life by the various manifestations of "depravity," the good life and the pleasures it holds in store for the individual. Thus, the individual comes into contact only with the most stimulating, pleasant, and pleasurable side of depravity and does not see that it is the part of life that the individual himself might generally condemn if he were considering harm and benefit to society. But even if Machiavelli had at some point become aware of this contradiction between the social and the individual, there were other traits in his outlook that by themselves and quite unconsciously bridged the gap: There was the unchanging human nature, the eternally evil, cunning, and pleasure-seeking nature of man, and there was the concept of "technology," which is an excellent instrument for liberation from ideological and moral bonds and a pretext for compromise of all kinds when transferred from the realm of politics to the realm of individual life. In *The Mandragora,* Machia velli's attitude toward "depravity" in its individualized aspects is that of a skeptic; he does not curse it, he only smiles, he ironizes and also allows wistfulness to come through-not that of the disappointed one who is at odds with himself, but the indulgent sadness of one who is convinced that things are so and will continue to be so; thus he avoids any superfluous dramatization and romanticization[188-].

This was probably the feeling that prevailed in Machiavelli's mind the few times found the way to achieve his personal goals closed; he certainly reduced his zeal in social intercourse and saw the life of those around him from a certain distance (while mostly assimilating).

And when he had the problem of having to withdraw into himself and hide his innermost self instead of turning it outward, he did so as the intellectual man that he was, certainly with irony toward others, but also toward himself. He was making fun of himself, or rather, of a false image of himself that he had drawn to hide his true self. With irony he creates an alibi, he burns an image of himself and diverts attention from his real self.

This complex psychological web can partly explain his much-discussed persistent attempt to enter the service of the Medici, the former rulers of Florence who had been exiled in 1494 and returned in 1512, taking power out of Soderini's hands and expelling his people from their positions. Within the framework of this attempt belongs Machiavelli's correspondence with Vettori (which he took pleasure in extending to a wide variety of subjects as long as he had the hope that Vettori would help him; however, he discontinued the correspondence when he was disappointed by him) and the *Prince*'s successive dedications to the two young Medici. Admittedly, the view that Ma chiavelli wrote this work solely to regain his position is indisputable; it is something else if he had seen it as useful and perhaps was himself willing to present his work as something that arose from the desire to help the directors of his homeland and his possible employers with advice. But such a motive cannot give rise to such a even if Machiavelli had wanted to use it for his own personal benefit. personal benefit; it is a rich, complex, fiery text, a collection of text, a collection of experiences, observations and generalisations[189]. One can see that in this matter two sides of Machiavelli Machiavelli: the thinker, who retains the original independence and inalienable independence for every thinker, and the social man, who takes the fruits of the thinker crystallized in a work and tries to use them not for the purposes of the thinker, but of the social man; but in this way he can use only the form of the work - but not its content -, only the external characteristics that show what qualities and abilities the author possesses. At the same time it is not possible to present the work to the addressee otherwise than as content, as help and guide for his actions; but in

reality, the content does not always reach the one to whom it is offered; because although he has the means to apply the offer of the work (to see the form and help the social man), he does not always have the personality that it takes to take the content of the work as a guide and at the same time not make friends with the social man who offered it to him, but with the thinker who wrote the book. The author, in turn, senses this and basically does not give the ruler all of his thinking, but only a part, even though he claims that he gives him everything. Machiavelli writes and gives advice, but in reality he puts the surplus of his thinking into words; nevertheless, the high literary achievements, even if they require a rich reservoir, can also appear for very specific purposes and even for low motives. In this contradictory psychological dialectic, one can neither say exclusively that Machiavelli wanted above all to regain his position in order to realize his ideas, nor that, as a pure technician of politics, he was not interested in the system he served, nor that he offered his services animated by the spirit of the good officer for whom governments change, but the state remains the same190- Since Machiavelli was forced to put the thinker in the sense mentioned above at the service of the social individual (whose needs constituted the bulk of the conscious personality), he perhaps underwent a process that can be found in different forms even today in the, incidentally quite conservative, back and forth of the so-called "intellectuals". Undoubtedly, in the *Prince,* Machiavelli honestly presented how he saw the problems of a reconstruction of Italy and of the state in general; but since he wanted to get closer to his former opponents, he ended up considering them precisely as those who would adopt his views par ex cellence, (leaving unnoticed what prevented them from playing such a role - but he would have noted this immediately if he had not needed them). If that were true, he would also have had to cross over to the other side to remain true to his views. Thus arises the inevitable "justification mechanism" of compromise, with which both the thinker and the social man are confronted. In some modern cases, the compromise is not always complete, and the renegade eventually feels remorse; but there is no reason to suppose that Machiavelli would have similar problems.

had had. As mentioned above, ideology was not yet synonymous with personal identity; the opportunist did not feel as if the finger was being pointed at him, nor did he take a defensive or aggressive stance before anyone had even condemned him.

A comparison of Machiavelli with his famous contemporary, the younger Guicciardini, better highlights certain fundamental criteria of his personality and at the same time also shows the currents that later prevailed among Italian intellectuals and made it impossible to nurture the seedling that Machia velli had set. Machiavelli's worldview is active and basically optimistic; he believes in certain things, he is sure of them, from this he also draws the strength to mock and be mocked. Of course, Guicciardini also has certain ideals; he wants Italy to be freed from foreign domination and to break away from the clergy, but he would not even lift a little finger for that. The vision of the state does not excite him like Machiavelli, nor does he become intoxicated with the memory of Rome. Every turgidity is rejected, rationalism and later cynicism reign; the center of the world is the individual, who refuses to overcome empirical realities and locks himself in a narrow world, where he rules who knows how to pursue his private interest and exploit the circumstances; even the common good can only be met if it coincides with the ambitions of the individual[191]. This subjective hermeticism has serious implications for the style and structure of Guicciardini's thought; in his historical descriptions he remains attached to individual events, and in his detailed examination of them (which Machiavelli neglected) he differentiates them in such a way that no general laws can be established [192]. Guicci ardini describes slowly and patiently, without digressing into generalizations or arranging his material in such a way that it helps him to make generalizations; Machiavelli, on the other hand, is impatient and in a hurry, he wants to grasp the basic element, the core, and build on it, leaving detailed description aside [193]. For Guicci ardini it is the event that counts, and this event is described exactly and statically, while for Machiavelli it is the generalization that counts, the rule; thus the individual events are only beginnings destined to unfold into rules[194]. Guicciardini also considers that human nature is immutable, but he does not consider that one can learn lessons from the study of history

He denies that there is any general law that could lead to a practical commitment. He also denies any predictability of the future and puts great emphasis on fate. Thus the world loses any fixed point; it becomes uncertain and dim. Guicciardini clearly expresses the melancholy and hypocrisy that caused the country's decline among Italian intellectuals. Machiavelli was able to develop a little earlier than Guicci ardini and in a more modest environment, not yet permeated by the decay and the sensation of this decay. This is the fundamental difference between Machiavelli and Guicciardini 195-.

V

If, after having sketched his time, the epoch and Machiavelli's character, one now wanted to describe his ideas, one is confronted with the quite individualistic way in which his thought combined all those elements that we ordered a posteriori on the basis of our own logical connections and classifications. But precisely at that point, where the transmission from the reservoir of phenomena that time supplied him with takes place in the structured form that they assumed in his thought, one feels a void; one realizes that one is missing the decisive link in this chain that begins with the most general and typical expressions of the life and attitudes of that time and ends in the finest facets of individual vision. This void cannot be filled because it involves the inevitable ignorance of the roots of the concrete man, of the innermost core of his personality, and also the inevitable ignorance of those born after him of the experiential personal events, the great and small incidents in the life of man, by means of which the general characteristics of the time gradually penetrated into this man, broken and fragmented and imperceptible, and arranged themselves in this form and not in another. The characteristics that constitute the essential part of the personality can certainly be found, and one can also trace in large part the concrete hearths where the individual developed and internalized those characteristics; but even if one

If one could find all of them, it does not mean that one can also explain the way in which they were connected, how the theory arose that is based on these traits. The Gordian knot - the point where the individual elements experienced their sublimation in exactly this synthesis and no other - can therefore only be broken, not dissolved, because the synthesis of the elements which the analysis yielded and which could be isolated is an individual process, and the completely individual, even if it is not outside the 'scope of the social sciences' (as Alfred Weber would say), is nevertheless outside their present possibilities. Therefore, from this point on, the presentation will no longer be interpretative or explanatory, but necessarily descriptive.

The problem posed by Machiavelli does not essentially go beyond the question posed by the ancient classics; it is politological and not sociological, it does not distinguish between state and society - the starting point of recent sociology. But on this question, the Renaissance provided entirely new material from which new perspectives emerge; although the terminology of Machiavelli is in many respects poorer than that found in Aristotle's *Politics, it is* full of illustrative material that allows conclusions that were not possible for the classics. In comparison to Aristotle, Machiavelli lacks the classification of his ideas into a coherent system. In the second chapter, it was shown that Machiavelli took the first step toward founding a science by distinguishing and separating politics from morality; but he never took the second and more important step because he spontaneously and unexaminedly equated the doctrine of action, political deontology, with historical and political ontology. Ratio did not retreat from the field of practice to a consistently theoretical position; it remained dual, practical and theoretical at the same time, noticeably inclined to practical interests. This practical orientation focused the thinking on alternative directions, it not only prevented the creation of a closed theoretical system, it also led to the formulation of thoughts that often contradicted each other. Any theoretical gain (that which was not denied by the general credo of the time) was obtained in the confrontation with practical-political questions, with double reference to both history and experience, and with the direct and conscious aim of making for this gain a practical application in dealing with the prac-

tical problems that led to its creation. In spite of everything, a theoretical reorganization of Machiavelli's thought can be made, because in his work the new perspective and the new reception of politics are everywhere present, while on the other hand he had the great ability to condense the abundance of his experiences and to place the rich edifice of his mind on few and simple but powerful pillars196-.

Machiavelli's questioning (and more generally the questioning of the His "political historiography") is determined by two great events of his time: First, the destruction of the autonomy of Italy by foreign powers - as a result, he reflects on military orga nization and on the external power of the state; second, the changes of government in Florence, which led to countless debates and investigations on the internal organization of the state. But if these historical events encouraged theoretical generalization, at the same time they limited it to those active forces that were most evident and effective in these events, that is, to the military and political forces. The events that drove the theoretical thinking were neither economic nor ideological; therefore, these factors were only incidentally a subject of investigation197- At the same time, these events that provided Machiavelli with the foundations of his thinking, refracted by the prevailing spirit, the generally prevailing attitude of the time, as I described in the first chapter, penetrated Machiavelli's thinking. But with regard to the last point, it must be noted that even if he was spontaneously imbued with the general attitude that sprang from certain social conditions, he himself must not necessarily have been able to trace his outlook back to the conditions that produced them; consequently, he is not compelled to regard those conditions as perfectly social and historical exemplars, while, on the other hand, he could readily regard the outlook that resulted from them as coherent (without himself knowing it). It is quite normal that the manifold ideological forms isolate themselves from the conditions that produce them, and that they appear autonomous in comparison to these - even if they are in turn externally determined, either by completely different conditions or by conditions that are related to their conditions of origin but contradict them. the general principles of the deliberative approach, of calculation,

but whereas today one can see these phenomena in their totality and recognise these principles in the actions of the prince as well as the condottiere, Machiavelli denies that the same values always underlie the actions of the prince and the condottiere - because Machiavelli was motivated precisely by the ultimate consequences of where these principles directed his thought after they had been transformed from principles of practice to principles of research; so he denies precisely one of the real givens that produced the principle on the basis of which the givenness itself was discarded. I note this not because it is exclusively characteristic of Machiavelli, but because it is a general phenomenon of the sociology of knowledge, the mention of which can lead researchers to the elimination of many contradictions, either in the persons they are investigating or in themselves.

Moreover, Machiavelli's work also contains certain fundamental views and assumptions that he shares with other contemporaries. These hypotheses are not explicitly formulated, but they run through and include the whole text of the work, so that they present themselves as conclusions and at the same time as starting points of his thought 198- One such hypothesis is the reception of human nature found in Machiavelli and in Guicciardini and very common in that period. Two major phenomena of Machiavelli's time involve the view that human nature is unchangeable and bad. The first phenomenon, the Reformation, seeks to save man by God's grace; it drives out his evil nature and enables him to do good; the good deed is not a direct consequence of the good nature, as another Christian camp held, but it is an indirect condition for salvation. The second great phenomenon, the emergence of nation-states, is ideologically based on the view that the state is the force that can counteract the innate, decomposing egoism of man199. Machiavelli spontaneously subscribes to the idea that man is bad, and to prove it he refers only to collective experience, not to an analysis of the essence of man. He is not interested in this essence, and it is very doubtful that he was ever concerned with its existence and its peculiarities; he is interested in the concrete manifestations of human nature, which congeal into various actions; in this form, someone who is not interested in the essence of man is not interested in the essence of man, but in the concrete manifestations of human nature, which congeal into various actions; in this form, someone who is not interested in the essence of man.

who is active on the political stage. What is certain is that the manifestations of human nature appear badly without a thorough investigation of whether and how this nature has come into being primarily. Human nature is thus not seen as something compact and static that could be elevated to first principle and objectification, but it is perceived as a dynamic disposition of desires and moods whose badness is empirically demonstrable - for if one treats people as if they were good, one almost always fails. This view is thus phenomenological and not metaphysical; Machiavelli seems to be saying only: it is certain that people tend toward the bad in any case, if there is nothing that can prevent them from doing so200- But there is no question of an unambiguous and one-sided nature of man, on the contrary; the manifestations that could theoretically be traced back to this nature are complex and often contradictory, and so one can neutralize the other, as, for example, cowardice can neutralize someone who is not good.For example, cowardice prevents someone from committing an atrocity, and man's wickedness is limited by his littleness *(Discorsi* I,27). Machiavelli says that man's nature is evil, meaning that man is antisocial and willing to undermine the group if it benefits him. But on the other hand, man is cowardly, he needs protection, and he prefers the much-trodden paths; this second aspect of man's bad nature contrasts with the first, and contributes to some extent to the consolidation of institutions rather than their submining201- In Machiavelli we also find the notion of supra-individual human nature, of a national character, a constant group trait that can be influenced by external factors, such as climate, or modified by laws and education. (This is a view he expresses sporadically when speaking of foreign peoples, and it is not impossible that it is a repetition of a common phrase of ancient historians that was also adopted by the humanists).

The more fundamental passions that human nature allows to be experienced are fear, desire and ambition. But these passions, in Machiavelli's view, are not only destructive forces, but also forms of energy set in motion under the influence of the myriad stimuli of the world. This movement is eternal and is composed of countless small movements of individuals driven by their passions.

The human being is a hearth of condensed energy which is latent or breaks out and unfolds as in a chain reaction to move the human being from the level of simple physical force to the level of consciousness. Man is a hearth of condensed energy which is latent or bursts forth and unfolds as in a chain reaction to raise man from the level of simple physical force to the state of a conscious and rational individual. The fact is that only a few reach this level; the masses remain attached to their passions, especially in times of decline. Nevertheless, it remains unfathomable why Machiavelli does not deal with it - neither mentions it nor interprets it - that man, or at least some men, change from bad and cowardly beings to calculating, rational individuals who are also honorable and have dreams. Does this happen automatically through the force that mobilizes the energy of the passions, or do we have to deal from the beginning with individuals who, for inexplicable reasons, evade, if not all aspects of nature that the majority of people possess, at least the worst aspects? Machiavelli does not answer this, but the strong liking he finds for personal intelligence easily suggests the latter. To be sure, intelligence very often goes hand in hand with the most repugnant qualities of human nature; Machiavelli knows this well, for beyond the purely technical assessment of political actions, he also has, as I said, broader criteria - the good of the state and the fatherland; in serving these criteria, intelligence achieves its highest value in Machiavelli's eyes. At least from the point of view of these individuals, life presents itself as an arena for the development not only of human instincts, but also of their faculties, their merits, their intellect; the will to rule no longer confronts the world as blind human nature, but as a deliberate, weighing mind that subdues the world with calculation and with proper handling; The individual now no longer has only inclinations, he also has goals, he is not only dominated by the desire for satisfaction of needs, but he structures his actions, he chooses the means, he understands reality and, according to his will, brings it into harmony with his actions, which already of themselves contain their standard of evaluation: success. Thus, the optimistic phenomenology of human nature - in an incomplete way, according to the criteria of abstract logic, but consistent with the profound practical impulses and aspects of Machiavelli's intellectual world - does not end up in a nihilistic or decomposing normativism; rather, the optimistic phenomenology of human nature does not end up in a nihilistic or decomposing normativism;

the opposite is the case. And this shows once more that the re zeption of human nature is neither a strict logical prius for Machiavelli's ideas nor the theoretical foundation of a mechanistic science, which would be basically nihilistic.

The active and dynamic development of the personality in the world in order to master this very world is the virtu, the merit. Components of virtu are will, ability, virtuosity, higher intelligence (ranging from grasping a situation to planning a ruse), courage, perseverance, flexibility, even physical strength. In short, virtu is the dynamic whole of a person, the weapon with which he confronts situations and reconciles them with his needs. Machiavelli does not seem to use the term virtu necessarily to grasp characteristic features that are reprehensible from a moral point of view; the sphere of his virtu stands like a world apart from the ordinary moral sphere, even though it can always encroach upon it202. More closely related to the ordinary moral sphere is not the virtu of the prince and the legislator - for it is primary, spontaneous and personal - but the virtu of the citizen, the average man, for as virtu ordinata it coincides with virtue, law-abidingness and patriotism. The primary and dynamic virtu of the legislator thus aims at the formation of a secondary virtu, which is no longer owed the creation of the state, but its preservation203. In addition to the primary virtu of the legislator and the virtu of the citizen, there is a third, apersonal virtu, which changes from country to country and from epoch to epoch and, with this change, causes the rise and fall of nations. the rise and fall of nations (Discorsi II, Introduction). and which is itself a dynamic and unpredictable element, a factor that and unpredictable element, a factor which prevents the emergence of a mechanical law in history, albeit on the basis of the unchangeable nature of man. of the unchangeable nature of man.

As shown in the first chapter, fortuna, fate, is the counterpart to virtu. This concept appears in a time of social inconstancy and ideological emptiness, since the providence of God is abandoned as an interpretative standard of value, but on the other hand, historical and sociological knowledge, and be it only newly created ideologies, are missing, which could compensate for this lack204. Machiavelli takes the symbol of fate, which was very widespread in his time, and incorporates it into his edifice of thought, without, however, sharing Dante's view in the least *(Die Hölle,* VII,67 ff.), fortuna

is an instrument for the fulfillment of a divine purpose[205]. In Machiavelli's work, however, fortuna is not an unambiguous term; it takes on various meanings. Sometimes it is the course of things itself, which one perhaps sees and knows, but which one cannot oppose. Then again it is an incomprehensible and mysterious power, which stands outside the intellectual abilities of the individual and becomes perceptible only because it exercises its power completely. Or it is an element that intervenes in an ambiguous situation and brings a solution when the virtu's trial of strength with things comes to an ambiguous end. For, Machiavelli says, good and evil are interwoven not only in our nature, in our inner selves, but also in the objectification of our selves, in our actions, where good and evil present themselves as equally probable and alternative consequences of our deeds, and from which arises a heteronomy of ends that fortuna can ameliorate but also worsen *(Discorsi* III,37). Sometimes fortuna is presented as an independent being, a kind of goddess who walks among men and achieves certain results through concrete actions *(Discorsi* II,29), sometimes "Him mel" takes her place, an indeterminate concept between the worldly fortuna of the Renaissance and fate as an instrument of God. And even in its most human and endogenous form, fortuna is nothing other than the limit that our own nature places on our handlings, depending on how well it can adapt to and keep up with the changing times. This may mean that fortuna can be overcome if human nature could change and become flexible and protean; but such a change in human nature is not possible.

The multiple and contradictory meanings of fortuna cannot be summarized in such a way that they appear in their pure form; nor can the relations between fortuna and virtu be authoritatively presented in a pure form, as is so often and so unsuccessfully attempted. Machiavelli's position on this critical question fluctuates, often without logical con sequence, according to his general mood and according to the concrete purpose of the passage. In his very early texts virtu and fortuna are united; fortuna accompanies virtu, it occurs as a necessary consequence, and the success of the talented person is taken for granted and certain[206]. But this faith in virtu is tempered by

the dramatic events of 1512 and with the experience of his personal persecution weakened, casting the shadow of doubt on Machiavelli's soul. Now virtu no longer measures himself directly and forehead to forehead with fortuna (as is evident from the letter he [probably] wrote to Soderini at the end of 1512, *Letters,* p.183 [the letter bears no date; translator's note]), but a new premise enters between the two: conformity with the particularities of the epoch; if virtu does not take these into account, it falls into the void, alone it can no longer confront fortuna. But the conformity with time is prevented by the immutability of human nature, which is accustomed to a certain way of acting and cannot change it even if it wanted to, the more so if the same way of acting under different conditions brought favorable results in the past. In the *prince,* virtu is again subject to the limitation determined by unchangeable human nature and to an additional element: occasione, the opportunity that fortuna creates and thus has another instrument in hand to put virtu in its place; if the opportunity does not arise, virtu cannot go into action *(Prince* 6). But the general mood in the *Prince* is active and encouraging, it wants to emphasize the right action and the possibilities of its success; carried away by this con structive mood, because it aims at a solution of the practical-political problems of Italy, Machiavelli logically does not continue the limitations of virtu on the part of fortuna, whereby he would have admittedly also come to consistent statements about the general human actions, but would have sown logical doubts about the efficiency of virtu and thus weakened the drive for action. Thus, in the end, he emphasizes and praises virtu, albeit with logical leaps. When he criticizes the princes for their mistakes *(Prince* 24), he leaves fortuna aside and evaluates only the virtu they displayed (while fortuna appears whenever the question of the policy to be followed is raised, and is examined as a function in the virtu - fortuna - occasione context). And in the following chapter *(Prince* 25), after reminding for the repeated time of the immutability of human nature, he ends by eliminating, without strict logical consequence, any doubt about the final superiority of virtu, his tone becomes enthusiastic and optimistic, until then fortuna is simply presented as the ally of the favorable occasion that the present situation in Italy

offers to the one who will act; the way of virtu thus remains open. Fortuna cannot be eliminated, but in practice she presents herself in such a way that she is no obstacle for the virtu *(Prince* 26). But Machiavelli is not always in this mood. At a time when he is disappointed because his suggestions were ultimately not taken up, he recurs to an existentialization of fate and repeatedly emphasizes the immutability of human nature *(Discorsi* Il,29 and Ill,9)[207-].

Along with virtu, fortuna and occasione, there is a fourth constant that constitutes a fundamental condition for human action - it is necessita, necessity, the pressure exerted by objective and subjective circumstances. Under this pressure, man plunges into struggle and action, he undergoes the process of using all his virtu, which is present in him as a dynamic disposition; without necessita, neither language nor man's hand would develop, much less his social and political possibilities *(Discorsi* Ill,12). Without the pressure of necessita, man, pleasure-seeking and listless as he is by nature, would remain arrested in indolence and idleness, he would have no reason to actively intervene in the world and shape it with his virtu. Consequently virtu and necessita are related and directly corresponding quantities; therefore, if nature does not itself determine necessita, the laws must determine it, lest man become effeminate *(Discorsi* 1,1). It must be noted that the necessita here is something quite different from the supra-empire necessity imposed by divine commandments, or a mechanical world order independent of man's will; here it is a matter of experiential circumstances and tangible obstacles that force man to become explicitly aware of his position and possibilities, and that suggest to him what course of action he should follow, what means he should employ. This concrete content of the necessita imposes different behaviors on people in each case, and the necessita itself causes the prince to resort to inhuman means, just as it causes the citizens to obey the laws[208-].

The law itself is also a necessita, but a secondary necessita and derived from a virtu, which is also secondary and derived. The law is determined by the primary virtu of the legislator. which in turn is motivated by the primary necessita of objective circumstances; and from the moment of its establishment, the law itself functions as a necessita which exerts a certain pressure on the human being

, but not a stimulating pressure (as the primary necessita of objective circumstances exerts on the legislator to create laws), but rather an inhibiting pressure. The law, the state, has the purpose either of keeping in check the egoistic caprice of individuals or of educating them to virtues and of consolidating in them the orderly, secondary virtu, the virtu of the conscious citizen, or of meeting them with force in case they are depraved and have internalized corrosive tendencies209- Thus, not only the good law, but the law in general and regardless of its content, is good in itself, because it represents a restraining necessita, which limits the innate immanent anarchy of the individual, makes him a member of an organized group, and endows him with that fear which is ultimately the moral sense (as I said, this "moral sense" is a worldly quantity, a product of the laws and not a consequence of any divine commandments or an inner voice). Nowhere does it say that Ma chiavelli divides laws into "just" and "unjust," nor does he speak of law in general; for him, there is no law and no right as that which the state creates210- law and right are enforced by the legislator, who, like an inexplicable exception at the temporal beginning of the state, stands above the passions and above the wickedness of the individual, weighing what institu tions are necessary for the state to be properly constituted. The legislator is wise and disinterested *(Discorsi* I,9), but if he wants to be successful, he must be an armed and not an unarmed prophet *(Prince* 6). Of course, it is better for a people to be unspoiled and virginal, so that the lawgiver can shape them with ease as he wishes (he is accomplishing a political work of art for Machiavelli, who here uses the metaphor of the sculptor); but because people always retain certain basic characteristics, the lawgiver, if he has the skills, can set on the right path even a people that has already entered the stage of decay *(Discorsi* 1,11). But the laws must not only confront the conditions of human nature, they must also eliminate the conditions of the natural environment and not allow a temperate climate or a fertile soil to make the people idle and sluggish *(Discorsi* I,1). The belief in the possibilities of the laws clearly shows the extent to which, according to Machiavellis'

view, the will and the conscious, purposeful action stand above the natural law and mechanistic limitations.

After the legislator has completed his work, he must not seek his own succession, but must retire and, when he dies, leave behind a polis that can function and live normally, following the institutions that he himself founded. The political structure of the state is based on a threefold system of institutions, laws and customs. As long as these three components are in balance and one is on par with the other, society is healthy. But this equilibrium does not last forever; mores decay through wealth and longstanding peace, which effeminates citizens, or through the rise of certain individuals above the law; when they decay, laws follow mores, albeit with the aim of preserving those mores and helping them to flourish again; thus, laws come into conflict with institutions (which are a relatively static element in the state system, while laws are relatively dynamic). Thus, then, the decay of the political mo ral illustrates the existence of the institutions, the constitution, so to speak, when the laws created within its framework can no longer serve their purpose, because the isolated law is not an absolutely deter mining component; its performance is determined by the validity of the basic institutions in practice, the general framework for the individual laws *(Discorsi* I,18). The equilibrium of the three components of a state system can be maintained with the regular return to its origin and with the reinvigoration of its original spirit *(Discorsi* Ill,1), as well as with its constant improvement and the adoption of new measures, because every law and every institution, however much circumstances may require it, also has an inherently bad side, which must be countered with a counter-law and a counter-institution (cf. *Discorsi* Ill,11: the tribunes of the people were necessary to prevent the nobility from corrupting the Republic; but the ambition of the tribunes of the people, in turn, would have been dangerous for Rome if the Senate had not taken measures against it; see also Ill,49). If in the end the decay cannot be averted, then the hour of the prince strikes, who reorganizes the state system, restores the equilibrium between institutions, laws and customs, and withdraws after consolidating his work.

The creation and stabilization of political morality is a work of both abstinence and education. Just as laws, on a general level, keep man's nature in check, so his innate imperfections and faults can also be mitigated by abstinence in individual cases *(Discorsi* II,36). Habit and education are elements that essentially influence the behavior of citizens *(Discorsi* III,31), as well as imitation *(Discorsi* III,29). Thus, education becomes a modifying factor for human nature, for on it occasionally depends the outcome of historical actions *(Discorsi* III,43). But the greatest formative influence on the morality of the citizen is religion. Although the law is a secular quantity, it is nevertheless good if it receives confirmation from religion, and the wise legislator must not fail to give it this confirmation, even if it is by trickery *(Discorsi* I,11 u. 12). Legislators and princes do not necessarily have to believe in religion in order to represent it; one might almost say that it is better for themselves if they are not true believers, so that their actions are not determined by religious ties. Religion binds the citizen to the state; it is a positive, active force that supports the good morals and moral education of citizens and thus the fundamentals of institutions and laws. For Machiavelli, the significance of religion is not limited to its function as a
"opium for the people", as a useful tool of the ruling class, but lies in its capacity as a helpful factor for domestic political life and the state as an entity[211]. Machiavelli knows that the founder of a religion or the legislator can also deceive the people; but the people allows itself to be deceived to its advantage, because religion increases the cohesion and power of the state; ie, that the state must support religion, especially in the visible and tangible manifestations through which the people communicate with it, namely, through the ritual acts. The dogmatic part of religion does not interest Machiavelli, he has nothing for theology; for him religion is a secular institution with state-oriented goals - its truth content is indifferent to him, because Machiavelli does not want to strengthen the citizen through knowledge (as we understand this today), but he wants to govern him, to make him a useful member of the state[212]. But in order for religion can fulfil this function, it must have a corresponding content, it must it must not itself be fearful, not anachoretical, nor preach a negative attitude towards the worldly.

Such was Christianity, whose effeminating effect on the martial and political mores Machiavelli denounces (it is particularly characteristic of that period that Vasari claims that Christianity had a harmful influence on art), while, on the contrary, he emphasizes the correspondingly positive sides of idolatrous religion (see *Discorsi* Il,2 and III,1). In this respect, Machiavelli is unconsciously the pioneer of an idea that is one of the most valuable achievements of recent social sciences, namely that ideologies have an influence on the formation of the behavior of a society and that they must be evaluated according to their function and not according to how far they are "true". Even more advanced is Machiavelli's suggestion in *Prince* 25, where he relates the formation of pragmatic judgment to the conditions of the times, saying that the spread of the knowledge that happiness reigns over man's deeds is due to the great and unforeseen upheavals that shook the era.

In spite of everything, the concept of "ideology", which is so dear to today's sociologists, remains alien to Machiavelli, just as today's common reference to the economy as the foundation of social organization is alien to him. Toward everything economic, Machia velli adopts the contemptuous (and toward his employer vindictive) attitude of the humanist (see the letter to Francesco Vettori of April 9, 1513, Letters, pp. 38f.). Moreover, he is suspicious of wealth, considers it an instrument of corruption par excellence, and never fails to emphasize that bravery and political morality are more important than money *(Discorsi* 11,10). Combined with the fact that his time was full of political and war events, but not economic ones, this attitude prevents him from searching for economic factors as determinants of historical events. He attaches so little importance to economic life that he advises the prince to encourage his people to go about their business, and immediately afterwards he advises the prince to keep his people entertained by feasts and spectacles *(Prince* 21). Here, first and foremost, the political purpose is of interest - to divert attention - and business is presented as a way to achieve this goal[213]. On the other hand, Machiavelli attaches great importance to the demographic factor. He cites overpopulation as a constant factor for the cause of

of wars *(Discorsi* Il,8; see also Il,5) and for great transformations of peoples *(Histories* I,1), while he repeatedly stresses the need for a place to be densely populated and cultivated, and rebukes the incompetent rulers who did not follow Roman custom and found colonies *(Histories* Il,l). A city without a large population can never become powerful and dominant, as the example of Rome shows in comparison with Sparta *(Discorsi* Il,3); among the first conditions for the expansion of a state is the previous increase of its population *(Discorsi* II,4).

An important position in Machiavelli's thought is occupied by a concept that was at the epicenter of modern sociology because it was indirectly connected with its emergence: the concept of the differentiation of classes and class struggle. Machiavelli was the first, before the end of the 18th century, to use class struggle as an antidote.Machiavelli is the first who, before the end of the eighteenth century, made the class struggle the subject of serious consideration and related it to the historical development and the formation of concrete social forms.[214] Of course, he does not relate class differentiation to economic differentiation, nor does he want to find economic and social causes or realities behind the class struggle; He sees the social conflicts in their tangible external manifestation, as a duel between parties, people, leaders and factions, whose decisive motive is deeply rooted in human nature - hunger for power, ambition and the preservation of power - just as, conversely, the fear that the other could prevail with his ambition. When Machiavelli tries to explain the social conflicts, he largely takes refuge in interpretations of the humanists and the historians of antiquity; he cites the pomposity of the powerful, the bad treatment of the people, and the various forms of power.

"However, it does not advance to detailed analyses and remains with the pre-scientifically outlined ideas of social differentiation, as they exist empirically also in the collective consciousness[215]- Nevertheless, the distinction of the classes is clear, and the observation of the dynamic unfolding of their conflicts evident. Certainly, Florentine history itself contributed to the consolidation of this view, after it developed so clearly, namely in that one class fell and the next took power; this happened in Florence almost with mathematical order and re-

The idea that this was reflected in the thinking of a Florentine state theorist could not be ignored.

For Machiavelli, the character and outcome of class conflicts determined the peculiarity of a state system. A class struggle that ends in the complete division of the social body and in the disintegration of one of its parts consequently weakens the state system and deprives it of the virtues of the social group that has been annihilated, while the opposing group can now rule unrestrained, tyrannical, and only indifferent to the cultivation of its merits. In contrast, a class struggle is favorable, from which emerges a state system in which the opposing classes each participate with their own dynamics, where the state system benefits from the merits of all classes and its potential can be exploited to the utmost. Thus, for Machiavelli, the comprehensive domination of the most "advanced" social group is not the most important thing, but the best mix of all social elements and the maximization of their performance. The complex and successive class differentiations, which end in a unilateral domination, harm the state system, while the simple and constant class conflicts animate it; the former happened in Florence, the latter in Rome, with the respective known effects. The legislator has the problem of using the hostilities between the people and the nobility in such a way that they each in their own way serve the same form of state, the goal of which should be to guarantee the state the greatest possible survivability in the eternal external competition; the legislator does not want to destroy either of the two hostile sides, he wants to weaken their disputes as much as possible and the reservoir from which the state draws strength should not dry up; he must only properly channel the energy that the class struggle releases. A mixed form of the state does not mean a weak compromise, but a fusion of possibilities.[216] Since there can be no general rule for the concrete form of a state system, the best form is the one that can mobilize the entire available potential of a state system and guarantee its survival and then its expansion. This flexibility, however, does not mean a mixture of alien and mutually alien elements. The mixed forms are harmful, good are the clear orders, in which however the components stand in a good relationship. The elements which are in an order

exist must be in equilibrium, they must not mix with elements from other orders.

We see, then, that Machiavelli views the problem of the form of government from the perspective of the reason of state. He would accept any form that is profitable for the state; the reason of state thus tends toward utilitarianism and utilitarianism toward relativism: there are no absolute values; good is what benefits the state[217-] Thus, the value of a form of state is relative only because the value of the state is absolute. For Machiavelli, the state - or, in any case, the existence of a group of people completely separate from another group - is a self-evident and indispensable historical entity, the premise for history in general; only where there is a state and where people have a fatherland, where they are able to determine the contents and forms of their historical existence themselves, does virtu have the historical and moral space to operate; only a structured people can engage in [politics218-] But Machiavelli makes no attempt to grasp the state ontologically or teleologically-one need not question anything that one has before one as a natural and eternal element; nor does he attempt to give a definition of the state, but to the term stato he assigns many [connotations219-] The state is a tangible and experiential phenomenon; only the appraisal of situations and the right action are of interest. What Machiavelli has to say about the state in general is that it satisfies basic human needs such as tranquility, security, and prosperity, and the pursuit of these goals is the driving force of human action. There is no point in examining whether these needs are rational or not, nor is the purpose and ultimate end of human action up for discussion. Also here any metaphysics is missing, moreover cities and states are not founded on the basis of a social contract, which would guarantee equality and freedom due to "natural law": The first states arose from the need for protection from enemies, from the need for individuals to find refuge and support in the bosom of a society. Thus, society, the state, places itself as a value above the individual from the beginning; it has no intrinsic relationship to any human morality it sought to serve. Through deliberative thought, the individual can form the state, but even then the indi vidual is not above the state, but serves [it220-] In general, Machiavelli's attitude toward the state follows the state doctrine of the

Renaissance, which does not make it its duty to explain society; it merely clarifies the usefulness of the state (which in Renaissance state theory is the bearer of governmental power), and makes certain proposals to that end221-.

A wide variety of reasons led Machiavelli to place the state as a political entity and as the focus of his political thought. Already in his time, the state clearly appeared as a state, as an independent entity acting in a certain way, not only in the great monarchies of Western Europe, but also in Ita lia, where the city-states, in their constant disputes, understood that they were separate organisms and began to create a state bureaucracy and an elementary state (and economic) policy. Machiavelli was in the service of this newly formed state apparatus, and through his daily work he arrived at a purely state-oriented political view. Moreover, his work, which was mainly diplomatic and in the field of foreign policy, led him to consider state affairs from the point of view of the stability of a state in competition with other states; and above all, the great weaknesses of Florentine foreign policy - a clear reflection of internal instability - led him to study this question in depth. Abroad, where Machiavelli often traveled, there was never any confidence in Florentine politics and its continuity, because its form of government was the result of an enforced equilibrium achieved at the price of fragmenting the body politic. Machia velli is fully aware of the relationship between foreign and domestic politics; he knows above all that a republic like Florence (and, unlike any prince, not of necessity any republic) suffers internally from a lack of decisiveness, hesitation, and inertia *(Discorsi* II,15). Strong remains only a republic like the Roman one, which expelled the kings, but with it did not sell the drastic concentration of the power to clear and concrete poles *(Discorsi* I,20). Whether a state pursues a policy of expansion or isolation is also determined by the form of government *(Discorsi* I,6). Obviously, Machiavelli prefers a state that has the power to expand; only timely expansion radically protects a state from the constant and natural attacks of its neighbors. The competition and the struggle for survival between states always lasts, and there is no other goal than power and domination. Machiavelli does not forget that war has bad consequences on

the republic has and thus power is concentrated in the hands of the army leaders *(Discorsi* 111,24), but he holds that a state that is always ready for war must arrange its form of government in such a way that it can resist any test with the maximum use of its potential in the sense mentioned above. Such a state, for example, would always be obliged to use its most deserving citizens *(Discorsi* 111,16), while war itself has a purifying effect, awakening the strength of the group and increasing its unity.

Due to the frequent wars and their peculiarities, the problems of warfare and the art of war became the focus of the themes of the 15th and 16th centuries. The easy triumph of the foreign invaders outraged minds and drew attention to the problem of the political and strategic weakness of the Italian states. The contradiction between Italy, which was culturally and economically advanced but strategically inferior to its "crude" neighbours, became clearly perceptible, and the question arose: Why is Italy strategically incapable? Why are the "barbarians" victorious over civilised peoples? This question was broadened by the related technical developments - the primacy of infantry over cavalry and the advent of artillery - which raised doubts. The humanists of the first generation had shown interest in strategic questions because they held to Rome's greatness, which was directly linked to strategic power, they praised Roman moderation Roman moderation and sang the praises of Spartan training. But this did not go beyond a purely moral appeal and was not linked to concrete proposals and [analysis222-] Machiavelli's contemporaries, Guicciardini and later Castiglione, were impressed above all by the difference in morality between the foreign invaders and the Italians223.The problem of soldierly morality, viz. the connection between soldier and citizen, also occupied Machiavelli a great deal; the relationship between forms of state and sufficient warfare is that the form of state creates citizens who put their activity at the service of the common good, maximizing the potential of society and sustaining or expanding it with the highest morality. For Machiavelli, the good citizen is one with the good sol date; there can be no good soldiers in a depraved society, but the creation of good citizens must begin with a good strate gic organization. If a depraved citizen is educated to be a good soldier, he will also become better as a citizen; and a

good strategic organization is followed by good laws, which in turn produce good citizens. A good army and good laws are quantities that are mutually dependent *(Prince* 12 and *Discorsi* III,31). Their common result and support is the unbribable citizen, the moderate, austere patriot who puts the public interest above his personal interest and to whose formation the laws and institutions of the state contribute, rewarding virtue and putting a stop to arrogance. Promotion to office must be based on merit, not wealth *(Discorsi* III,25). The citizen must be poor, the state rich *(Discorsi* II,19); money not only corrupts the citizens, it also gives them the opportunity to corrupt others, so that eventually the worthy citizens are driven out of public administration *(Discorsi* III,16). Only the creation of such conditions and such citizens makes a survival and an expansion of the state possible, because the state is maintained by the good soldier and not by the wealth or by the many [erudition224-] The citizen must submit to the state as state and not to the state as representative of alternative values such as religion; therefore Machiavelli basically does not appreciate the ecclesiastical state structures *(Prince* 11).

All this makes Machiavelli's clear and strong dislike of above mercenaries understandable; his dislike even goes so far as to distort certain real events, although on the one hand he berates mercenaries, on the other hand he admires them when they become princes. But Machiavelli is not so much interested in the personal merits of the mercenaries as in the fact that their existence is in contradiction with the institutions he considers important for a state system; thus he refutes the close connection between good citizen and good soldier. He is indifferent to the concrete cases in which mercenaries played a constructive role - cases that are also remote for him, since Florence was always the most long-suffering of the Italian cities and the most unlucky in its use of mercenaries. The only solution that Machiavelli can welcome and for which he fights persistently for twenty years is the creation of a nationa l army recruited from peasants of the Florentine countryside. But it was not in Machiavelli's hands to combine the creation of a national army with the inevitable political reorganization, and it seems that, in his practical zeal, he missed the point.

The social position of the peasants of the Florentine hinterland was very different from that of the citizens of Rome. The country people of Florence had no political rights and had no great interest in defending a state that oppressed them; but Machiavelli nonetheless enlists them-not to raise them to the level of city dwellers and bind them closely to the city, but because they were the only ones available after most city dwellers shunned conscription but peasants could be conscripted225- Because the opposing camps in Florence feared the creation of an organization that could be used against any camp, the whole plan was foiled in practice.

In terms of war tactics, Machiavelli astutely saw that infantry took precedence over cavalry, and with equal astuteness he assessed the diminished importance of defense towers and fortresses. In both points he understands very well the changes that the decline of the feudal nobility brought about in the use of the weapons that this class had at its disposal, namely cavalry and defense towers. On the other hand, he does not understand and underestimates the importance of the newly emerged artillery, although it had already played a great role in battles in his time; but the reason for this misjudgment is political and ideological, not purely strategic: Machiavelli did not want to accept that a technical and mechanical factor could prove decisive and refute what was most important to him, namely the morale of the soldier, which is intertwined with the state itself. Machiavelli associates the creation of a national army with certain characteristics that derive from the structure of the state and whose purity and intrinsic value could be diminished by the erratic development of the art of war; once again Machiavelli's insistence on his political ideal distorts the picture of reality. To this essential reason must be added that the artillery was then still in a puny state and could be re-tralized by the timely use of the infantry and that the intention was to make it the counterpart of the imitation of the ancient art of war, which led Machiavelli not to distinguish the artillery essentially from the ancient armament. However, regardless of his individual accurate assessments, it can be said that Machia velli brought logic and consistency to the military doctrine (he gave himself

proudly as an expert, made appropriate analyses and gave judgments - with the same vanity of the self-proclaimed expert with which Tolstoy describes strategic situations in *War and Peace*); as in politics, he gave goals, means and logical criteria on the application of which the final result depended[226].

The existence of a national army to protect a state being is a prerequisite for its freedom, because the army, as Machiavelli understands it, consists of virtuous citizens trained in self-government; if there are no such citizens, the people held in bondage who attain freedom will not know how to use it and will soon fall back under a yoke *(Discorsi* I,16). For Machiavelli, however, "liberty" is not related to a truly democratic constitution, in which the people participate in lawmaking, the right to freedom of thought and speech is protected, there is religious tolerance, and the citizen has the inviolable right to resist orders of the state when oppressed by them. For Machiavelli
Freedom" is a state of security and order resulting from the observance of the law, whatever that law may be. But for the law to prevail, there must be an internal balance in the state, and this balance is guaranteed in a republic by the mixed constitution. From this point of view, the clas perpendicular is an element that consolidates freedom by maintaining the balance *(Discorsi* I,4). Within the framework of the observance of the laws, liberty acquires a civil touch: it is the unrestricted use of the goods of the individual, the possibility of determining home and family, etc., so that the general wealth and prosperity become greater. Political liberty is not an essential part of freedom; moreover, its lack is felt mainly by the few who aspire to government, while the many are more interested in their security; moreover, Machiavelli does not worry because the people as a whole do not share in the power that political liberty confers, because he basically believes that only a few are worthy of holding such positions of power[227]. Such a type of liberty, of course, can exist not only in republics, but also in other forms of government, such as in a monarchy or an absolutist state. And in a mixed constitution, the protection of liberty can be entrusted either to the nobility, as in Venice and Sparta, or to the people, as in Rome *(Discorsi* I,5), although the question of who is the guarantor of liberty is related to the ability of the state to expan-

sion; Rome expanded, Venice and Sparta did not.

Since this is the content of liberty, it follows that different forms of government can incorporate it, which, despite the difference in form, become identical in essence. It is precisely this element that makes possible the reconstruction of a decayed republic by means of the political form of the princely state, without the external contradiction between these two forms of state constituting an obstacle to the transition from one to the other. The decay of a republic occurs through the mechanism mentioned above, namely, the successive decay of mores, laws and institutions, and it becomes noticeable when certain individuals place themselves above the laws and obscure them as state and political factors. The distinguishing feature of a democracy is the exclusive subordination of all people to the law and the elementary pursuit of the common good, and not the existence of debating clubs and pure libertarianism, where the interests of autonomous individuals clash or where these interests take the political form of alleged self-government in the form of representatives of the people228- When such a republic "decays" and certain individuals rise above the laws, a society falls into disintegration and needs a strong hand to hold it together and lay foundations again. The first duty of the prince is to eliminate all individuals who put themselves above the law (and these are first and foremost the nobles); then he must combine the reconstruction of the state with the morale of the citizen through a good army organization, which thus prepares the ground for the creation, observance and maintenance of good institutions and laws. In parallel, the Prince must protect freedom, as described above, and must take care to lay solid foundations for the future Republic. This intermediate status of reconstruction is what Machiavelli calls "popular principality" (principato civile) and distinguishes it from the absolutist or personal principality. The popular principality differs from absolutist rule not in the degree of force and harshness used (civile has nothing to do with persuasion and soft methods), but in the extent to which the nobility is eliminated, the people are given security, and power is not exercised for the personal benefit of the prince. From this point of view, the people's principality bears the characteristics of the progressive bourgeois monarchy,

and Machiavelli viewed such monarchies at the time with an approving eye. But his sympathy was undoubtedly with a vital republic of incorruptible citizens and with an omnipotence of law; in spite of this, he firmly believed that only a popular principality can restore a decayed republic, and he was as sure that the prince can better found a state as that a republic can better maintain it. The principality is the inevitable prelude to a republic; only the principality can pave the way for the republic. And Machiavelli emphasizes in the *Prince* the characteristics and the necessity of a popular principality so emphatically and persistently because he considered his time deeply corrupt; hence his views on the monarchy are also more modern, because they are woven from elements that he drew either as givens or imperatives from his parallel political life, while his theory on the republic sometimes seems to be formed from traditional and classical elements and sounds a bit cranky on the background of the conditions in Italy at that time229-.

The difference between the principality and the republic was in the
The harmonious coexistence of the two concepts in the works of the thinkers of that time shows how Machiavelli also viewed this relationship; thus, the much-cited contradiction between the "monarchist" Machiavelli and the "republican" Machiavelli, which supposedly tore him apart and tormented him, disappears. The duality of this modern view stems from the fact that, in contrast to the Middle Ages, where man was bound but society was fragmented, in the Renaissance, conversely, man frees himself from traditional society, while society unites into a state that acts as guarantor of the individual's freedom; From this arises a dual ideology, namely individualistic and absolutist at the same time230- In broad outline, this duality is connected with the double life of the bourgeoisie in its first period - with its turning to a republican form of state within the framework of the bourgeois society and the turning to monarchy within the framework of the national state. But apart from these general-historical reasons, the common comprehension of principality and republic as forms of state under the term "state" has the consequence that both show certain fundamental common criteria in their ideal, not in their historical reception. First and foremost, both must use the same tactics in their foreign policy, especially during war, because the

external struggle, the struggle for the survival of the state, is equally hard for all forms of state. Secondly, Machiavelli believes that every power structure is centralizing by its very nature; no matter how a republic may be organized, no more than forty, fifty people get into leading positions *(Discorsi* 1,16).

All this explains why the view that there is a fundamental difference in the attitude and goals of the *Prince* and the *Discorsi is* wrong. Both works are based on the same conception: republic and popular principality are the same in content - freedom within and preservation or expansion of the state outside. The difference is that in the *Prince the* means of establishing a state are more clearly emphasized, while in the *Discorsi the* emphasis is on the situation that results historically from the supremacy of a prince who serves the common good and not his personal interests. In both works there is a common problem (the reconstruction of a corrupted state); they are also basically similar in terms of their sources and political substratum, as well as in terms of what they propose and praise. There are no more differences in value than there are differences in value between the Republic and the Principality; in the *Discorsi* the research is more complete and better structured ("more systematic" we would say today), while in the *Prince the* immediate and particular predominates, that which is more directly related to the reputation and duty of the present; therefore, in the *Prince, the* elements of the *Discorsi that do* not fit directly into the more limited theoretical framework required by pressing practical necessities are absent[231]. But even if there are no differences in principle, in both works there are differences in the assessment of individual factors that diverge to the same degree as republic and popular principality. In the *Prince,* "freedom" is presented more passively, it is rather a subordination to the well-meaning and wise prince; in the *Discorsi*, on the other hand, freedom presents itself more actively, it is not only a good, but a postulate. In a republic, the people participate to a greater or lesser degree in the governance of the state, while their position in the popular principality is passive and uninvolved - which is also a side of the balancing process that the prince controls by fighting the domineering nobility: it is closer to the republican sense of equality when all are equally subject to a prince's rule than when society is divided into nobility and people (whereas in the Discorsi, freedom is not only a good but a postulate).

the nobility is above the law, but the people bow to it), even if there is no monarch. The decline of the Republic begins because the nobility becomes more powerful than the law; therefore, the reconstruction of the Republic must begin, first of all, with the curtailment of rights or with the crushing of the nobility. The nobility, however, is not fought by the people themselves, but by the prince; consequently, the crushing of the nobility does not mean at the same time the political rise of the people; moreover, the active people of a repu blic is not a premise of popular principality, premises are only two other characteristics: Liberty and Equality - the "political" bios. Therefore, in the Prince, the postulate of virtu concerns only one person, whereas in the Discorsi there is not only talk of the virtu of the people, but also of the apersonal virtu of laws, education, and religion; this gives rise to a multidimensional state, which differs from the popular principality, since the latter depends only on the virtu of the Prince. In the Discorsi, Machiavelli also does not abandon individualism altogether, but here the state is not as anthropomorphic as in the Prince232- Also, the bad nature of man is emphasized more in the *Prince* than in the *Discorsi.* The violence that the Prince uses to achieve his good goals can only be justified if one accepts that man has a bad nature; the Republic, on the other hand, also presupposes reasonable, moral forces in man. Therefore, the educability of the citizens is mentioned only in the *Discorsi.* The individual differences are also reflected in the style of the two works: in contrast to the forceful, choppy and "dictatorial" style of the *Prince,* the style in the more versatile and, so to speak, "democratic" *Discorsi is more* complex, detailed and discursive.

The strong personality of the prince emerges at two historical moments: when he founds a state and establishes the fundamental instances that determine the future of the state, and when decline begins and when the decline begins and society must be rebuilt. In the first case, he is a politician and legislator who has something God-given and priestly about him, and in the second case, he is the iron man who has something demonic and violent about him. In the first case he is a politician and legislator, who has something God-given and priestly about him; in the second case he is the iron man, who has something demonic and violent about him, because he must now fight against the decline and not only create a healthy body out of unadulterated material, but also cut off and destroy rotten limbs. The legislator stands at the starting point of a constitution, he creates it and then hands it over to the people, who finally rule republican

becomes. A state at its height, according to Machiavelli, should be republican, all its constituent parts should be active; in such a state, the attempt to install a prince would be wrong and untenable *(Discorsi* III,8). The prince enters the scene in the situation of decline, when the public spirit gives up and depravity prevails; when there is a need for a renewal of institutions and laws, a single reasonable and capable man must appear to remedy this need. But this should hardly convince the others that they must accept the uncircumventable changes, because men want to live as they are accustomed; therefore, if there is a change, it is only by force against the habits of human nature *(Discorsi* I,18). In both cases, in the capacity of lawgiver as well as prince, the strong personality stands alone and isolated from the social whole; in the first case, it is a direct and tangible product of its purposeful actions. Machiavelli does not conceive of the apersonal and gradual processes of development as objective, widely ramified causes, nor does he attach any weight to them; in the decisive and great moments of the founding and transformation of a state, the qualities and actions of individuals take precedence for him. He knows the change of historical stages only in the form of laws or states connected with a great personality, which in turn is not formed by the people, but on the contrary forms the people[233].

The emphasis on personality, of course, intensely reflects the individualism of the Renaissance is reflected in Machiavelli's work, all the more so because individualism goes hand in hand with another characteristic of the Renaissance worldview: ratio. Personality is the natural bearer of ratio, which means, on the one hand, that ratio does not depend on origin, race, etc. (on the contrary, in the first lines of the *Life of Castruccio Castracani it* says that all or almost all the greats were of low origin); Machiavelli at this point spontaneously ignores any medieval criterion of evaluation, just as he ignores the medieval supra-ethnic entities from which supra-ethnic ideas grew (e.g., Christianity); moreover, he ignores the medieval supra-ethnic entities from which supra-ethnic ideas grew.For the rest, these entities were already fragmented into individuals who had engaged in a relentless competition, and the criteria of evaluation had to be adapted to the criterion of personal merit. On the other hand, this means that the per-

In the first case, a prince comes to power with the support of the people or the nobility; in the second case, he has greater difficulty in asserting himself, yet he has the possibility of following the right path and becoming independent. A prince, for example, comes to power with the support of the people or the nobility; in the second case, he has greater difficulty in asserting himself, yet he has the possibility of following the right path and becoming independent if he is meritorious *(Prince* 9). Machiavelli, however, values even more highly that prince who, from the beginning, assumed power exclusively thanks to his own abilities; he prefers this wholly new creation, this new principality, which, from the beginning, can be rationally and rather reshaped according to the maxims of the law than according to situational requirements. The subject of the *prince* is therefore not the spiritual or the composite, but the new principalities, where a country is ruled for the first time by a person who also became a prince for the first time.

Ratio also leads the prince to extreme practical con sequences of the separation of politics and morality. But the extent to which he departs from morality is not determined by a general, principled attitude on the subject, but by the concrete requirements of necessita. Cunning and violence or their mixture are neither ends in themselves nor an occasion to show off one's abilities -, they are unavoidable means for the attainment of certain goals. The prince is an enlightened ruler, he has no confidence in man, and by force he wants to lead him to an order planned by reason[234]. Since men are unreasonable and short-sighted and let themselves be seduced by appearances rather than asking about the essence, hypocrisy is also a necessary measure of the prince along with force and cunning; however, if the prince acts for the good of the state, in the end the deception turns into a benefit for the people. The prince also does not use superfluous violence, he exercises only "surgical" violence[235] that does not mean at the same time oppression and impoverishment of the people and whose measure depends on the degree of depravity and aims at eliminating those individuals who act to the detriment of the people. And the "immoral" means used by the prince (in a popular principality, not in an absolutist principality) naturally contribute to the consolidation of the liberty and security of the people, because they can put their enemies out of action sooner. Machiavelli advises the prince repeatedly and after-

He insists that he should have the people on his side, because the love of the people is worth more than all the forts that unreasonable princes have built *(Discorsi* 11,24). Moreover, the only limit to a prince's actions is not an authority that limits his sphere of power, but the interest of the people, in whose name he fights against the nobles236- This criterion, the good of the people and the state, shows that Machiavelli's advice to the prince is actually addressed to the state, after the prince and the state are identical in the Renaissance view; moreover, his oeuvre as a whole, with the exception of the *Prince, shows* that his real goal is not the prince as such, but "the regeneration of a sunken people .. by the virtu of a coercive lord and the leverage of all the means dictated by necessita."237-.

In the person of Cesare Borgia, Machiavelli found the embodiment of the ideal prince; not only because Borgia's actions apparently corresponded to the duties of a prince as Machiavelli understood them, but also because Machiavelli saw Borgia's political activities from the point of view of that mixture of rationalism, vision, and fantasy I spoke about in the previous chapter in a pure form, elevating them to a higher level than ordinary politics and making them an example worth imitating, the model of his reference. The model of the ideal prince was not for him a superhistorical recept ion of the same, but in his mind it was the refracted, altered, and purified image of two historical prototypes of his time enjoyed: the Italian prince with the familiar characteristics, and the Western monarch, with the prince more prominent. Ma chiavelli does not take the prototype of the prince from the Roman An tike, because he is attached to the sublimity of republican Rome and considers the Empire as a period of decline, while from ancient Greece he mentions above all Agathocles, Agis and Cleomenes. Thus, the personality of the prince is a supra-personal synthesis of characteristics distributed among different persons, and in order to give strength and life to this synthesis, Machiavelli does not hesitate (just as he never put historical accuracy above the approaches that preoccupied him) to select one of many princely personalities and work on it in the necessary places until it resembles his ideal figure. To what extent the real Cesare Borgia corresponded to the ideal type of prince is a subject that can be debated for all eternity; we only know with certainty that, regardless of Borgia's merits

as an individual and regardless of the intentions of his actions, the results they produced justified very well in Machiavelli's mind the emergence of the image we find in *Prince* 7. Romagna, Borgia's duchy, was the region (in northern and central Italy) with the most vestiges of feudalism and the most occasions for feudal wars-there were complex interconnections through marriages and kinships, feudalistic tribute obligations and patronage on a large scale, a noble class that waged war exclusively, the ideal of knightly virtues such as honor, valor, etc.[238- In] place of the feudal lordships tearing each other apart, Borgia set up a single state, restored order and peace, and provided relief for the population, which had been battered by the struggles of the nobles-because, after all, a single tyrant could not be worse than twenty tyrants239- The fact that Borgia only ensured peace because he himself wanted to take possession of this region, and that he would have willingly razed the region to the ground if someone else had had the benefit in his place, did not matter at all; For his contemporaries, the only thing that mattered was that Borgia accomplished what they had thought unattainable for centuries. Moreover, he recruited inhabitants of Romagna, not mercenaries; this was another reason why Machiavelli admired him, without considering that Borgia could only do this because the inhabitants of Romagna were trained in the craft of war; After all, this is where most of the Italian mercenaries came from, who gave their princes in service to other cities so that they could earn money240- So, regardless of his personality and regardless of the impression it made on Machiavelli, what is essential is that from Borgia's action (whether approved or not) a state structure emerged that fulfilled certain basic requirements that Machiavelli emphasized as a duty of the prince. From now on, any rounding off of events was possible, so that they took the form of an exemplary practice.

Today, it is only natural that Machiavelli's view that Italy's subjugation to foreign rule and the general "depravity" of the country are the result of certain mistakes made by specific individuals strikes us as simple-minded. Even more naive seems the belief that a prince could emerge whose change of character would precede his works and who, in a political and institu tional vacuum, would raise a national army to drive out the foreigners and liberate Italy. But one must not forget,

that the historical conditionality of the leadership personality was scientifically investigated and recognized only in the nineteenth century, while to our social-scientific findings is added the fact that the leadership personality, as it has prevailed for at least a century, is connected with relatively young personal apparatuses (parties, etc.), by means of which it distinguishes itself and acts and usually achieves a dynamics only to the extent that it also adequately represents these apparatuses. Recent science and society have forced us to revise our conception of the role of personality. But this does not change the fact that our views are relatively young and that, at least until the beginning of the nineteenth century, hero worship always prevailed in the general assessment of historical events. Such a criticism of Machiavelli would therefore be only a commonplace and a superfluous remark. What is significant here is the understanding that this perception of the prince on the background of hero worship was inspired, on the one hand, by the individualism of the Renaissance and, on the other hand, by Machiavelli's passionate patriotism, which in turn led him to an active and dynamic worldview, which in turn is a prerequisite for action, whereas a causalist perception of the possibilities of personality would have had an inhibiting effect. In spite of everything, however, not everything in the historical sphere depends on the personality of the prince, because it is subject to the limitations and the fluctuations that arise from the respective relationship of virtu and fortuna.

The Prince is called upon to do everything in his power to free Italy from the foreign occupiers. In this call is the protest of the humanists against the "barbarians" who were flooding Italy, a protest that was nourished by the memory of the greatness of ancient Rome. The foreign invasion gives new impetus to this memory in the soul of the Italians, this time not as a framework of learned references as in Petrarch's time and after, but as a frame of reference for a germinating nationalism, which, although not aimed at leading a fragmented Italy to internal unification, nevertheless contains very strongly the sense of the difference of the Italians from the foreigners who have invaded their country. But the unclear idea of the unity of Italy, which arose in this way and emerges from this source, could not be brought into clarity and translated into concrete political action, although it existed as an idea among many contemporaries at the time[241]. There remained a zeal and a mood, which, however, in the end ultimately weakened and suffocated by the insurmountable conflicts of the Italian cities. and suffocated by the insurmountable conflicts of the Italian cities.

The reasons for this are objective: Italy lacked any political form of a national structure and a national character on which national sentiment could have been concentrated and, based on realities, could have taken a substantial form. Italy's bourgeoisie never fully emerged from its "stagnant" phase to enter a "political" phase, while it did not stop at the borders of the nation-state when it broke away from the medieval cosmopolitan vision and existence of the Church, but narrowed down even more and confined itself within the narrow confines of the national structure.

The reasons for this are objective: Italy lacked any political form of national structure and national character on which national feeling could have concentrated and, based on realities, taken on a substantial form. Italy's bourgeoisie never quite emerged from its "estates" phase to enter a "political" phase, while it did not stop at the borders of the nation-state when it broke away from the medieval cosmopolitan vision and existence of the Church, but rather narrowed itself even more and enclosed itself within the narrow framework of the city-states242. The real foundation for the idea of an inwardly united Italy was lacking, and so Machiavelli nowhere advocates such an idea either. He wanted the saving prince to drive the foreigners out of his country and guarantee its independence. As mentioned above, Machiavelli, as a member of the permanent civil service, always had Florentine politics in mind and shared its consistent orientation as well as its unchanging antipathies (e.g. towards Venice). His patriotism was primarily directed towards Florence and towards bourgeois society. When it leaves this field, it becomes more dispassionate, sounds more erudite and is more concerned with the memory of Rome than with real analyses; Italy is then no longer grasped as a close political association of all its parts, which until then had been separated from each other, but rather as an abstract political entity superior to the "barbarians" occupying the country243. Machiavelli probably saw a real unification of Italy rather pessimistically; in a letter to Vettori (dated 10.8.1513, written almost at the same time as the Prince) he states: "As for the unification of the Italians, I must laugh ... "(Letters, p. 89).

Although in Italy the conditions for political unification and the creation of a nation state did not yet exist, in Europe - in France and Spain - the great monarchies had already emerged, and this was by no means lost on Machiavelli. The physiognomies of Louis XI and Ferdinand II were well known to him, and their deeds stood out to him as memorable models. But it is unlikely that he saw the connection that existed between the deeds of these rulers and the creation of a nation-state as such; what he required of his prince, of the ruler who was to restore Italy, was therefore to lay the foundations for the creation of a state in the heart of the Italian boot that would be strong enough to keep the other Italian states in subservience and drive out the foreign invaders. Machiavelli did not think against the background of the category of the nation-state, which incidentally came into being later, consequently he did not describe the duties of the prince in terms of the historical realisation of this category - an attitude that can be fully justified and reconciled with the structure of political consciousness in his time. Machiavelli did not formulate a utopia outside of time and space and demand that a great personality realise it on his own, on the contrary; he unconsciously but clearly and emphatically pointed to political forms and political behaviour that had not yet crystallised, but which were to play a decisive role in the future formation of a society associated with the nation-state. In the period of the dissolution of medieval political structures and conceptions, Machiavelli set out the prince's catalogue of duties in no uncertain terms, integrating very many of those elements that were later to constitute the\ characteristics and conscious features of the younger states - the elimination of the feudal nobility, the creation of a national army, the strengthening of central power, and so on. - while at the same time he also assessed the importance that a common language and common customs and traditions have for the cohesion of a state (Prince 3). Even if he did not yet know in their final form the political and social formations that were laid out in the history of his time, Machiavelli, with his unsurpassed political genius, grasped their essential features in advance and mapped out the path they were to take until then. It is not important if he did not explicitly relate the postulates and methods he introduced to their later consequences, and if he himself did not even know this relationship; what is important is that everything he formulated had deep roots in historical reality and contributed decisively to making the traces of the past visible and to giving the new society its weapons in hand.

Over the years, and after the call for a saving prince for Italy failed to find an echo, Machiavelli's ideas of a popular principality fade and weaken. Machiavelli's ideas of a popular principality, presented in the Prince and in the first chapters of the *Discorsi* as bridging the opposition between republic and monarchy, fade and wane. Now Machiavelli is no longer the secretary who sees the political situation in Florence from his professional position and considers the question of the form of government in connection with the demand for a strong appearance of the state in international relations; he is only a man who wants to enter the service of the new rulers and directs his attention mainly to the internal politics of Florence, the aspects of which only arouse his theo retical interest insofar as they could open doors through which he could return to his position. But in the game of Florence's internal politics he could no longer participate as a bearer and mastermind of the idea of the popular principality; Florence has a very republican tradition, in which the appearance of a prince would be inappropriate and unlikely and, consequently, something that was outside the political ideas of the Medici, whom Machiavelli wanted to serve. At the same time, it would have prevented Machiavelli from proposing the prince as a solution to Florence's political problems because he himself had internalized the republican tradition of bourgeois society; this difficulty would undoubtedly have contributed even more to the abandonment of the notion of a popular prince tum. The concrete manifestations of Florentine domestic politics are so close to him, and he carries them so much within himself (at the same time, his preoccupation with them is the only way to realize his personal goals), that they alone shape his thinking; and while he persistently deals with each of these many forms of appearance, going through them one after the other, he lets himself be seduced into examining them independently and in isolation; he unconsciously goes over to considering them practically and empirically, and in doing so forgets, or no longer dares, to confront them with his theoretical approach in all clarity. As mentioned above, Machiavelli's concept of popular principality bridged the contrast between republic and absolutist rule, for republic and popular principality retain the fundamental characteristics of liberty and equality, and in both the nobility is not above the law but subordinate to it. Now, however, both concepts begin to differentiate and eventually polarize so that at one extreme stands the republic, synonymous with equality, and at the other the absolutist state, synonymous with inequality. As an indispensable prerequisite for the

establishment of a principality or monarchy is now considered not the elimination of the nobility, but its existence or its appointment *(Discorsi* I,55). The monarchy is now understood univocally, in the form of the feudalistic pyramid that set interdependencies and limited the king; forgotten is the popular principality that blurred the boundaries between monarchy and republic. Republic and monarchy are strictly separated, and only the republic in one form or another offers itself as a solution to the problems of Florence, while the monarchy is all the more likely to be ruled out because it is understood in a form that no longer has anything in common with republic and equality245- In this process of reversal of concepts, one can see that Machiavelli's history of ideas is not only a history of ideas, but also a history of the people, In this respect, it is quite typical that this extreme contrast between republic and monarchy is highlighted in the petition he submitted to Cardinal Giulio de' Medici in 1519 or 1520.

At the same time as the idea of the popular principality fades and recedes, so does the image of its incarnation: the prince. The prince is now no longer a figure who can enter the political stage at any time and reshape politics according to the necessita and with the means it demands; he is now only a vision and a memory projected into the past and idealized in figures such as Theoderic or Castruccio Castracani, while contemporary rulers, the less able they are to act properly, attract the more bitter judgments *(Kriegs kunst* VII). The rulers are now no longer given concrete and vivid suggestions as in the *Prince,* but (and this already from Book II of the *Discorsi)* they are rather called upon to imitate the Roman model. The perfection of this model hangs like a censure over the decline of the time, and the irreproachable by-play comes before the precepts that emerge from the concrete historical situation as an answer to the problems that it primarily posed. Thus the emphasis falls on imitation (as is clear from the art of war), not on initiative; this shows the hopelessness into which the real prospects and possibilities of action have fallen. It is quite natural that now again more emphasis is laid on human nature, which is unchangeable at all times, through which not only the imitation of the model, but also the repetition of the mistakes becomes probable246- The heroic and

enthusiastic time of the *prince is* over, Machiavelli is imbued with insecurity and pessimism, and this leads to the loss of the enthusiasm of his thinking, which was the strongest motive for action.

VI

The historical fate of Machiavelli and "Machiavellism" can be studied as significant and as an extreme case of the sociology of knowledge. The appearance of each thinker admittedly changes from epoch to epoch, but perhaps the different times and the different camps reflect none so clearly as Machiavelli's. For one obvious reason: Machiavelli touched spontaneously, directly and unapologetically on certain crucial points of the political behaviour of people who, at least until today, have hung "ideological" cloaks over their political actions. But the conflicting camps or individuals do not enter the political arena as declared bearers of the real means they use and the real results that emerge from their actions (and which they themselves also rarely know); rather, they come to the battlefield as representatives of the most diverse views and ideals, which act as a protective and deceptive cloak of their true face and in whose name they fight and recruit supporters. Consequently, any tearing down of the mask, any revealing of the real processes taking place behind it, has an inhibiting effect on the dynamics of a camp. Certainly, Machiavelli did not intend to expose the "ideologies" and protect people from their influence by pointing out the true content of these ideologies, on the contrary - he himself accepted ideology as an inevitable part of political practice and considered its "immoral" means, as indispensable weapons of the prince, admittedly that prince (and this is important) who fights for the higher goals of reconstruction and survival of the state. That Machiavelli sees the question of ends and means from this perspective is nevertheless probably of little comfort to those political camps who, as I have said, enter the stage masked and base their appeal on the mask rather than on their person; for these camps, the simple reference to the disproportionality of ends and means is a factor that (as they rightly sense) undermines their actions. So drastic

and as useful as Machiavelli's teachings are for the narrow circle of the immediate political actors, they prove to be harmful for the same persons when they become common knowledge and the lowliness of their means casts a shadow on the artful exaggeration of the goals in the eyes of the conditional or real followers. Voltaire wrote correctly on the occasion of Frederick the Great's Anti-*Machiavell*: If Machiavelli had had a prince as a pupil, the first thing he would have advised him to do would have been to write a book against Machiavellianism, thus preserving his mask and the luster of his power of attraction. Voltaire felt that Machiavelli, just by addressing the moral incongruity of ends and means (necessary for him, however), was objectively attacking not only the position of every political per son and every political camp, but also persons or camps he might want to help. And from the moment he touched the neuralgic point of politics, it was inevitable that he would become a bone of contention and a person on whom opinions differed. It is particularly typical that the curses that have been spoken about him and the hymns that have been sung to him have been accompanied only to a small extent by a knowledge of his work - which only in recent times has received wider dissemination in its entirety - and merely reflect the attitude demanded by the social or political position of his critics and his eulogists. That the legend of Machiavelli replaced the knowledge of Machiavelli is a negative but striking proof of how hard the winds blew in the face of the Florentine Secretary.

During his lifetime, Machiavelli did not have the reputation of a thinker and writer; he was much more known as a poet and comedy writer. Moreover, his two major works, *Discorsi* and *Prince, were not* printed until 1531 and 1532, after his death. Even as a manuscript, however, The *Prince caused* neither scandal nor surprise; if anything of the sort had occurred, it would have been mentioned in the texts of the time and, of course, in Machiavelli's Correspondence. No one condemned his work on the grounds of "moral values," and if anyone disagreed with it, as Guicciardini did, the reasons lay elsewhere. Vettori, on the other hand, praised it, and Pope Clement VII [1478-1534, Pope from 19.11.1523] was not negatively affected by it - he even entrusted Machia velli with the writing of the Florentine History. But a short time later, the *prince* became the object of wild plagiarism by a certain Agostino Nifo, a wretched philosopher, who made his "work" the object of his own criticism.

Charles V. Machiavelli was quickly caught up in the conflicts of Florentine domestic politics. Shortly before his death, the Medici were banished for the second time, but returned after three years. A terrible reign of terror and expulsions ensued; the persecuted opponents of the Medici cursed Machiavelli's memory, saying that in his time he had wanted to advise and flatter these same tyrants; Machiavelli's friends defended him, arguing that he had in fact wanted to undermine the Medici's rule - here we find the beginnings of Machiavelli's "democratic" interpretation. Finally, both camps turned against him, the friends and the enemies of the Medici - the enemies for the aforementioned reasons, the friends because they could not forget that Machiavelli had been a faithful follower of Soderims.

In the meantime, the Reformation was flourishing. The Catholic
The Church split, reorganized itself, expanded its domain in Italy and began to systematically persecute its political and spiritual opponents. Machiavelli, the anti-papal patriot who subordinated church and religion to the interests of the state, became the object of sharp polemics from the Jesuits, the champion of the subjugation of the state to the church. In 1559, his portrait was burned and he was placed on the Index, which forbade the reproduction, sale and possession of his works - a decree confirmed by the Council of Trent and by the Pope in 1564. The Counter-Reformation rallies the Catholic kings around the Church; the monarch must be its faithful son and a fighter in Christ and obey its commandments, consequently he must also disgustedly renounce all means of the devil: What need has he of the counsels of a Machiavell, if he follows God's ways? The name of Machiavelli is now almost synonymous with the power of evil, and clergymen who have never read a work of his write a great many books against him, but the hatred of the Catholics cannot outweigh the sympathy which the Protestants have for him. The Protestant rulers liked Machiavelli's position of subordination of the church to the state, but his clear indifference to dogma and what they considered Machiavelli's immoralism made him unappealing to the still strict religious conscience of the Protestants. Machiavelli thus became the common scapegoat of the conflicting camps, while at the same time, in the second half of the 16th century, he had no influence whatsoever on the Protestants.

The new political system is more influential on the development of political thought, partly because the religious conflicts change their direction, and partly because the foreign domination has a corrosive effect in Italy. Pessimism and hermetism, already found in Guicciardini, deepen and solidify into insurmountable conservatism and unconquerable reticence. The only thing that Paruta (1540-1598) and Ammirato (1531-1601) have to advise a prince is to live in moderation, not to open himself too much and to turn his flag according to the wind. For Botero (1540-1617), the most important thing is the preservation of a state and not its foundation, and a central place in his reason of state is occupied by the coincidence of ecclesiastical and state interests, as was the case with the Spanish monarchy. But Boccalini (1556-1613), an opponent of the Spanish monarchy and a friend of "democracy," also held anti-Machiavellian views. He was deeply imbued with pessimism and had the feeling that he lived in a wild world torn apart by the self-interest of its rulers (for him, of course, Machiavelli was responsible) and in which there were only a few corners where one could devote oneself to objective writing; for him, one such corner was Venice. Campanella (1568-1639) also disliked Machiavelli; he was disturbed by the Florentine's liberalism and by his view that the various religions were an instrument of the state. He accused Machiavelli of not seeing the relationship between heaven and earth in which history occurred, and of treating only the particular while leaving aside the general. But for Campanella, politics could not be isolated from the other spheres of life, which were in direct contact with the divine, thus also with morality; moreover, he believed that the actions of the Machiavellian prince could only be animated by a sinister egoism, totally incompatible with the sense of justice that must prevail in an ideal state247-.

There were several reasons for outlawing Machiavelli and "Machiavellianism" in 16th century France. Here, the reaction came from those citizens who had already become conservative, and at the same time they were already so powerful that they saw the monarch only as their venerable protector. Ideologically, the bourgeoisie found itself in a confused situation. It had not yet detached itself from the spiritual heritage of the Middle Ages as much as Machiavelli (moreover, the monarchy in France had not been reduced to the

The French monarchy was the heir and defender of legitimate feudal rights; the bourgeoisie in France brought its moral principles to the people by means of an extensive moral philosophy.) There was no new ruler in a popular principality, but the monarch was heir to and defender of legitimate feudalist rights; the bourgeoisie in France put forward its postulates by means of an extensive moral philology. Its most important intellectual representative, Jean Bodin (1530-1596), takes up Machiavelli's basic postulate for a strong central power. But he wants a king who is a good father to his people, without pomp and without much violence, without a nonsensical taxation of the bourgeoisie, but with sufficient power to protect the citizens. Since the state is built on justice, any
At the same time, the only limitation of the monarch would be justice. In this framework, Bodin approves of the absolute power of the ruler as well as the concept of the reason of state; moreover, like Machiavelli, he receives the state through its concrete bearers. Admittedly, the image of the "just ruler" comes into obvious conflict with the demonic image of the Machiavellian prince that was widespread at the time, and Bodin, who shares the moral reservations of the bourgeoisie, accuses Machiavelli on many points and, moreover, despises him as an empiricist, because he himself, unlike Machiavelli, attached great importance to the dogmatic layout of his doctrines248- The Huguenots, for their part, the French Protestants, are per defintionem anti-Machiavellists; they are against the central power, which also wants to unify the state religiously and persecute the Huguenots. Consequently, they have every reason to see the monarch as the bearer of Machiavelli's satanic ideas and methods, rather than Bo din's "just ruler." When the interests of the nobility became more prominent in the Huguenot movement at the end of the 16th century, its representatives were not only disturbed by the Machiavellian image of the ruler and by the subordination of religion to the state, which extinguished "freedom of conscience," but also by Machiavelli's well-known criticism of the nobility; this is clearly expressed by Gentillet (c. 1535-1595). Previously, the Night of St. Bartholomew was attributed to the influence Machiavelli's teachings had on Catherine de Medici - the impure spirit she had brought to France from Florence. Each camp accused its opponents of "Machiavellianism"; thus, all are Machiavelists and anti-Machiavellians at the same time. The Jesuits called Bodin a Machiavellian because he was not an orthodox Catholic; the French defenders of the monarchy, for their part, called Bodin a Machiavellian because he was not an orthodox Catholic.

the Jesuits as Machiavellians, while the Huguenots agreed with them, but they in turn directed the accusation of being Machiavellians against the monarchists, thus sharing the Jesuits' opinion. In short, each anti-Machiavellism came from a different source and had different contents, which had nothing to do with Machiavelli's person and work.

In Elizabethan England, Machiavelli was synonymous with unbelief and iniquity. He is mentioned hundreds of times in this sense in the literature of the time and even speaks the prologue, for example, as a character in Christopher Marlowe's *The Jew of Malta.* (In Shakespeare he appears in *The Merry Wives of Windsor* III,1,104, in *Henry VI,* Part One, IV,1,74, and in Part Three, III,2,193). For the rounded and harmonious far-sightedness of the Elizabethans, Machiavelli was the personification of evil and depravity, of all those powers that threatened the balance, the independence and the moderate of the English universe249- The problem posed in England by social development was not the strengthening of the monarchy, but its limitation and its compromise with the other state and social forces; therefore, the image of the ruler using all means to obtain an overpowering personal position aroused fierce resistance among the English bourgeoisie and, more generally, among the English people. But behind the scenes, Machiavelli was read by experts. Thomas Cromwell, the famous anti-papal chancellor of Henry VIII, often referred to Machiavelli, while Bacon praised Machiavelli's antischolastic, lively spirit, in which he saw a kinship with his own experimental and empirical philosophical views. But the suitable ground for the reception of Machiavelli's basic ideas was not found in 16th century England, but in France at the beginning of the 17th century. There, the monarchy had a very different social function than in England; it was a force that unified the state politically and ideologically by concentrating power at one pole, eliminating feudalist reaction and giving the bourgeoisie almost free rein. The monopolization of power and the subordination of the Church to the State were the two most important tasks now facing the monarchy, and Machiavelli gave it the intellectual weapons to solve both. The greatest personalities of the time in which these tasks arose and were solved were Henry IV and Richelieu, both passionate readers of Machiavelli.

But when the absolutist monarchy was finally consolidated and the predatory military rule turned into an officially ordered cen tral state, the undisputed hereditary king considers the previous ruler, who used extreme means to assert his power, as an evildoer favored by fortune and not as his predecessor and ancestor. The power of the rightful king is surrounded by a divine halo, with which Louis XIV, the Sun King, also adorned himself, and it no longer has anything in common, of course, with the characteristics that Machiavelli gave to the rule of a prince who came to an unstable power "through crime". The monarch, now firmly seated on the throne, has little need to use violence; he wants to reconcile himself with the people and rejects Machiavelli, who allegedly incited his predecessors to their brutalities. This current becomes stronger in the 18th century, in the time of the "Enlightenment" and the "enlightened" Herrscher. From the marginal notes that the famous Christine of Sweden wrote in her copy of the *Prince, we* can see how her deep admiration for a prince who fought to unify and stabilize his state was now mixed with the new reception of the enlightened ruler who gives himself as the representative and servant of his people rather than the embodiment of the state. In this reception, the Herrscher, who oppresses his subjects, appears like a barbaric and imprudent man. The optimism of the Enlightenment has the consequence that man and also the subject are seen from a different perspective than that of Machiavelli; man is not seen as the bearer of a bad nature, but as a fully enable being open to reason, so that violence is superfluous. It is therefore sufficient if the ruler is enlightened, moral and virtuous, rational and a philosopher. This spirit of abstract high-mindedness reigns in the aforementioned anti Machiavell of Frederick the Great. Frederick does not adhere to Machiavelli's basic idea that the prince must act for the good of his people; rather, he isolates the means that Machiavelli points out to the prince and imagines that he turns them against his people rather than against the enemies of the unity and survival of the state. Nevertheless, Frederick knows only too well that the survival of the state in the competitive struggle in foreign affairs is a prerequisite for the exercise of an enlightened domestic policy, because this creates the internal conditions of security and order that permit the extension of political rights, religious tolerance, and the like. Therefore

Frederick unconsciously tends to a double strategy; apparently he condemns a "Machiavellian" domestic policy, but in foreign policy he has no aversion to corresponding methods (in fact, he even proved to be very virtuosic in their application). The historical conditions of his time (the stability of the monarchy at home) did not allow Frederick to see the concrete conditions that imposed on Machiavelli's princes uniform methods in domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, Frederick's difficulty in understanding Machiavelli was also magnified by the ahistorical and abstract formulation of Enlightenment ideas, which was completely different from the concrete and empirical conceptualization of the Renaissance; although Frederick was an empiricist and realist in practice, his way of thinking nevertheless corresponded to the abstract thinking of the Enlightenment250-.

Nevertheless, the Enlightenment in its entirety also contains aspects, for which one could see in Machiavelli a clear and ardent supporter. In particular, the Enlightenment was animated by the spirit of liberalism and anticlericalism, and Machiavelli's well-known antipapal stance easily went hand in hand with this point, even if his attitude toward religion in general differed substantially from the position of the Enlightenment's representatives; but when intellectual and ideological movements were at the height of their activity and comrades-in-arms and champions were sought to stabilize their influence, there was no time for such quibbles and conceptualizations. Machiavelli's tomb in Santa Croce, with its eulogistic inscription, was donated by the Grand Duke of Tuscany (and "enlightened ruler") Leopold 1st, son of Maria Theresa and later Emperor of Austria, who was in constant conflict with the Church and the Pope; the significance of this act is thus clear. In the other camp of the Enlightenment as well, Rousseau takes up Spinoza's view and claims that Machiavelli only pretended to give weapons to tyrants, in reality he wanted to inform and arm the people. And of the factions of the French Revolution, the Jacobins, who want to come closer to the intellectual legacy of Rousseau, idolize him, seeing him as a thinker who, on the one hand, indirectly fomented hatred of tyrants with his work and, on the other hand, showed the revolutionary forces the means they must use if they make the salvation of the fatherland their highest imperative. A little later, Napoleon became an avowed admirer of

Machiavelli; he always has his works with him, reads them and spreads this current in Paris; but this inclination has other reasons than Napoleon's earlier superficial contact with the Jacobins. He, too, is a "new ruler," and he needs the morals and resources of the man who made it on his own merits and relies on his personal merits; At the same time, he does not feel that he identifies with the people or is merely their representative; he finds that he is above the people and is the head who wants to muster all the forces of the state and national organism - all the more so, of course, because he has to deal daily with threats from outside and the problems of ruling conquered peoples, which was also for the Machiavellian prince a decisive field for challenges and deployment of resources. As an enemy of Napoleon, the "immoral" ruler by his own power and without any tradition, as a defender of the ancestral privileges of kings and representative of a degenerated form of enlightened rule, Metternich, of course, sees Machiavelli quite differently.

The hour for Machiavelli's solemn rehabilitation arrives at the beginning of the 19th century, when the great nations, above all Germany and Italy, became very conscious of their internal unity and strive to concretise it in the political form of the nation-state.Machiavelli's patriotism, in particular, now comes to the fore, while Machiavelli himself is considered a prophet of natio nalism, an inspired exponent of the ways and means by which national unity can be achieved. Unlike in Germany, the nation-state movement in Italy did not begin monarchically, but republican, enlightened and antipapal. To adapt Ma chiavelli's "immoralism" to this framework, Alfieri and Foscolo [Vittorio Alfieri, 1749-1803, ,,Dei principe e delle lettere" 1778; Ugo Foscolo, 1778-1827, ,,Fama e vita di Nicolo Ma chiavelli," in: F., Prose politiche e letterarie, VII, Firenze 1973, pp. 19- 63] again a "republican interpretation" of his work, which Rousseau also advocated, and adopt the romantic theory of Machiavelli's inner conflict. But the closer the realization of the unification of Italy, the clearer it becomes that in the future the political form will be the monarchy; the "republican" Machiavelli recedes into the background, and his patriotism becomes associated with the person of the saving ruler. This patriotic-monarchist attitude, which replaces the patriotic-republican one, is clearly expressed in Zambelli's work on Machiavelli.

including the well-known work of Pasquale Villari. In Germany, the Napoleonic Wars had rekindled local nationalism, and humiliating foreign domination had made Germans feel the absence of a strong state as painfully as Machiavelli's contemporaries; Hegel, then still young, sees in Machiavelli the ardent patriot and recognizes the necessity of the means he proposes. For Hegel, the state, the "rational" state, is an achievement of the spirit, it is its culmination. Consequently, with Hegel, the old duality between the real, empirically experienceable state and the rational, the best state is balanced. State reason is generally equated with ratio, the question of the morality of the means is cancelled252- Hegel and Machiavelli also agree in the view, the war and the competition with other states as well as the ability to survive belong to the essence of the state. If Hegel and Machiavelli are related to each other through some logical bridges, besides the patriotic and state postulate, "Machiavellianism" from the very beginning was fundamentally different from the strongly moral character of Fichte's philosophy; nevertheless, Fichte, who was also imbued with ardent patriotic feeling, appreciated Machiavelli as much as Hegel and first forgot the rational postulates of his philosophical system in favor of nation and state, which, by the way, are also moral quantities in their own way. The appreciation of Machiavelli and his *prince on the* basis of the requirements of a national unification movement continued for a long time in Germany253-.

The historical method of the nineteenth century, on the basis of which historical phenomena are considered under the conditions of their origin, also agrees with Machiavelli. Machiavelli is now considered in his time, and his political views are related to its characteristics and postulates; this removes from them the aspect of satanic thought, which in a certain way emerged from a supra-historical realm of evil and is from the beginning an antagonist of the luminous realm of moral order. But the logical extrapolation of the historical method is absolute moral relativity; and if moral relativity is conceived as an organic part of historicism, "Machiavellianism", i.e. not the separation but the inherent opposition of politics and morality, could become a method that could overcome the historical epoch that produced it, it could become a law that is valid for all epochs; historicism would lead to supra-historical immoralism.

But the pioneers and founders of the historical me thod, Ranke foremost among them, were not inclined to draw such conclusions for more general ideological reasons, and so they basically limited Machiavelli's work by its positioning in his epoch. Thus, it is argued that Machiavelli's political philosophy expresses exclusively the demands and conditions of his time, and thus has no lasting value and cannot meaningfully address the political problems of other eras, especially in their relation to morality. Machiavelli, as an ardent patriot who proposed the necessary measures to save his fatherland in the concrete situation in which it found itself, is morally "rehabilitated" on the condition that he remains in his time and does not sow discord in later epochs, which are historically different from Machiavelli's time and may not need to use "immoral" means. In this way, our hierarchy of moral values is not shaken. On the background of this indecisiveness Machiavelli is considered by Leopold von Ranke, but also by Macaulay, who praised the personal morality and patriotism of the Florentine, but denied his political theses a general [validity254]. Gervinus's critique vacillated between the historism and the exigencies of German nationalism that I mentioned in the previous section. Later, the successes on the road to nation-state unification and the great philosophical tra dition of idealism in Germany led to an even more emphatic (in theory) abolition of the separation of politics and morality and to the emergence of a new theoretical synthesis of these greats. Heinrich von Treitschke accepts power as the foundation of the state, consequently also the circumstances connected with its attainment - but not power as the goal of the state. The goal must be justice and morality and their constant perfection, to which the individual is also obliged. Treitschke's historical view is individualistic and originates from the subjective-moral idealism of Fichte (while Ranke comes from the objective idealism of Hegel and sees personality in connection with apersonal historical

forces). But this very individualistic-moralistic and anti-Machiavellian view of Treitschke, who demands from the state to act as morally as an individual, unintentionally carries the germ of a Machiavellian view: if the moral and political reference point of the state is the strong individual, the great personality, then the distance to the *prince is* rather small. From another point of view, the nationalist postulate, the maxim of the strong individual who can unite a fragmented nation, shines through at this point - which is exactly what led Mommsen to his emperor worship at that time.

Towards the end of the 19th century, interest in Machiavelli waned. Bourgeois liberalism in Europe stabilises itself in the parliamentary system and produces a hypocritical political morality that fiercely rejects "Machiavellianism", even if the representatives of parliamentarism frequently and explicitly recognise the need for "micromachiavellianism" in the style of Talleyrand and boast of its virtuoso application. On the other hand, the socialist movement emerges, whose declared aim is the classless society and the abolition of social contradictions - consequently also the abolition of the opposition between political being and political ought and thus the final bridging of the gap between politics and morality. Socialism while recognising that Machiavelli drew a unique picture of the struggle for power in class society, also rejects "Machiavellianism" and adopts a distanced, if not hostile, attitude to Machiavelli's work, for the separation separation of politics and morality is irrevocable for Machiavelli, because it is with human nature - and if that is true, then the ideal of a classless society is unattainable. the concordance of politics and morality, which leads to both being both cancel each other out in a society of completely free people.255-.

Wars, revolutions, globalization, the unprecedented abruptness and nakedness with which the problem of the relationship between morality and politics has been posed in the last fifty years of human history, have brought Machiavelli back to the scene with sad topicality. In the last years before and after the war, hundreds and hundreds of studies were written about Machiavelli as a person and about his work. This is not at all strange. Through other channels and with other socio-economic contents, the

history, the fundamental factors of the Machiavellian political view are again current: the state as a secular principle, based on power and subordinating everything to the pursuit of its stabilization and expansion; the ruler, now no longer as an interim power that reconstructs society, but as the crowning glory and expression of its monolithic permanence; and the separation of politics and morality, infinitely more conspicuous today because the disproportion between ends and means becomes even greater when the ends are not the usual practical and prosaic ones, but when they are lofty world-historical goals that modern "ideologies" set up with messianic zeal and a claim to eternal validity. The relative social and moral autonomy of the apparatuses of power that all these appearances entailed led Machiavelli to be regarded - as I said, apologetically but nevertheless erroneously - as a cool anatomist and technician of power in its pure form. Since Machiavelli himself was considered a scientist with a distinctly ontological rather than normativist orientation, it was assumed that the way was also open to a purely scientific assessment. But Machiavelli, and also certain fundamental suggestions and insights associated with his name, need not remain confined to the realm of theoretical assessments, because these tend by themselves to connect with real situations that occur again and again in history, and to become ideological weapons in the quarrels of opposing parties. The greatest paradox of our time, that it fights for utopia with millions of determined fighters and sinks into the most blind globalization, gave a new form to the dialectic of the victim-perpetrator relationship, and "Ma chiavellism" is a charge raised by both sides in the struggle. In the Moscow show trials, the perpetrator, in Vyshinsky's voice, accused the victim, Lev Kamenev, author of a voluminous introduction to an edition of Machiavelli's works, of "Machiavellianism "[256]; by defending the option of clean politics and hypocritically condemning "Machiavellianism," the perpetrator(s) provide(s) an alibi, an ideological mask, to cover himself and act freely; thus, his attitude does not differ significantly from that of the bourgeois-liberals. But shortly before 1956, when the Russian tanks bloodily put down the workers' uprising in Budapest, the accusation of Machiavellianism is raised by the victim, Imre Nagy, against the perpetrato[257].

The accusation of the perpetrator as well as the victim are both equidistant from the scientific truth about Machiavelli - the first, however, is based on hypocrisy, the second on protest and struggle; also, the functions they fulfil are diametrically opposed: In the first case concealment, in the second case exposure.

In the future, too, the use of "Machiavellianism" as a political and ideological weapon will depend on the characteristics and outcome of social and ethnic conflicts. Theoretically, three options can be pointed out: First, "Machiavellianism" will disappear with the abolition of the separation of politics and morality in a humane society; second, it will exist for eternity because the separation of politics and morality is imma nent, and it will not only exist practically, but it will also agonizingly divide people's consciousness; third, the separation of politics and morality will not be abolished in practice, but it will prevail to such an extent that the moral side will fade away and be forgotten - in a historical phase in which barbarism, however technologically transfigured, will become a self-evident and carefree way of life for brainwashed people who treat and solve every problem only technically; then the principle of achievement will take the place of morality, of the humanistic ideal. But the fact that these three options have been formulated here does not mean that we have all three in front of us and can choose, weighing each one from the outside; we are already in the middle of the path towards one of these three options, the impetus on this path being determined by great and famous events as well as by our daily actions, and the heterogeneity of the goals being always virulent. This historical impetus that emerges and that gradually changes in the chaos of individual events forces us, if not to pessimism, then to skepticism.

Notes

[1] Sombart, p. 19.
[2] On the "economization of forces," see ibid. p. 400 f.
[3] On "diligence," see ibid. p. 142.
[4] Martin, p. 51. Simmel already pointed out the analogy between money and intellect; see also Marx, p. 232.
[5] Doren, p. 656.
[6] Burckhardt, p. 276.
[7] Martin, p. 2.
[8] Cf. Sombart, p. 69ff.
[9] Burckhardt, p. 94.
[10] Dilthey, p.18f.; he establishes an artificial connection between different points and writes: "withdrawal into oneself" begins in literature with Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, it continues with Augustine, the Cluniac movement and the Franciscans, and is taken up by Petrarch.
[11] Burckhardt, p. 209.
[12] Ibid., p. 226f.
[13] Ibid., p. 100ff.
[14] Ibid., p. 233 ff.
[15] Ibid., p. 106ff.
[16] Hauser, p. 247ff.
[17] A nice elaboration on this can be found in Valery, p. 39 ff. and passim.
[18] Burckhardt, p. 60f.
[19] Spirito, p. 29.
2° Kofler, p. 175 ff.
[21] Martin, p. 26.
[22] Doren, p. 477ff; cf. a. Kofler, p. 180.
[23] Martin, p. 56.
[24] Villari (1877), p. 200.
[25] Burckhardt, p. 358.
[26] This is shown by the rumors that circulated after the death of Pope Alexander VI; see Villari (1877), p. 386.
Russo, p. 158 f., argues convincingly that in the novella *Belfagor* Machiavelli is not polemicizing against the lei dships of the spouses, as is generally assumed, but against the superstition and credulity of the people, who believe that Savonarola speaks with God *(Discorsi* I,11).
[27] Sombart, p. 77ff; cf. a. Martin, p. 12.

[28] Burckhardt, pp. 52 f. and 57 ff.
[29] Ullmann, p. 101 f.
[30] Burckhardt, p. 73.
[31] Chabod, pp. 42 ff. and 49 f.
[32] See a. Cobban, p. 311.
[33] Burckhardt, p. 14 f.
[34] Ibid, pp. 35 f. and 69.
[35] Villari (1877), p. 9 ff.
[36] Sombart, p. 82 ff.
[37] Martin, p. 14.
[38] Doren, p. 524 f.
[39] Dobb, p. 192; on the development of the monetary system, see Doren, pp. 647 ff.
[40] Doren, p. 472.
[41] Marks, p. 146.
[42] Doren, pp. 642 and 680.
[43] Ibid, p. 673 f.
[44] Martin, p. 71.
[45] On the dependence on feudal courts, see Antal, p. 21 f.
[46] De Sanctis (1941), p. 542 ff.
[47] Meinecke (1963), p. 30 ff.
[48] Ullmann, p. 205 ff. Villari (1882), p. 214 ff.
[49] Mounin, p. 143 f.
[50] Windelband, p. 266 ff, and Logothetis, p. 751 f.; on the indirect reverberation of these thoughts in Thomas Aquinas, see ibid, p. 681.
[51] On Pombonatius, see Lange, pp. 103 ff.
[52] Cf. Villari (1877), p. 444 f.
[53] Villari (1883), p. 332 f.
[54] Gramsci, p. 9.
[55] Dilthey, p. 31.
[56] Meinecke (1963), p. 37.
[57] Chabod, p. 383 f.
[58] Sasso (1967), pp. 61 ff. and 72 f. The beautiful comparison of Machiavelli's moral-political *"cosmos"* and the corresponding "*cos mos"* in Thrasymachus and Thucydides goes to Sasso. Croce (1945), p. 21 ff, and (1967), p.174ff, does not see this dialectic between politics and morality in Machiavelli and exclusively emphasizes their separation, because he projects the greatness of Machiavelli's thought onto his own philosophy of the "stages" of the mind. He wants to see Machiavelli as a phi losophist who mediates between the two realms, and raises his thought to an inappropriately modern level, see the remark in Chabod, p. 254.
[59] Sharks (1966), p. 158.
[60] Cf. Cassirer, pp. 180f., and de Sanctis (1943), p. 323.
[61] Bronowski/Mazlish, p. 52; according to this, Machiavelli relies not only on the empirical side of his method but also on axioms, above all on the uniformity of human nature, which takes the place of unchanging matter in Galileo.

[62] Perotti translated Polybius as a commissioned work for Pope Nicholas V. This translation, up to the 5th book, appeared in 1473. It is not possible to trace when and how Machiavelli became aware of the 6th book, although it is claimed (see Hexter, p. 87ff.) that this happened in 1515, because he could not have begun writing the *Discorsi* before then; see also Dilthey, p.28, and Villari (1882), p.257f. The claim by Dilthey and many others that no writer influenced Machiavelli as much as Polybius is unsubstantiated. Even if Machiavelli took over a substantial part unchanged from Polybius (which is not the case), he nevertheless did not build his system of thought on it - if there is such a system at all in the literal sense. And if he then also integrated points into his thinking, which can be found in the circulation theory, these criteria with Polybius only experienced an underpinning, but developed in other contexts. Moreover, Machiavelli's ability to base his thinking on a theoretical approach, which he took over from a writer, would presuppose that this ability was much more abstract and theoretical, even Cartesian, than it actually is. A cyclical conception of history is also found in other writers of that time, who were by no means influenced by Polybius, e.g. Luigi da Porto,

s. Haie (1960), p. 97, and with Vasari, who dealt with the history of painting on this background, see Croce (1915),

S. 193 f.

[63] The following paragraphs draw on the conclusions from the detailed conceptual analysis in Sasso (1958).

[64] Cf. ibid., p. 348 ff.

[65] Ibid, p. 358 ff. On Machiavelli's reception of natural disasters, cf. *Discorsi* II,5.

[66] Sasso (1958), p. 340.

[67] Cf. Sasso (1967), p. 283 ff.

[68] Ibid, p. 293 f.

[69] Especially in the context of the general consideration of the epoch, Sasso's analyses stand back. But the general consideration must be the last and most probable criterion, otherwise the discussions about the meaning of Machiavelli's passages may never end, even if one also takes into account the contradictory contents and the interpreta
toric zeal of the researchers is taken into account.

7° Chabod, p. 213. Cf. a. Kofler, p. 197 f.

[71] Chiapelli, p. 84 ff.

[72] Spirito, p. 22.

[73] Bronowski/Mazlish, p. 37.

[74] Cf. Renaudet, p. 132.

[75] Dilthey, p. 29, and Kofler, p. 198. However, when Dilthey speaks of the "in stinctive unmethodical force", and the "abhorrence of deductions", he is not aware that he contradicts his own assertion: „... but the unity of genius is in his thinking."

[76] Spirito, p. 124.
[77] Sasso (1967), p. 323 ff.
[78] Cf. Allen, p. 472.
[79] Cassirer, p. 201; he characterizes The *Prince* as a purely "technical book."
[80] Sharks (1966), p. 152.
[81] Cf. Rornilly, p. 298.
[82] Renaudet, p. 167.
[83] Cf. Haie (1966), p. 174.
[84] De Sanctis (1943), p. 105.
[85] This is the sense of the ironic epigram about Piero Soderini, see Russo, p. 222; cf. a. Ridolfi, p. 318.
[86] A vivid characterization is offered by Vespasiano, p. 149, with the episode about King Alfonso of Naples, who refrained from using technical means to destroy the Genoese fleet besieging the port of Naples because he could not reconcile this with chivalric virtues; see Martin, p. 9.
[87] Spirito, p. 42 f.
[88] Meinecke (1963), pp. 34 and 36.
[89] Schmid, p. 19.
[90] Weber, p. 125.
[91] Doren, p. 668.
[92] This relation of the narrowly rational, technical element to the other inner forces that constitute Machiavelli's thought has been treated many times. For Cassirer, p. 189 f., the purely technical side of Machiavellian thinking is predominant, a thinking that corresponds to the natural law view of reality; Machia velli's obvious patriotism does not change this fundamentally. This view is also shared by Freyer, p. 92 ff, and Lerner, among others,
p. XXV and XLV. For Russo, p. 191 ff., the element of political technique prevails, whereby this technique has not only a coolly calculating side, as for Cassirer and Freyer, but also a distinctly artistic side, where imagination plays an important role. The artistic element is also emphasized by Spirito, p. 40 f. - the scientific thinking becomes the lyrical climax; this explains Machiavelli's duality: cool calculator on the one hand and ardent patriot on the other. However, Spirito, p. 46 f., claims that Machiavelli's artistic ideal, the fatherland, is fought against and clouded by his agnosticism; he does feel love for the fatherland, but he lives it on a philological and abstract level; the fatherland becomes an entity that is nourished by the myth of Rome and where rhetoric ultimately prevails. Grarnsci's view, p. 119, is more in line with the facts: The technique that Machiavelli teaches in the *Prince* goes far beyond the experience of rulers, Machiavelli wanted to teach them a coherent technique of government aimed at a purpose, namely the creation of a state. *The Prince* is therefore not a work of directly scientific-descrip-

tive intent, but of "directly political passion," and the proposed means refer to the necessary structure of a particular policy, even if "purely political" elements emerge from it. For Russell, on the other hand, p. 518 ff, patriotism and political virtuosity are incompatible.

93 Berenson, pp. 54 ff. and 73.

94 Cf. Spirito, p. 57 ff.

95 As Renaudet, p. 73, wrongly assumes.

96 Cf. Villari (1883), p. 72. Horkheimer, p.12ff. and 31 ff., overlooks Machiavelli's strongly practical and patriotic interest and claims that despite his contemporary approach, he draws from history, from the past, as a source for the study of normal phenomena; thus Machiavelli arrives at the assertion about the uniformity of human nature, etc. Machiavelli is not considered as a living being who has tangible contradictions, but as a stage in the development of bourgeois historical philosophy. Thus, of course, the whole weight does not fall on the overall consideration, but on the elements that coincide with one or another consideration about the lines of development of philosophy. This is not unauthorized, nor is it fruitless; however, by grouping large periods of time into units, he tears apart the individual thinkers; therefore, this particular approach must also be explained at the outset.

97 Russo,p.174.

98 Meinecke (1946), p. 127.

99 Allen, p. 450 f.

100 Schmid, p. 42.

101 Renaudet, pp. 133 and 220.

102 Mounin, pp. 14 f. and 144.

103 Kofler, p. 198.

104 Mattingly (1965), pp. 24 and 27.

105 Ibid., p. 55 ff.

106 Cf. Meinecke (1963), p. 35.

107 Mattingly (1965), p. 63 ff.

108 Ibid., p. 97 f.

109 Ibid, p. 106 f.; cf. a. Sharks (1957), p. 270.

110 Villari (1877), p. 211.

111 Sharks (1966), p. 2 f.

112 Villari (1882), p. 220 ff.

11J Haie (1966), p. 19. Biagio Buonaccorsi, a friend of Machiavelli, wrote the history of Florence, covering the period of his own service in the Signoria. Francesco Vettori wrote the history of his time, while Filippo de' Nerli and Iacopo Nardi also wrote histories of their times. With Guicciardini, Machiavelli's relationship became closer much later.

114 Villari (1877), p. 373.

115 Sharks (1966), p. 152, and Chabod, p. 377.

[116] Chabod, pp. 286, 300, and 357. He notes that the reference to Cesare Borgia's mistake in accepting Julius II as pope *(Prince* 7) is already contained in the 1503 reports from Rome (pp. 312 f.); also that the November 21, 1500 report from France already contains in nuce the 3rd chapter of *Prince.*

[117] Sharks (1966), p. 98 f.

[118] Cf. Martin, pp. 36-39.

[119] Burckhardt, p. 122.

[120] Cf. Villari (1877), p. 88. The application of humanistic education to politics was also facilitated by the fact that the humanists were initially closer to rhetoric and moral philosophy than to the philosophical tradition per se (on this helpful distinction, see Kristeller, pp. 17ff. and 94f.). The unification of these two traditions in the person of the humanists takes place later, when they withdraw from public life and from political interests and come closer to the Neoplatonic, and partly also to the Aristotelian tradition. It is precisely this attachment of the Huma nists to rhetoric and to moral philosophy that leads to their inability to seriously attack the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition, which revolves around logic and around natural philosophy, because they do not seriously address its problems (ibid., p.46) and consider their preoccupations only as part of the total knowledge, even if it is obviously more eclectic (ibid., 102 f.). This distinction is valid until the 16th century, then the Aristotelian natural philosophy is displaced.

[121] Villari gives two fine examples of such references, (1877), p. 216, and (1883), p. 271 f.; the first quotation is from a letter of King Ferdi nand of Aragon - written by Giovanni Pontano - to his envoy in Rome; in the second case it is the argumentation of Morone, who wanted to win the Marquis of Pescara, General of Charles V, for his famous conspiracy.

[122] In *De principe* by Pontano we read that the prince must be good, just, etc., and of course protect the educated. In *De infelicitate principum* by Poggio Bracciolini, on the other hand, we learn that the prince's life is a martyrdom of sorrows and hardships, while only the private citizens and the philosophers are happy. Bracciolini describes foreign places and gives information, albeit stylized, about their geography, customs and traditions. Here we find one of the most direct and fruitful influences of ancient historiogra phy, which also clearly goes back to Byzantine historians.

[123] A poignant episode is found in Villari (1877), p. 274. In 1498, the Florentines summoned the mercenary leader Paolo Vitelli (who was later beheaded) to take charge of their troops. Mar cello Virgilio received him with a speech in Latin, but the speech was interrupted when the astrologers, who at that hour were looking for good omina, thought that these had now appeared and that the moment was favorable to give Vitelli the command baton

to hand over. Such episodes say much more about the time than analyses that portray this period as the high point of rationalism.

[124] Kofler, p. 180.

[125] Randall, p. 184.

[126] Renaudet, p. 21 ff. Berenson, p. 155 ff., aptly points out the same general humanist reception in Mategna's painting.

[127] Cf. Hay, p. 15 f.

[128] Cf. Burckhardt, p. 149.

[129] Sombart, 236 f. Cf. also the perceptive remarks in Weber, „The Protestant Ethic ... ", p. 39 ff.

[130] Baron (1957), pp. 71 ff. Cf. a. Russell, p. 519 f. The anti-imperial-republican sentiment that generally establishes itself with the supremacy of the city-states prevails and manifests itself in Florence especially after the war of 1402 against the Duke of Mai land, which led to a greater self-confidence of the bourgeoisie. This feeling is not so much humanistic as political, and so it expresses itself first among active citizens, but is then rounded out and glossed over by the humanists, especially Leonardo Bruni Aretino *(Laudatio florentinae urbis)*. Humanism takes on a militant and democratic aspect, integrating active politics and the corresponding "living" interpretation of history, and even defending the vernacular. Bruni's generation thus takes a step beyond the genes of Salutati's, who was even closer to the remnants of the medieval reception and saw the conflict with Milan as a continuation of the conflict between the Guelfs and the Ghibellines, whereas his anti-Kaiserism was not absolute. This, in summary, is the basis of the famous study by Hans Baron (1966); it can be noted as a fundamental drawback that in presenting the determinants of ideological change, he puts much more emphasis on the factors of political history than on the sociological factors. With respect to Machiavelli, he concludes from his analysis that one must connect the Flo rentinian's militant republicanism with the intellectual world of Bruni, although he is closer to Salutati if one takes the latter's ambivalent attitude toward a choice between republic and monarchy as a criterion.

[131] Burckhardt, p. 383; Martin, p. 72; Kofler, p. 189 f.

[132] Bronowski/Mazlish, pp. 29 and 37.

m As Russo, p. 225, erroneously claims.

[114] Cf. Renaudet, p. 39 f.

rn Cf. Mounin, p. 89, and Villari (1877), p. 260 ff.

[136] Ridolfi, p. 7 f. rn

Chabod, p. 260.

[138] Ridolfi, p. 22.

[139] Spritio, p. 45.

[140] Russo, p. 42; cf. a. Russell, p. 516.

[141] Whitfield, p. 18, and Dilthey, p. 24, clearly allude to this. Hidden in this reception is the intention to promote Machiavelli intellectually and to place him among the most learned elements of his time. But in doing so, the proponents of this opinion are quite simply mistaken; since they want to characterize an era by the community of its noble minds under all circumstances, they of necessity also title those who had only an outward education as noble minds, but not the living core of intellectual life, while on the other hand it seems to them almost nonsensical that someone with a healthy, lively mind should stand outside half the sometimes boring community of noble minds. Thus one senses "with tact" the effeminate vergeisti gung of the authors who hold similar views.

[142] Lord Acton, p. 79 f. Salutati and his generation were of the Reli
On the contrary, they were closer to religion and the Thomistic system and to a large extent linked religious motifs and religious echoes with the national feeling of the citizens. Bruni's generation presents itself more gei stically independent, that is, distinctly classically oriented and more secular, but does not spoil it with the Church. An excellent analysis of the relationships and interconnections between civic and religious ideologies, as they occurred in Florence with the emergence and activity of the Franciscans (in their late period) and Dominicans in particular, can be found in Antal, p. 64 ff. In general, the religious ideas and the cultivation of the corresponding literature in the Renaissance did not deviate noticeably from their counterweight and counterpart, the secular ideas and secular prose, see Kristeller,

p. 71 f. The predominant current is the mutual adaptation and not the disappearance of one of the two elements. Religious thought absorbs humanistic influences and changes; however, in order to exert such an influence, humanism basically presents itself as a movement that is anything but anti-religious. Common points are emphasized, theology comes into contact with the philological studies of the humanists, and the scholastic tradition is to some extent displaced. Garin does not see this relationship quite right when he wants to emphasize the innovative role that humanism played in all fields; philologically this book is impeccable, but it is far from a sociological approach and the necessary distinctions and connections.

[143] Kofler, p. 182.

[144] On the relevant testimonies, see Chabod, p. 265 f.; cf. a. Burck- hardt, pp. 322 and 344 ff.

14s Rubinstein, p. 166.

[146] Ridolfi, p. 15 f.

[147] Chabod's view, p. 272 f., that Machiavelli, as a man of pleasure and as a sociable person, abhorred the preaching of moderation, is not correct.

not correct (if Chabod also considers this a secondary reason for the dispute with Savonarola). Machiavelli himself always stressed that the state must be rich, the citizens poor *(Discorsi* II,19 and III,35).

[148] Chabod, p. 268 f.

[149] Gramsci, p. 39 f.

[150] Such attempts were made by Ellinger and Lutoslawski. Triantaphyllis holds with ardent patriotism that Machiavelli knew Greek and read the Greek writers in the original;
see Villari (1877), p. 266 f., note 1, and Toffanin, p. 41 ff.

[151] Renaudet, p. 122 ff.; cf. a. Villari (1882), p. 249 ff.; vis-à-vis the nor mativist Aristotle, Machiavelli proves to be a strict natura list. The difference between Machiavelli's and Aristotle's approach has already been pointed out by Ranke, p. 195.

[152] Fueter, p. 9.

[153] See above, note 113.

[154] Cf. Fueter, p. 56.

[155] Renaudet, p. 155 ff.

[156] Fueter, p. 13 ff; cf. a. Croce (1915), p. 190 f.

[157] Fueter, p. 58; cf. a. Burckhardt, p. 59.

[158] Fueter, p. 60.

[159] Villari (1877), p. 326, and (1882), p. 260; cf. a. Fueter, pp. 66 and 69.

16° Fueter, p. 64; cf. a Renaudet, p. 106.

[161] It is significant that Machiavelli had his source, Flavio Biondo, around The author is not afraid to go into detail or to paraphrase in order to erase anything that might cast a shadow on the image of his hero; having otherwise followed him almost word for word, he shows no inclination here to examine in any detail those points that are not of general interest to him.

[162] Russo, p. 60 f. From this point of view, de Sanctis' opinion (1943), p. 385 f., is wrong, Machiavelli reflects the accidental and not the essential of history, he describes the outstanding single events, but does not have the whole in mind. Here it is obvious that de Sanctis is influenced by the approaches of phased historical progression that emerged in the 19th century and which he considered a summary of the (metaphysical or non-metaphysical) essence of history. The absence of such an approach in Ma chiavelli's approach leads de Sanctis to believe that machia velli is content with the partial, where the tangible manifestations of historical phenomena are limited.

[163] Sharks (1966), p. 72.

[164] Cf. Chabod, p. 283 and pp. 6 and 21.

[165] Ibid, p. 19.

[166] Russo, p. 178 f.

[167] De Sanctis (1943), p. 97 ff.

[168] Cf. Russo, pp. 74-86. The beauty of these pages is due to the fact that he basically falsely describes Machiavelli as an artist's

and takes this as an occasion for such lofty stylistic analyses as befits an artist. This now coincides with the personal literary vein of the observer, so that the deception becomes even more tempting and greater in beauty, but not in accuracy.

[169] Spirito, p. 123.

[170] De Sanctis (1943), p. 95 ff.

[171] Cf. Fueter, p. 61, and Burckhardt, p. 168.

[172] Chiapelli, pp. 39 and 111.

[173] Chabod, p. 263.

[174] Villari (1877), p. 259.

[175] Chabod, p. 274.

[176] Such leadership ambition on Machiavelli's part is also assumed by Kanellopoulos (1966), p. 918, along with a very tolerant ma chiavellian school. Kanellopoulos is always quick to load the personalities he meets with unfulfilled dreams, the burden of which results in an inner conflict. This motif is pervasive in Kanellopoulos's texts, and one can easily surmise that it is the usual elevation of a personal melancholy to an explanatory principle. It is indeed difficult to find multiple criteria of explanation when someone in each case gathers the available publications, writes thousands of pages on innumerable topics within a short time, and the volumes on each individual topic fill entire shelves.

[177] Mounin, p. 56; cf. a. Sharks (1966), pp. 8 and 47.

[178] See Ridolfi, p. 155 f.; Burd, p. 196, cf. a. Gilbert.

[179] Rubinstein, p. 180.

[180] Benoist, p. 143 ff.

[181] On Soderini's attitude toward Machiavelli and his letters to him, see Benoist, p.137ff. Machiavelli probably alludes to personal relations with Soderini when he mentions what Soderini confided to his friends *(Discorsi,* III,3).

[182] Benoist, pp. 140 f. and 148 ff.

[183] De Sanctis (1943), p. 78.

[184] Cf. Barincou, p. 13.

[185] Cf. Gramsci, p. 119.

[186] Mounin, p. 68 f.

[187] Macaulay (1850), p. 81. [In the German translation this passage is missing, it simply says: "The citizen of an Italian republic was timid and pliable, cunning and unscrupulous, but he had a fatherland whose independence and welfare were dear to him. If his character might be degraded by base crimes, he was, on the other hand, ennobled by public spirit and respectable ambition." (1947), p. 267; translator's note]

[188] Cf. Russo, p. 92 f. Dilthey, p. 26, sees a connection between Machiavelli's moral flexibility as an individual and the contrast between his republican sentiments with respect to Florence

and his monarchist attitude toward Italy. However, it is weakly founded that the opposites in the theoretical attitude of an individual should correspond to opposites in his character. Even if this is true, it is still extremely difficult to prove that the contrast *x* in the character corresponds to the contrast *x in the* ideas of the person and not to a contrast *y*.

189 Cf. Sasso (1967), p. 16 ff.

190 See Villari, (1882), p. 337; Russo, p. 37; and Barincou, p. 54 ff.

191 Spirito, p. 90 f., and de Sanctis (1943), p. 137 ff.

192 Spirito, p. 82 ff.

193 Villari (1882), p. 225.

194 Chabod, p. 9; cf. a. Allen, p. 496 ff.

195 Gramsci, p. 85, deftly draws attention to the difference between the way one and the other each approached politics: Guicciardini was concerned with di plomacy, which is inherently conservative and an attempt to keep the status quo in equilibrium, while the more general state service in which Machiavelli was engaged was more conducive to the development of initiative and to active engagement with the world.

196 Meinecke (1963), p. 43.

197 Fueter, p. 57 ff.

198 Burd, p. 202. The view that the theory of human nature is the "logical *prius*" (ibid., p. 208) in Machiavelli's thought is not valid because a logical *prius* presupposes the existence of a theoretical system. To make it clear that the theory about the nature of man is indeed a logical *prius*, he would have to prove concretely that if this theory were absent, Machiavelli's whole thought would have taken a different path. It is a different matter if *we* arrange Machiavelli's thought as systematically as possible (and it would also be difficult to present it otherwise), starting from factors that are logical priors *for us*.

199 Villari (1882), p. 246 f.

200 Dilthey, p. 31.

201 Allen, p. 454.

202 Meinecke (1963), p. 39.

201 Ibid., p. 40 f.

204 Cf. Haie (1966), p. 24.

205 Cassirer, p. 205 ff. He is disconcerted by the fact that *fortuna* was integrated into Machiavelli's thought, because, as already mentioned, he equates Machiavelli with Galileo as the creator of a naturalistic, mechanistic system. But *fortuna does* not contradict the rest of Machiavelli's thought, which is anything but mechanistic, on the contrary: he saw his tragic experiences as an expression of the power of fate, and they represented for him a driving force of thought itself. In this sense, fate is not a counterpart to science, but its prerequisite in the spiritual-mental constitution of the

thinking subject. On the other hand, Spirito, p. 39, claims that the concept of *fortuna does* not allow Machiavelli to arrive at a completed science, because if *fortuna* stands in the way, he cannot control and evaluate his experiential material, while at the same time the fluctuations of *fortuna* require the politician to be not only a scientist but also an artist. But Ma chiavelli had not set out to found a science and got bogged down over the concept of fortune; *fortuna* was part of his worldview, along with other fundamental factors. The me chanistic system or the completed science is not hindered by fate, but, as we have seen, by the postu lat of pragmatism, which pervades and forms this causal worldview on its own axes.

[206] Chabod, pp. 292, 297, and 305.

[207] Sasso (1965), pp. 131f., 179 ff. and 202f. Cf. a. Chabod, p. 22.

[208] Meinecke (1963), p. 46 f.

[209] Dilthey, p. 32.

[210] Schmid, p. 37.

[211] Cf. Sasso (1965), p. 247 f.

[212] Cf. Renaudet, p. 179 ff. Polybius also claims that religion is a secular entity whose purpose is to support the state (VI, 56,6-15). But even if Machiavelli did not know Polybius' text, his view on this would not change in anything, because this view was an organic part of the worldview of his time (by the way, this is why, sometimes abruptly, passages in certain authors are highlighted and underlined - not because they were "discovered" for the first time).

[213] Gramsci, pp. 16 and 211, thinks that one can see whether Machiavelli had eco nomic theories and traced his political conceptions back to the corresponding economic conceptions of a system. Now, if it is true that Machiavelli wanted to re-establish a relationship between the countryside and the city and to integrate the peasant class into the state, one must also assume that he discarded his mercantile conceptions and leaned toward agrarian structures. But the methodological premises for such a consideration of a thinker (by projecting the obvious factors of his thought on a general board in order to conclude also all that he did not assert) are weak.

[214] Kanellopoulos (1934), p. 127.

[215] Cf. ibid., p. 21, and Renaudet, p. 137.

[216] For Polybius, class struggles are overcome once and for all in a mixed constitution; for Machiavelli, they are a constant reality and not just an episode, they are elementary, necessary forces. Moreover, Polybius, with his mechanical rationalism, tends to equate the superiority of a culture with the superiority of its constitution, ignoring factors such as leadership, bravery, morality, and the like. But in this way he can

cannot explain why, for example, Rome or Sparta, both of which had mixed constitutions, experienced such different historical fates. Machiavelli, on the other hand, with his dynamic thinking, seeks the difference in the power structure of the two cities and, more specifically, in the degree of popular participation in public affairs. This relationship that Machiavelli places between institutions and social reality "is perhaps the highest achievement of his political >philosophy<." (Sasso (1967), p. 266, see also pp. 238 and 245).

217 Meinecke (1963), p. 50, and (1946), p. 129.

21s Schmid, pp. 19 and 30.

219 Ibid., p. 32: "The popular element ... not the people, but the na **tion."**

220 Macaulay (1947), p. 293, criticizes Machiavelli on the basis of libe ral ideas because he subordinates the individual, the single limb, to the total body and not vice versa.

221 Kofler, p. 178.

222 See Gilbert.

223 Haie (1960), p. 115 f. A nice remark on the change of the artificial leric account of the war after the invasions can be found ibid, S. 106.

224 In his report of 7.12.1509 from Verona, Machiavelli writes that. the Venetians now represent St. Mark with a sword and no longer with a book, because they understood that states cannot assert themselves only with studies and books („... ad tenere li stati non bastono li studi e el' libri."), Villari (1882), p. 106.

225 Mounin, p. 197. The Italian bourgeoisie found the arming of the peasants so nonsensical that Venice, although defended by a more or less spontaneous partisan war of the surrounding peasants against the imperial troops in 1508, steadfastly denied that the city had released the peasants from their oath of allegiance and advised them to defend themselves (ibid., p. 74).

226 See Gilbert on this.

227 Renaudet, p. 188.

228 Schmid, p. 29 f. Cf. a. Kofler, p. 201.

229 Renaudet, p. 143.

23° Kofler, pp. 174 and 192. Cf. also Villari (1882), p. 217 ff.

231 Cf. Sasso (1967), pp. 24 ff., and Gramsci, p. 141.

232 Chabod, p. 217.

m Villari (1883), p. 294 f.

234 Renaudet, p. 290.

235 Bronowski/Mazlish, p. 63. Spirito's view is wrong, p. 64 ff.) the flight into violence is determined by the fact that a prince's life is limited and he consequently has to act as quickly as possible - which would exclude the pursuit of the same goals through long-term reforms and would put reformist historicism in place of revolutionary rationalism. The exist-

tialistic note that this view gives to the ruler is of no use in understanding Machiavelli's thought; Machiavelli wanted above all to correlate the extent of violence with the extent of harm. Equally alien to Machiavelli's thinking is Rusoso's opinion, p. 45 f., that the prince has something ephemeral and phan tastic about him, namely that he is not the product of an objective necessity, but merely a product of Machiavelli's imagination; this results in his mixed tragic-heroic character and also his inhumanity, which thus resembles a desperate attempt at self-affirmation.

[236] Sasso (1967), p. 133.

[237] Meinecke (1963), p. 49.

[238] Sharks (1966), p. 58.

[239] Lord Acton, p. 43.

[240] Mattingly (1964), p. 67.

[241] This is also evident in the famous conspiracy of Morone, the Sforza secretary, who, after the Battle of Pavia, attempted to unite the Italian states against Charles V in the name of national unity and by invoking ancient history. However, this took place behind the scenes and was not a prerequisite for a broad national movement.

[242] Gramsci, p. 90. cf. a. Renaudet, p. 76.

[243] Sharks (1966), p. 20 ff, and Mounin, p. 150 f.

[244] Chabod, p. 64 ff. For evidence that people at that time expected Lorenzo de' Medici to establish a strong kingdom in central Italy, and for evidence of how great the expectations were of this strong man, see Ranke, Supplement, p. 194.

[245] Cf. Sasso (1967), pp. 150 ff.

[246] Cf. Sasso (1965), pp. 264 ff. and 271 f.

[247] Meinecke (1963), p. 76 ff.

[248] Cf. Chabod, p. 111 ff.

[249] Praz, pp. 97-151.

[250] Cf. Meinecke (1963), p. 321 ff.

[251] See Zambelli.

[252] Cf. Meinecke (1963), pp. 409 f. and 426 f.

[253] Characteristic of this nationalistic and patriotic philology is Bollmann's book.

[254] Ranke, p. 201 f.

[255] Gramsci attempted a compromise between socialism and "Machiavellianism. Characteristically, this attempt was made not in terms of the ultimate goals of the socialist movement, but in terms of the political means, the political processes, that he (his party leadership) considered appropriate. The modern ruler, according to Gramsci, p. 5ff, cannot be a person, but only an organism, a complex social element: the political party, which is obliged to develop the collective consciousness, and which becomes the organizer of an intellectual and social movement.

moral change must become. In accordance with the duties of the modern party, he retroactively projects onto Machiavelli the intention to instruct not the prince but the people and to force them to accept a leader, p. 10. The unconscious attitude underlying these ideas is very well shown by the fact that Gramsci is content to borrow the methods from "Machiavellism" without, however, believing that Machiavelli's thought had any relation to the socialist ideal. Thus the relationship between Machiavellianism and socialism becomes one-sided: socialism takes something from Machiavellianism, but not vice versa. Thus, socialism is dependent for its means on something that does not fit its goals at all, and the gap that arises is obvious. As a shadow of the ideal, there remains only the wish that the ruler may not oppress, but convince. Mer leau-Ponty, p. 348 ff, also makes an attempt at a humanistic modernization of Machia vellis with the help of the existentialist dae monologie, without apparently having any direct knowledge of texts other than the *Prince. The* French often forget that chic superficiality is no longer charming at all when it is projected from everyday life onto spiritual themes.

256 See Abramsky, p. 36 ff.

257 Nagy, Imre, *lmre Nagy on Communism,* London 1957, quoted in: Horo witz, p. 267.

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